MAGTF INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION



U.S. Marine Corps

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-1775 **FOREWORD** Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-13, MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination, builds on the doctrinal foundation established in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence and MCWP 2-1, Intelligence Operations by providing the higher order tactics, techniques, and procedures for MAGTF intelligence dissemination. It is designed for intelligence personnel involved with the direction, planning, development and execution of intelligence dissemination, including both MAGTF command element intelligence personnel and commanders/operations staffs of MAGTF units with a primary intelligence collection and/or production mission. MCWP 2-13 describes aspects of MAGTF intelligence dissemination operations and activities including doctrinal fundamentals, responsibilities, dissemination methodologies, command and control, supporting communications and information systems support and architectures, formats for various intelligence dissemination means, dissemination and the common tactical picture, planning and execution. MCWP 2-13 provides the information needed by Marines to understand, plan, execute and improve intelligence dissemination operations in support of the MAGTF. Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS JOHN E. RHODES Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command

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Chapter 1

Intelligence Dissemination Fundamentals

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1001. Introduction to Intelligence Dissemination

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a. Objectives. Intelligence has two objectives: to reduce uncertainty and to assist in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence (CI). The objective of intelligence dissemination within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is to quickly and securely deliver relevant intelligence to tactical commanders and those who need it, in a timely manner and usable format, to satisfy their planning and decisionmaking needs.

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b. The Balance. Effective intelligence dissemination requires that intelligence personnel have exceptional situational awareness not only of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action, but also of friendly missions, the commanders' intent, and concepts of operations. It also requires intelligence personnel to display good judgment. Too much or too little intelligence can adversely affect operations. Successful intelligence dissemination reduces uncertainty and friction, enhances situational awareness, and results in a smarter fighting force on the battlefield.

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c. The Challenge. MAGTF intelligence dissemination requires planning, management, and flexibility for successful execution. With the fielding of numerous operational and intelligencerelated automated systems, as well as the challenges of joint, combined, and allied operations, MAGTF intelligence dissemination has become a complicated endeavor. Yet systems planning alone is not enough. Planning and executing intelligence dissemination is both an art and a science, full of trade-offs and risks. Mastery of intelligence dissemination principles alone will not suffice; these techniques and procedures must be fully integrated with intelligence collection and production, and applied creatively to achieve success.

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Skill and initiative factor into successful MAGTF intelligence dissemination operations. If intelligence personnel have operational and tactical situational awareness, they can overcome deficiencies in the dissemination architecture through personal initiative and perseverence. They will know when a unit or section outside of "normal distribution" needs certain intelligence, use appropriate alternate means of dissemination (when necessary), and make sure the intelligence is disseminated, received and understood.

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1 2 3 1002. Definitions 4 a. Intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 6 analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries 7 or areas. Knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support 8 decision making. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through 9 observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also, in Marine Corps 10 usage, intelligence is knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to 11 support decisionmaking. This knowledge is the result of collection, processing, exploitation, 12 13 evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information about the battlespace and threat. (MCRP 5-12C) 14 15 b. All-Source Intelligence. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that 16 17 incorporate all available sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, 18 and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) 19 20 21 c. Intelligence Requirement (also called IR). Any subject, general or specific, upon which 22 there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to 23 24 which a commander requires to make sound decisions. (MCRP 5-12C) 25 d. Intelligence Dissemination. Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. 26 27 (Joint Pub 1-02) 28 e. Intelligence Requirements Management (IRM). Encompasses the continuous 29 evaluation of the importance of each developed intelligence requirement within the context of 30 the operational mission and enemy activities; the information and assets needed to satisfy each; 31 32 the resources presently committed toward fulfilling these; the supporting command, control, 33 communications and computer (C4) support system for the transmission of information and 34 intelligence; and the degree to which each has been satisfied by completed intelligence 35 activities. (MCWP 2-1) Key components of requirements management are intelligence collection management (ICM), intelligence production management (IPM), and intelligence 36 37 dissemination management (IDM). 38 39

f. Dissemination Management -- Involves establishing dissemination priorities, selection of dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination management is to deliver the required intelligence to the appropriate user in proper form at the right time while ensuring that individual consumers and the dissemination system are not overloaded by attempting to move unneeded or irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls which do

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1 2 3	not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting intelligence sources and methods. (MCRP 5-12)
4 5 6 7 8 9	g. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. NOTE: CCIRs are normally divided into three primary subcategories: priority intelligence requirements; friendly force information requirements; and essential elements of friendly information. (MCRP 5-12C)
10 11 12 13 14 15	h. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. (MCRP 5-12C)
16	1003. Overview of MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	a. General. Dissemination involves establishing dissemination priorities, selecting dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination management is to deliver the required intelligence to all appropriate users in the proper forms, at the right times, while ensuring that individual users and the dissemination systems are not overloaded by irrelevant intelligence and information. Dissemination also provides for use of security controls that do not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while providing appropriate protection of intelligence sources and methods.
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34	The dissemination system must ensure sufficient streamlined communiations and information systems (CIS) connectivity with all supporting intelligence resources and be integrated with internal intelligence as well as the broader operational command and control (C2) structure. From national and theater echelons, throughout the joint force and the MAGTF, all-source intelligence pertinent to tactical operations must be identified, quickly retrieved, processed, tailored to the supported echelon, and ultimately made available to planners and decisionmakers at all MAGTF command echelons in time to be of value to their operations.
35 36	b. Intelligence Dissemination and Intelligence Functions. In providing support to the commander, MAGTF intelligence operations must support six specific intelligence functions:
37 38 39 40 41 42 43	 Support to the commander's estimate Situation development Indications and warning (I&W) Support to force protection Support to targeting Support to combat assessment

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Intelligence dissemination is vital to all these functions, for intelligence is meaningless unless it reaches the right people in time to affect the decisionmaking process and in a form that is understandable. (MCWP 2-1) Whether disseminated electronically, by hard copy, verbally, or via courier, effective intelligence dissemination provides intelligence to all users in a timely fashion.

c. Intelligence Dissemination within the Intelligence Cycle. The process used to develop intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. (See figure 1-1) The intelligence cycle consists of six sequential yet interdependent steps: planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; production; dissemination; and utilization.

Dissemination is equal in importance to any other intelligence cycle activity. Without dissemination, commanders do not receive the intelligence products needed for the planning and execution of operations. During MAGTF operations, intelligence dissemination must be planned for and supervised *to the same degree* as collection, processing and production to ensure that intelligence operations and intelligence support are successful.

2.5

Planning and Direction

Collection

Processing and Exploitation

Production

Figure 1-1. The Intelligence Cycle

d. Basic Dissemination Management Process

(1) General. Intelligence dissemination management is the process that helps identify and validate intelligence dissemination requirements, prioritizes these, determines effective

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means for acquiring information and previously produced intelligence to help satisfy these, and develops and supervises internal intelligence dissemination and CIS operations executed to accomplish this. First, intelligence dissemination must be done in an integrated manner with intelligence collection and intelligence production management, all within the framework of intelligence requirements management. Then, beyond its critical tie to requirements management, dissemination requires the skills and flexibility mentioned earlier - for even the best planning cannot predict with certainty who will need what across all aspects of the operation.

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> (2) Requirements Management. Requirements management planning is the first step in dissemination planning. In MAGTF intelligence operations, intelligence collection, production, and dissemination all flow out of an integrated intelligence planning and direction process that is built upon IR management. Each IR will generally have an associated intelligence collection requirement (ICR), intelligence production requirement (IPR), and intelligence dissemination requirement (IDR). (See figure 1-2.)



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


Figure 1-2. Requirements Satisfaction

For more discussion of requirements management, see chapter three of this publication and MCWP 2-1 Intelligence Operations, chapter three.

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2	(3) Dissemination Management Functions. There are two distinct functions within
3	dissemination management: dissemination requirements management; and dissemination
4	operations management. Dissemination requirements managements defines what intelligence
5	will be disseminated and who needs it, and dissemination operations management specifies how
6	the intelligence will be disseminated. They are considered separately to better understand their
7	objectives, but in practice the distinction between them often disappears.
8	
9	(a) Dissemination Requirements Management. Dissemination requirements
10	management is driven by the dissemination strategy, which incorporates commander's intent,
11	PIRs, IRs, concept of operations and requests for intelligence (RFIs). Developing a
12	dissemination strategy ahead of time pays dividends by familiarizing personnel with which
13	intelligence products will be disseminated by what means, describing alternate means of
14	dissemination, and providing all MAGTF users with information they need to ensure they have
15	the right dissemination SOP, architecture and training.
16	
17	(b) Dissemination Operations Management
18	
19	(1) Means. Delivery of the intelligence product to MAGTF users is directly related
20	to the choice of the means used to disseminate that product. Dissemination is managed by
21	using a combination of methods (supply-push and demand-pull), channels (standard and alarm),
22	and modes (broadcast and point-to-point) to convey the product to users. These means are
23	discussed in detail in paragraph 1005.
24	
25	(2) Architectures. How the intelligence is disseminated is a function of the status
26	of dissemination systems (both automated and manual) and alternate means. The functioning
27	of MAGTF CIS circuits, such as Marine Expeditonary Force (MEF) radio nets and Secret
28	Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) connectivity, are the responsibility of the CIS
29	officer (G/S-6); dedicated intelligence systems vary in who is responsible for their operation.
30	
31	(3) Responsibility. Regardless of the status of intelligence dissemination CIS
32	support and connectivity, the intelligence officer is responsible for timely dissemination of
33	critical intelligence. Intelligence personnel must be able to quickly and reasonably determine
34	how and to whom to disseminate critical intelligence when planned dissemination flow is
35	degraded or interrupted.
36	
37	Dissemination requirements management and dissemination operations management are
38	performed at all levels of the intelligence community. At the MAGTF command element (CE)
39	it is coordinated by the intelligence battalion in accordance with the MAGTF G/S-2's direction.
40	However, each element of the MAGTF performs dissemination management functions. Each
41	unit interacts with levels above and below, and among units, organizations, and agencies on the
42	same level. The further up the chain of command, the broader the perspective and scope of
13	responsibility: the lower, the more specific the function and parrow the scope

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2	(4) Dissemination Process. Integrating intelligence dissemination efforts with those of
3	collection, processing, and production is an ongoing process. Dissemination planning and
4	direction begins with the receipt of an IR and encompasses the following series of steps,
5	discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4 of this publication:
6	
7	 Identification of IRs
8	 Determination of dissemination priorities and forms
9	Selection of means to deliver intelligence
10	 Allocation of resources
11	• Intelligence dissemination
12	Monitoring the flow of intelligence
13	
14	
15	1004. Principles of Intelligence Dissemination
16	
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18	
19	In order for intelligence to be of value to tactical commanders, it must meet the following
20	basic dissemination requirements:
21	·
22	Pertinence, Usability of Form, Timeliness, and Security.
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24	
25	
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27	The company of the co
28	a. Pertinence. The dissemination system must provide the flexibility to use a <i>supply-push</i>
29	system (which pushes important or time-sensitive intelligence directly to users), while also
30	permitting users to demand-pull other relevant intelligence as needed from readily accessible
31	sources, such as a database or a watch section at an intelligence center.
32	
33	(1) Requirements. Relevant intelligence must be disseminated to all units or agencies
34	that require it. Determining who gets what is the real "art" part of dissemination. It gets back
35	to identified IRs, which necessitates thorough knowledge and understanding of user needs and
	to identified IRs, which necessitates thorough knowledge and understanding of user needs and missions based on the current situation, commanders' intent, and PIRs. In short, intelligence
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35 36	to identified IRs, which necessitates thorough knowledge and understanding of user needs and missions based on the current situation, commanders' intent, and PIRs. In short, intelligence must be tailored to the needs of the commander/planner.
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35 36 37 38	to identified IRs, which necessitates thorough knowledge and understanding of user needs and missions based on the current situation, commanders' intent, and PIRs. In short, intelligence must be tailored to the needs of the commander/planner.
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35 36 37 38 39 40 41	to identified IRs, which necessitates thorough knowledge and understanding of user needs and missions based on the current situation, commanders' intent, and PIRs. In short, intelligence must be tailored to the needs of the commander/planner. Intelligence personnel must know and understand each user's PIRs and other IRs; however, being tactically aware is equally important. PIR lists will not cover all the bases of intelligence needs: they just can't. These requirements are a minimum, and they change. Tactical judgment

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(2) Intelligence and Information. Intelligence is not simply another term for information. Intelligence is more than an element of data or a grouping of information; it is a body of knowledge. There is a clear and important distinction between raw data, information, and intelligence. To be considered intelligence, data must be placed in context to provide an accurate and meaningful image of the hostile situation.

Intelligence staffs process acquired information into usable intelligence, tailor the product for consumers, and disseminate it. The guiding principle is to disseminate *intelligence*, not simply *information*, to supported decisionmakers. *However*:

Disseminating information, not just intelligence, is important. Because of their highly perishable or critical nature, combat data (derived from reporting by operational units) and sensor data are sometimes used to effect decisions without being converted into intelligence, especially in support of target acquisition operations. A caution: this type of data and information is not evaluated intelligence. Thus, this area has the potential for overreactive targeting, since it may lead to immediate operational reaction based on information, not processed intelligence. Like other critical flash warnings, combat and sensor data may later be explained in ways other than the original assumption. Additionally, this type of information has the potential to be over-disseminated. Operational rules of engagement must match the command's reactive targeting policy. The G/S-2 must coordinate closely with the G/S-3 (for responsibilities) and the G/S-6 (for bandwidth, connectivity, and time-sensitivity aspects) to develop procedures for these issues

Additionally, crisis situations may preclude some or all of the normal filtering process.
 Filtering is a responsibility shared among intelligence collectors, producers and disseminators, as well as among intelligence and other warfighting functional personnel.

When time-sensitive crisis situations preclude deliberate intelligence processing and necessitate dissemination of untailored intelligence or unevaluated information, intelligence personnel must ensure that tactical commanders are aware that they are receiving unevaluated intelligence.

(3) **Downward Dissemination.** *Generally, dissemination downward should be selective.* Units should not receive irrelevant intelligence or voluminous amounts of information which tie up their communication channels. This is especially valid in the case of dissemination to lower tactical units whose capabilities for processing and producing information are relatively limited. However, broad dissemination which results in the occasional delivery of intelligence to a unit to which it is not pertinent is preferable to selective dissemination in which units may

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fail to receive

available intelligence when they need it. *If doubt exists, disseminate the intelligence.* Just be sure to minimize the doubt factor through good situational awareness and tactical judgment.

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(4) Upward and Lateral Dissemination. Conversely, greater quantities of intelligence are generally disseminated upward and laterally because the pertinence of intelligence to such units/echelons may be broadly affected by a change in the situation. This is particularly true for intelligence regarding battle damage assessment (BDA), that of potential value to future operations, and that critical to exploitation of threat vulnerabilities requiring immediate higher headquarters' operational decisions and actions. An item of intelligence which is not needed by a particular unit at a given time may prove pertinent to it later or may be extremely important to an adjacent or senior unit. Again, if doubt exists as to whether to disseminate an item, disseminate the intelligence.

(5) General Guidance. Satisfying the pertinence attribute requires intelligence Marines to master two general challenges:

(a) Situational Awareness and Current IR Priorities. First, they must maintain constant and accurate awareness of the operational situation and of current intelligence requirements priorities. In doing so, they must avoid a natural tendency to focus solely upon their own command echelon's requirements and activities, to the neglect of the broader force --particularly those of subordinate and lateral units.

 (b) CIS System Status Awareness. Second, they must stay current on the status of the supporting CIS: which links and networks are operational; which are being excessively taxed; which are available for immediate time-sensitive needs; how all users can be reached quickly when required; etc. By doing so, their ability to anticipate situations within a dynamic operational environment enhances responsiveness and improves the ability to disseminate specific intelligence to those for whom it is relevant.

b. Usability of Form. Disseminated intelligence must be in a form suitable for immediate use by the recipient and should be tailored as much as possible for the intended consumer. The tactical commander should be able to quickly identify and apply relevant intelligence without additional analysis or manipulation. Standard formats, such as the intelligence estimate, intelligence studies, briefings, reports, etc., must be established, understood, and practiced by intelligence personnel and users. When appropriate, intelligence personnel should limit textual data and employ graphics to reflect and disseminate intelligence. This helps convey an accurate image of the battlespace or threat to the decisionmaker in a form that aids his rapid understanding of the intelligence. It's important to remember, however, that different units and echelons have different capabilities and requirements – e.g., some may prefer having access to datastreams and databases (instead of graphics).

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Dissemination methods, channels, modes and forms will vary according to the situation, the location of the recipient, the urgency of the intelligence, the complexity or nature of the intelligence, the disseminating and receiving intelligence sections' capabilities, and the available dissemination means.

Written documents -- intelligence estimates, OPLAN/OPORD annexes, studies and reports are useful for general dissemination of large amounts of intelligence to many users,
 particularly within larger organizations (when time is not critical and when deliberate
 planning is possible) and for all organizations in support of specified wartime contingency
 planning.

Messages -- both textual and voice -- may be effective for either routine or time-critical
situations, particularly if restricted to a single intelligence subject, issue, or action. It is
important, however, that formats be standardized and understood by all – particularly if
abbreviations or codes are used to aid with brevity.

Oral briefings -- especially when built around a situation map and focused supporting
graphics and imagery -- are often used during deliberate planning as well as during dynamic
and time-sensitive operations, and are the norm for intelligence dissemination to the
immediate commander and his staff.

Automated technologies and "information systems" -- are advancing opportunities for intelligence personnel at all command echelons to employ capabilities such as demand-pull, video-teleconferencing and enhanced graphical techniques to access broad intelligence community resources that incorporate each of the previous methodologies. The increasing use of world-wide web (www) like technologies is one such example.

c. Timeliness. Intelligence must be disseminated in time to influence planning, decisionmaking and execution or it is worthless. In particular, fast dissemination of critical, time-sensitive intelligence and related information is vital. Timely intelligence concerning enemy capabilities and intentions is critical to the formulation of sound tactical decisions and, ultimately, to mission success. The commander's intent, once formulated, guides intelligence staffs in identifying PIRs and anticipating future IRs. A continuous interaction between intelligence and operations personnel and access to intelligence organizations, systems and products assists in the performance of effective intelligence dissemination.

(1) Factors Influencing Timely Dissemination. Many factors influence intelligence timeliness. The sheer volume of intelligence reporting, especially in a crisis, can sometimes degrade the performance of available intelligence communication networks and overwhelm

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scarce analytical resources. Distance, mobility and terrain factors often limit available CIS 1 2 options, such as automated wide area networks (WANs), thereby increasing reliance upon less effective single channel radio and courier methods. Other factors include the communications 3 means available; the quality of the intelligence (i.e., acquired information usually needs some level of analysis before it can be of use to recipients); the quantity and quality of intelligence previously disseminated; and the need to properly reformat certain intelligence products (in 6 user-friendly formats) before they can be further disseminated. Additionally, a heightened tempo usually produces a greater quantity of IRs and a larger customer base than normal. 8 Finally, hardware and software requirements may pose interoperability or security problems -10 especially in joint or multinational operations.

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(2) **Date Desired (DATEDES).** Date-time-group of when the requester requires the intelligence product.

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(3) Latest Time Intel of Value (LTIOV). LTIOV should be designated in cases where the intelligence value of intelligence collection would still be of use even if received after the specified date desired. LTIOVs should be written into PIRs for incorporation into dissemination operations planning and management.

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(4) Planning Factors. Intelligence dissemination plans and procedures must incorporate:

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- IDR priorities, to include integrated linkage with ICRs and IPRs.
- Preferred intelligence product formats (e.g., by unit or staff section).
 - Primary and alternate communication means with all supported units.
 - Routine and time-sensitive means and responsibilities.
 - Procedures to positively verify that the intelligence has been received by the intended recipients.

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Intelligence dissemination should be preplanned, tailored and automated to the degree possible. Back-up plans and manual means of dissemination must also be developed and planned for. To ensure quality dissemination, intelligence personnel should tailor intelligence for specific recipients as much as possible – based on unit mission. Finally, if critical information is received that will affect operations, it should be passed on immediately without processing. Do not sacrifice timeliness to allow more analysis if the intelligence may be critical!

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(5) Improving Timely Dissemination. To improve timely intelligence dissemination:

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Assign priorities to intelligence requiring dissemination.

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- Target specific recipients for each intelligence product.
- Reduce volume.

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- Develop well-defined procedures that are understood by all.
- Train

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d. Security. There will always be a trade-off/tension between security and dissemination.
 Intelligence should be disseminated by any system available that provides adequate
 information security. This includes secure communications such as voice, facsimile, radio,
 video, teletype, wire, computer, and the VHF/UHF/SATCOM links. The purpose of
 transmitting intelligence securely is to preclude the enemy from knowing the sources and
 effectiveness of MAGTF intelligence operations and then altering his actions or strengthening
 his counterintelligence (CI) efforts.

Security extends beyond simply the intelligence battlespace activity. It must be planned for and integrated with the full scope of current and future command security program activities: operations, information, communications, personnel and physical security. The goal is simple: keep the enemy from exploiting any friendly security vulnerability in a manner that allows him to gain planning, decisionmaking and operational tempo advantages over ours.

 (1) Available Secure Tools. The majority of tactical communications and information systems used today have integral or supporting features that provide sufficient security protection. For more restricted operational (e.g., focal point) or sensitive compartmented information (SCI) communications, detailed procedures exist that allow for sanitization and timely broader dissemination whenever necessary. Accordingly, the principal security challenge that may be faced during tactical or crisis situations is when events occur which disrupt or degrade these unit CIS, necessitating a potential trade-off between security and dissemination. Similarly, the increasing frequency of multinational operations raises an additional dissemination challenge regarding the sharing of intelligence among allied and coalition forces.

(2) Considerations. Tailored intelligence will be disseminated via the best means available consistent with the operational situation. Although by nature most intelligence will be classified, even some unclassified intelligence may require security protection due to operational security considerations. Resolving these challenges will be situationally dependent—there is no rule of thumb covering all possibilities. Relevant factors to consider include:

- The enemy's own intelligence collection, processing and dissemination capabilities.

Phase of the operation's planning or execution.
Significance of current intelligence gaps, particularly at lower tactical units.

 How the intelligence may support the dynamic and timely exploitation of threat vulnerabilities and tactical opportunities.

(3) Urgent Situations. The standing principle is to use secure dissemination methods whenever possible. However, if doubt exists and the situation and intelligence are timesensitive, disseminate the intelligence via any available means! In such cases, immediately inform the unit security manager and intelligence officer, who will then assess any possible damage and initiate necessary remedial corrective actions.

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1005. Intelligence Dissemination Modes. Delivery of tailored intelligence products and other support to the right people in a timely manner is directly related to the means of dissemination. Within the MAGTF, no single way of disseminating will be satisfactory for all recipients and for all situations -- a combination of *methods, channels, modes and forms* are planned, managed and employed to accomplish the intelligence dissemination goal.

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a. Dissemination Methods

There are two basic methods used to disseminate intelligence: <u>Supply-Push</u> and <u>Demand-Pull</u>. The key factors influencing which dissemination mode is chosen are: supported PIR/IR, timeliness, recipient, and format. Intelligence planners must develop and implement intelligence dissemination plans with the flexibility to exploit either methodology, <u>pushing</u> time-sensitive intelligence directly to users while simultaneously allowing them to <u>pull</u> other intelligence as needed.

(1) **Supply-Push.** The supply-push method disseminates intelligence as it becomes available (or on a schedule) from the intelligence collector/producer down to selected users to satisfy their IRs or to relay other relevant intelligence information (e.g., status update on planned intelligence collection operations). This method is said to be "need-driven" -- the delivery of intelligence is triggered by the availability of that intelligence and understanding of its need by specific users.

and updates to schedules, distribution lists, databases or overlays. Electronic and hardcopy messages, e-mail, voice, and fax are used to disseminate supply-push intelligence.

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Advantages. The key advantage is that users do not have to initiate requests to receive intelligence support or products.

Disadvantages. Its key disadvantage is the potential for information overload -- either of the CIS support architecture or of the user's ability to process a large amount of intelligence in a timely manner. Thus, for supply-push methods, the disseminator must strive to tailor the intelligence to specific users, and not simply broadcast it to a large audience. Likewise, users should take themselves off distribution for intelligence products they don't need.

(3) **Demand-Pull.** This method seeks to exploit technological improvements by giving users either direct electronic access to intelligence databases, files, servers or other intelligence products and repositories through detailed search or inquiry procedures, or via direct queries to intelligence planners' and producers' watch sections, such as the MEF's Production and Analysis (P&A) Cell or, through reachback, to the Joint Intellience Center (JIC).

Demand-pull dissemination also results from unanticipated needs by a commander and his staff and can flow up, down, or laterally through the G-2 intelligence and CIS architectures. This type of dissemination occurs primarily when there is a need by a lower command echelon to access intelligence archives at higher headquarters--such as databases and technical files maintained at JICs and the P&A Cell--for amplifying intelligence to support its planning activities, such as basic/descriptive intelligence or technical information. It also, however, may be employed by higher echelons to satisfy IRs when the amplifying data can best be acquired from subordinate units.

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standard times (such as INTSUMs, DISUMS, and weather reports) can be efficiently disseminated via the MAGTF intelligence website, with hardcopy/courier dissemination as the alternate means. Most often, intelligence products and data are posted on a computer server for users to view, then download as needed. Examples of demand-pull dissemination means include INTELINK, image product library (IPL) servers, websites and databases. CIS connectivity may be either the standard MAGTF tactical data network (TDN) or by dedicated intelligence CIS.

Examples. Standard intelligence reports and products scheduled for release at

Advantages. The advantage of demand-pull dissemination is that it may significantly reduce the volume of intelligence being transmitted through the MAGTF TDN, particularly regarding intelligence with no immediate influence on the current battle. Further, it allows users to better employ their intelligence processing and production capabilities by reducing their receipt of superfluous intelligence products. It also contributes to the preparation of better tailored products for the commander.

Disadvantages. Demand-pull intelligence dissemination can be more timeconsuming than supply-push modes. Its main disadvantage, however, is that intelligence timeliness may be degraded in that the user may not receive critical intelligence until he after he has initiated a request for it. Additionally, the generally more limited area of interest (AOI) of lower echelon units may lead to situations where they are ignorant of available intelligence of value to future operations. Finally, users must know in advance where all desired intelligence products may be accessed in order to support immediate use.

b. Channels

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Intelligence is disseminated using two types of channels: Standard and Alarm.


Standard Channels. Standard dissemination consists of a transmission of intelligence down and laterally through the chain of command according to a set order and format. It is used for routine intelligence dissemination (to maintain and share situational awareness and current intelligence of the battlespace) and is the channel used for the majority of dissemination requirements. Dissemination generally occurs on a regular schedule or intervals. Examples of standard intelligence dissemination include studies, reports, routine message intelligence summaries and formal staff briefings. Standard dissemination employs normal MAGTF command and staff channels and the supporting CIS.

(2) Alarm Channels. Alarm channel dissemination is used for critical, time-sensitive intelligence that can have an immediate effect on operations. This type of dissemination has

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no set format or schedule and activates only when critical intelligence is received that requires immediate decision or action, and thus rapid dissemination. When an alarm-triggering event occurs, intelligence must go to the units or sections most affected by the most direct means possible, even if it means skipping echelons of command. CIS connectivity may be either the standard MAGTF CIS architecture or by dedicated intelligence CIS. Because alarm intelligence is time-sensitive, dissemination should include a means for verifying receipt and understanding. Intelligence operations reporting criteria and supporting dissemination procedures must ensure that filters and thresholds for alarm-triggering events are developed, understood, and practiced in advance. Effectively disseminating intelligence via alarm channels requires:

- Detailed intelligence collection, production and reporting direction.
- Broad MAGTF CIS knowledge.
- Frequent multi-echelon training (to include other service and joint organizations).
- Training for intelligence, operations and unit personnel operating CIS systems to improve their ability to immediately recognize, act upon received intelligence, and disseminate it.



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Figure 1-3. Intelligence Dissemination Channels

c. Dissemination Modes. Intelligence is disseminated via one of two modes: *Broadcast or Point-to-Point*.

(1) **Broadcast Mode.** When using the broadcast mode, intelligence that affects the majority of units is disseminated simultaneously to a broad audience. Common examples are the dissemination of the initial MAGTF intelligence estimate developed during contingency planning, or the dissemination of an I&W report of an enemy surface-to-surface missile launch. Successful use of broadcast modes depends upon several factors: judicious selection of what intelligence is disseminated; the ability of all pertinent users to monitor the broadcast; and as technology improves and new systems are fielded, the availability of a processing methodology to filter and select for detailed examination only that intelligence pertinent to user requirements. This mode offers the advantage of improving dissemination timeliness, but only if used with discipline, due to the risk of overloading MAGTF CIS pathways or burdening lower units' intelligence processing capabilities.

(2) Point-to-Point Mode. In the point-to-point mode, intelligence is disseminated to a specific user(s), normally in response to previously stated IRs. From there it may be further disseminated by users to others as appropriate. Although this mode is generally slower than the broadcast mode, it allows for more intelligence focus and tailoring to specific user needs in that each recipient acts as a sort of control mechanism, filtering and integrating intelligence prior to disseminating it further, thereby reducing information overload of others with unnecessary intelligence. Conversely, this very control mechanism adds another risk as the intelligence

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meaning may become distorted as it is conveyed from one command to another. Examples of point-to-point modes include e-mail, voice radio or telephone, and courier. When a secure WAN or local area network (LAN) is operational, a majority of intelligence disseminated between the MEF and its major subordinate commands (MSCs) may be via email. Below the MSC level, the majority of point-to-point dissemination is done either by radio, wire communiations or courier.




Figure 1-4. Intelligence Dissemination Modes

d. Dissemination Forms

Intelligence may be disseminated in a variety of forms. Formats may be either standalone or employed in combination with each other, and are categorized as: <u>Verbal</u>, <u>Documents</u>, <u>Electronic</u>, or <u>Graphical</u>.

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The most suitable format for intelligence dissemination depends primarily on the needs of the commanders and planners, the nature and urgency of the intelligence and the means available to convey the information. Which is most suitable depends primarily on the user's requirements -- which the unit intelligence officer should always consciously consider and specify whenever stating an intelligence production and/or intelligence dissemination requirement.

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


Figure 1-5. Intelligence Dissemination Forms

(1) Verbal. Examples include dissemination via radio or telephone; face-to-face, such as during formal or informal intelligence briefings or the constant intelligence/commander/staff personal interaction; or a more recent combination of these in the form of video-teleconferencing. The primary benefit of verbal formats is timeliness (both in getting the information to the user, and by the disseminator having immediate positive verification of delivery) and the possibility for immediate feedback or questioning, particularly during fast-developing situations. Additionally, it can enhance communication in that many more subtle factors -- tone of voice, inflection, facial expressions, body language, gestures -- may convey deeper meaning and understanding than the words alone could. Disadvantages of verbal formats are difficulty in conveying and ensuring understanding (particularly if the subject is complicated) concurrently to a large audience; and the risk that the recipient may assume understanding, when in fact he does not, and fail to ask questions or seek necessary clarification.

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Intelligence briefings are used extensively to provide both background and situation data and can range in scope from fairly lengthy and complex presentations of technical data to one-minute enemy situation and order-of-battle updates. Dissemination is tailored. Audiences may also range from one person to hundreds of people. Briefings usually provide personal interface with those most in need of the the intelligence presented--often generating better PIRs and additional IRs--but time constraints may preclude optimal preparation periods. Dissemination is tailored and often limited

Briefings

(2) **Documents.** Much intelligence is disseminated broadly via documents, which themselves may take many forms: plans, studies, analyses, estimates, assessments, reports, and electronic messages. Advantages include the ability to deal comprehensively, whether broadly or with a narrow focus, with complex subjects and those requiring broad dissemination; the ability to logically organize the intelligence in a manner conducive to user needs (e.g., basic summary up front, with detailed amplifying annexes and appendices as necessary); and their usability as a ready reference source, particularly during deliberate or contingency planning. The chief disadvantages are that these may quickly become obsolete, particularly once operations have commenced; they require a large commitment of time and other resources to develop; they lack immediate collector/producer/user personal interaction; and they are difficult to rapidly and broadly disseminate during tactical operations (whether hardcopy or electronic message documents).

Intelligence Estimates and Studies

Intelligence estimates and studies are normally written in peacetime or during the planning phase of potential operations. They are used to convey large amounts of background intelligence and other information to a wide audience when the need for such is not time-critical.

(3) Electronic. The first broadly available electronic formats were primarily technological modifications of traditional intelligence documents and graphical product formats. A very basic example is leveraging automated tactical local and wide area networks for coordinating intelligence requirements and disseminating intelligence throughout a MAGTF. More sophisticated examples include recently fielded and emerging specially designated intelligence systems, such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS), which incorporate a broad variety of intelligence capabilities: transmission and managing of stated intelligence requirements; secondary imagery dissemination; multi-user access to common intelligence databases; and archiving and analytical exploitation of intelligence messages, files, target folders and other products. Additionally, improved near-real-time connectivity between intelligence collectors, producers and users highlights the principal advantage of electronic dissemination formats -- significantly greater

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access throughout the MAGTF to organic and external intelligence capabilities.

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(a) Reports

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Intelligence reports and summaries are normally used to broadcast information electronically to a wide audience in order to update a current situation or subject of interest. Types can range from terrorist updates for travelers in peacetime to battlefield INTSUMS, INTREPs, and SALUTE reports. Normally released according to a predetermined time schedule, reports continuously "refresh" databases but may lag in timeliness during a fast-moving crisis or battle.

Reports

- (b) Databases. Intelligence-related databases are major elements in MAGTF push/pull automated dissemination. The principal threat and environmental databases will be maintained within the intelligence battalion's Production and Analysis (P&A) Cell with the MEF CE. Additionally, subordinate units generally will establish and maintain their own databases, tailored to their units' intelligence needs. Major issues include user access, information updates, administration and maintenance responsibilities, their integration with other unit and pertinent external databases (e.g., operation, CSS), and available communication connectivity and capabilities.
- (c) Sensor Data and Information Streams. The G/S-2, G/S-3 and G/S-6 must coordinate on information management and dissemination issues. This refers to the potential dissemination of intelligence information (e.g., UAV video footage) directly from a collector to a targeting or operational node (perhaps via an intelligence operations node). Both tactical advantages and risks must be considered.
- (d) Common Operational Picture (COP) and Common Tactical Picture (CTP). Successful migration of current capabilities to facilitiate a COP and CTP among units will improve operational interoperability, reliability and flexibility. For the near term, COP/CTP is still an evolving concept. A common operational database, which effectively combines visual and integration tools, is still needed: once configured and built, COP/CTP will become more real. The pace of technological and operating changes requires the following:
 - Comprehensive intelligence individual and unit collective training in order to fully exploit these capabilities.
 - Development of integrated and interoperable multi-force MAGTF, naval, and joint C4I doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).
 - Multi-force exercise of these capabilities under realistic field operating conditions.

The MAGTF CE should be responsible for maintaining and disseminating the COP, which involves both friendly and enemy information. The MAGTF G/S-2 should receive inputs from

MCWP 2-13, MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination

	COORDINATING DRAFT
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1	the MSCs via the IAS (SPOTREPs, etc.) analyze them, and produce and disseminate the enemy
2	situation portion of the COP via the designated system(s) [Intelligence Operations
3	Workstation (IOW), IAS, JDISS]. One major challenge is in determining the extent to which
4	subordinate units need to/should control their own view of the battlefield. Additionally, data
5	aggregation problems abound regarding a group picture. Other issues to be resolved include:
6	
7	• Which different units should be designated "ground truth" disseminators for various
8	sectors.
9	How to accomplish COP/CTP track management. (Disseminating redundant tracks)
0	will quickly run the automated systems low on memory.)
1	 How to manage one COP database.
2	How to pull a tailored picture from the MEF CE intelligence databases for use by
3	subordinate units.
4	 Details on how to input intelligence information on the CTP in a visual format

Joint and multi-service intelligence standardization.

(4) Graphical Products. Examples include maps, overlays, annotated imagery, topographic products such as terrain models, simple graphics used to support intelligence briefs, and new and more sophisticated graphical capabilities and techniques that promise great improvement to combat readiness and operations. The chief benefit of graphical dissemination formats is that they may be assimilated and understood by people more quickly than textuallybased formats. However, like with electronic dissemination formats, effective use of graphical product dissemination requires functional training, development of integrated multi-force standards and procedures, and realistic operational practice and evaluation of these. Additionally, while graphics may be useful for targeting and mission planning, textual grid coordinates are essential. Finally, graphics alone risk users assuming information that may not be accurate: thus, in most cases intelligence disseminated via graphics must be reinforced with supporting documents or other products.

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Graphics

Graphics, such as those used in map enhancements or contained in annotated imagery, portray vast amounts of intelligence in a condensed form more easily interpreted by the human mind. When appropriate, they should be incorporated in all forms of intelligence production and dissemination.

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1006. Overview of MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination Capabilities and Challenges

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a. MAGTF CE Dissemination. The MEF's intelligence battalion collection management/dissemination (CMD) section provides the core C2 for MEF intelligence dissemination operations by developing and coordinating the dissemination plan and reporting

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1	criteria. The Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell (SARC) executes reporting criteria. The
2	P&A Cell receives collected intelligence data and information, analyzes it, produces intelligence
3	products, and executes dissemination criteria. Key CIS resources required include IAS and JDISS,
4	with access to the full range of MAGTF communications [JWICS, SIPRNET, NIPRNET
5	(nonsecure), Defense Switched Network (DSN), etc.] for external dissemination; and IAS via
6	the tactical data network (TDN) and other MAGTF communications resources for internal
7	dissemination.
8	L. I. A I. MA CITE D'
9	b. Internal MAGTF Dissemination. Within the MAGTF, especially for dissemination
10	between the CE and MSCs, the IAS, the IOW, and MAGTF TDN are the key tools for
11	electronic dissemination. IAS will be available at all command echelons down to the maneuver
12	battalion/squadron levels. Communications connectivity between the MAGTF CE and its MSE
13	HQs are predominantly provided by SATCOM, supplemented where practical with HF/UHF
14 15	radios, troposcatter multi-channel radio systems, telephone systems and couriers.
16	c. External Dissemination. The MAGTF CE will attempt to exploit all available external
17	capabilities (national, theater, JTF, etc.) to satisfy its IRs. Each dissemination supporting
18	database, specialized system, and team from the various intelligence agencies and DOD
19	organizations has specific connectivity and procedural requirements. These must be planned
20	for and coordinated extensively through the J-2 and J-6, or MARFOR headquarters (as
21	appropriate).
22	appropriate).
23	d. MSC Level and Below. Connectivity to the regiment/group level is principally via the
24	TDN, single-channel radio, various multichannel radio resources, telephones and couriers.
25	Finally, communications connectivity below the regiment/group level depends principally on
26	single channel radio primarily designed for voice traffic, with limited range and limited data
27	capacities (1.2 Kbps to 16 Kbps). Although these units possess tactical data systems, their
28	ability to exchange data traffic is limited due to the far less available bandwidth.
29	activity to entertaining chain training to the fact to
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Chapter 2 1 2 **Intelligence Dissemination Responsibilities** 3 4

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2001. General. Developing the capabilities and executing the operations to satisfy the wide variety of MAGTF intelligence dissemination requirements is an extremely difficult challenge that requires extensive planning, cooperation, coordination, flexibility, situational awareness, and perseverence. This chapter addresses the major dissemination roles and responsibilities of key operational and all-source intelligence personnel within the MAGTF.

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2002. Commander. The commander is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities of the command. Although he may delegate specific authority to subordinates to assist in the performance of intelligence functions, the commander remains fully responsible for supervising all delegated activities. The commander controls the direction of intelligence by:

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Establishing intelligence priorities (PIRs) that serve as guideposts for intelligence dissemination activities.

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Identifying desired forms for dissemination.

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 Establishing command and control and supporting CIS priorities and allocating resources accordingly.

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• Monitoring and evaluating the overall effectiveness of intelligence dissemination operations.

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• Ensuring the effective use of intelligence in unit planning and decision making.

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2003. MEF Command Element G-2 Section and the Intelligence Battalion

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37 38 a. Assistant Chief of Staff (AC/S), G-2. The AC/S G-2 has staff responsibility for intelligence and intelligence operations, to include intelligence dissemination. The commander relies on the intelligence officer to provide the necessary information on the weather, terrain, and enemy capabilities, status, and intentions. Through the intelligence operations plan and supporting intelligence and reconnaissance and surveillance plans, the AC/S G-2 plans and coordinates intelligence priorities; integrates collection, production and dissemination; allocates resources; assigns specific missions to subordinate elements; and supervises the overall intelligence and reconnaissance efforts. Specific dissemination responsibilities include:

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 Developing and answering outstanding MEF and subordinate units' PIRs and IRs by planning, directing, integrating, and supervising organic multi-discipline MEF and supporting intelligence operations.

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• Preparing appropriate intelligence dissemination plans and orders for the MEF and reviewing and coordinating the all-source intelligence dissemination plans of JTFs, theaters, and other organizations.

• Submitting and coordinating all-source collection, production, and dissemination requirements beyond the capability of the MEF to satisfy to higher headquarters for JTF, theater, or national systems support.

• Ensuring intelligence information is rapidly processed, analyzed, and incorporated where appropriate in all-source intelligence products, and rapidly disseminated to all MEF and external units requiring these.

• Evaluating JTF, theater, and national intelligence dissemination support and coordinating changes if necessary.

• Identifying and correcting deficiencies in intelligence and reconnaissance personnel and equipment resources.

• Incorporating intelligence dissemination in training exercises in order to improve MEF individual, collective, and unit readiness.

• Facilitating understanding of intelligence dissemination in support of the planning and execution of MEF operations.

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b. G-2 Operations Officer. The G-2 operations officer, under the direction of the MEF AC/S G-2, has primary responsibility for intelligence support to the Commanding General (CG) and the remainder of the MEF CE in support of current operations and future operations. Specific dissemination-related duties include (see figure 2-1):




Figure 2-1. MEF G-2 Division Principal Staff Officers and Relationships

w Coordinating and providing intelligence support (to include dissemination support) to the CG, the G-3 operations section, and the rest of the MEF CE's battlestaff.

w Serving as the G-2 representative to the MEF CE crisis action team (CAT).

w Coordinating, providing, and supervising intelligence support to the MEF CE current operations center (COC), future operations center (FOC), and force fires.

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2	w Planning, directing and supervising the <i>Red Cell</i> .
3	
4	w Providing recommendations on PIR and IR validation, prioritization, and taskings to
5	the AC/S G-2 and the Intelligence Support Coordinator (ISC).
6 7	w Coordinating and supervising the transition of intelligence planning and operations
8	from G-2 plans to G-2 future operations, and from G-2 future operations to G-2 current
9	operations, in order to effectively support the MEF's "single battle" transition process.
10	
11	w Planning, directing and supervising MEF liaison teams to external commands and
12 13	intelligence organizations.
14	w Coordinating with the ISC and MEF MSCs' G-2 operations officers to ensure unity of
15	effort of MEF intelligence operations.
16	officit of M21 mionigenee operations.
17	w Providing intelligence input and other support to MEF warning and fragmentary orders
18	and to operations related reporting (e.g., periodic situation reports).
19	and to operations related reporting (e.g., periodic situation reports).
20	w Coordinating intelligence training for the MEF G-2 section (to include dissemination
21	training) and providing G-2 oversight for and integration of the entire MEF intelligence training
22	program.
23	program:
24	w Other intelligence support and tasks as directed by the AC/S G-2.
25	
26	c. G-2 Plans Officer. The G-2 plans officer, under the direction of the MEF AC/S G-2, has
27	primary responsibility for intelligence support to the MEF CE's future plans cell. Specific
28	dissemination-related duties include (see figure 2-1):
29	,
30	w Planning the MEF concept of intelligence operations for approval by the AC/S G-2 and
31	subsequent implementation by the ISC based upon the mission, threat, commander's intent,
32	guidance, and concept of operations. This concept of intelligence operations will include a
33	supporting disseminaton concept of operations.
34	
35	w Leading, coordinating and providing intelligence support to the MEF G-5 future plans
36	section.
37	
38	w Planning and coordinating intelligence support requirements for and the deployment of
39	intelligence elements and resources into the area of operations (AO).
40	
41	w Providing recommendations on PIR and IR validation, prioritization, and taskings to
42	the AC/S G-2 and the ISC.

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1	w Coordinating, in conjunction with the ISC, G-2 development of Annex B (Intelligence)
2	and Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services) to MEF operations plan (OPLAN), their
3	supporting appendices, and all intelligence input to other annexes of OPLANs.
4	
5	w Keeping the G-2 section, other CE staff sections, intelligence liaison personnel,
6	augmentees, and others as appropriate apprised of MEF intelligence dissemination actions and
7	requirements.
8	
9	w Identifying requirements and providing recommendations to the G-2 operations officer
0	for MEF intelligence liaison teams to external commands (e.g., the JTF or other components'
1	headquarters) and intelligence agencies.
12	
13	w Coordinating and developing policies for MEF intelligence, CI and reconnaissance
14	operations.
15	
16	w Planning, directing and supervising the MEF G-2's imagery and mapping, CI/HUMINT
17	SIGINT, and weather sections.
18	
19	w Other intelligence support and tasks as directed by the AC/S G-2.
20	
21	d. Intelligence Battalion Commander/Intelligence Support Coordinator (ISC). The
22	intelligence battalion commander is responsible for planning and directing, collecting,
23	processing, producing and disseminating intelligence, and providing CI support to the MEF,
24	MEF MSCs, subordinate MAGTFs, and other commands as directed.
25 26	w Garrison. In garrison the principal task of the intel bn commander is to organize, train
27	and equip detachments that support MAGTFs or other designated commands to execute
28	integrated collection, intelligence analysis, production and dissemination of intelligence
29	products. The composition of intel bn is shown in figure 2-2.
30	products. The composition of inter on is shown in figure 2.2.
31	
32	
33	Figure 2-2. Intelligence Battalion
34	
35	w Actual Operations. During operations the intel bn commander is dual-hatted as the
36	ISC ¹ , serving as such under the direct staff cognizance of the MEF AC/S G-2. The intel bn's S-3
37	section along with the operations center element of the MEF G-2 form the core of the ISC

During garrison operations, most of the tasks listed here are the responsibility of the G-2 operations officer.

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support effort, with planning, direction, and C2 conducted within the intelligence operations center's (IOC's) support cell. As the ISC he is responsible to the MEF AC/S G-2 for the overall planning and execution of MEF all-source intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance operations. Specific dissemination-related responsibilities of the ISC during actual operations include:

■ Implementing the concept of intelligence operations (and the supporting dissemination concept of operations) developed by the G-2 plans officer and approved by the AC/S G-2.

■ Establishing and supervising operation of the MEF IOC, which includes the support cell, the SARC, and the P&A cell (see figure 2-3.) Generally the IOC will be co-located with the MEF CE's main command post.




Figure 2-3. Intelligence Operations Center

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1	
2	x Developing, consolidating, validating, and prioritizing ² recommended PIRs and IRs
3	to support MAGTF planning and operations.
4	
5	x Planning, developing, integrating, and coordinating MEF intelligence collection,
6	production, and dissemination plans.
7	
8	x Performing staff cognizance of and the effective organic and external integration and
9	employment of MEF imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),
10	counterintelligence (CI), human resources intelligence (HUMINT), geographic intelligence (GEOINT), ground remote sensors, ground reconnaissance, and tactical air reconnaissance
11 12	intelligence collections, production, and dissemination operations.
13	intenigence concenons, production, and assemblation operations.
14	x Developing, in conjunction with the G-2 plans officer and G-2 operations officer, and
15	completing Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services) to MEF
16	operations orders (OPORD), their supporting appendices, and all intelligence input to other
17	annexes of OPORDs.
18	
19	x Planning, developing, integrating, and coordinating intelligence and CI support to the
20	commander's estimate, situation development, indications and warning, force protection,
21	targeting, and combat assessment.
22	
23	x Managing and fusing the threat (or <i>red</i>) COP/CTP inputs from subordinate units and
24	external commands and intelligence agencies into the MEF CE's threat COP/CTP.
25	- Description in the literature of the MEE CE C 2 and in and the MCC.
26	x Providing intelligence support to the MEF CE G-2 section and the MSCs.
27	w Dranging the intelligence and CI estimates to support G 2 plans
28	x Preparing the intelligence and CI estimates to support G-2 plans.
29 30	x Planning, developing, and coordinating the intelligence dissemination CIS
31	architecture, to include its integration with and support of intelligence and reconnaissance
32	requirements.
33	requirements.
34	x Coordinating and integrating MEF intelligence dissemination operations with other
35	service components, the JTF joint intelligence support element (JISE), the theater joint
36	intelligence center (JIC) or joint analysis center (JAC), and national intelligence agencies and, to
37	include all aspects of intelligence reachback support.
38	- -

² The ISC is tasked to perform PIR and IR validation and prioritization *only* during actual operations when the IOC is activated. During routine peacetime operations the PIR/IR validation and prioritization tasks are the responsibility of the MEF CE's G-2 operations officer.

00

1 2	x Assisting with the evaluation and improvement of MEF intelligence dissemination operations.
3	x Other intelligence support and tasks as directed by the AC/S G-2.
5 6 7 8	(See figure 2-4 for a summary of the principal responsibilities of the AC/S, G-2's, three principal subordinate staff officers.)
9 0 1	Figure 2-4. AC/S G-2's Principal Subordinate Staff Officers and their Responsibilities
2	Collection Management/Diggeringtion Officer (CMDO). The CMDO is seemed from the
3	e. Collection Management/Dissemination Officer (CMDO). The CMDO is sourced from the intel bn's S-3 section and is subordinate to the intel bn commander/ISC during operations. The
5	CMDO is responsible for formulating detailed intelligence collection requirements (ICRs) and
6	intelligence dissemination requirements (IDRs) and tasking and coordinating internal and
7	external operations to satisfy these. The CMDO receives validated PIRs and IRs and direction
8	from the ISC, and then plans and manages the best methods to employ organic and supporting
9	collection and dissemination resources through the intelligence collection and dissemination
0	plans. The CMDO is also responsible for validating and forwarding MEF and MSC requests for
1	national and theater collection and dissemination support using appropriate intelligence tools and
2	TTP. He also is responsible for coordinating intelligence CIS requirements and maintaining
3	awareness of available CIS connectivity throughout the MAGTF and with key external
4	organizations. During operations the CMDO works within the support cell (see figure 2-3). In
5	coordination with the P&A cell OIC, the SARC OIC, G-2 operations officer, intelligence unit
6	COs/OICs, and the MEF G-6, the CMDO is responsible to the ISC for the following
7	dissemination-related tasks:
8	
9	w Determination and coordination of the collection and dissemination efforts of PIRs/IRs.
)	
	w Determination of PIRs/IRs and preparation of requests for intelligence (RFI) that are
)	beyond organic capabilities and preparing submissions to higher headquarters and external
3	intelligence agencies for support.
	w Recommending dissemination priorities, development of intelligence reporting criteria,
	and advising on and selecting dissemination means.
3	w Developing and coordinating intelligence collection plans, coordinating and integrating

these with MEF, other components, JTF, theater, and national intelligence production operations.

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w Developing and coordinating intelligence dissemination plans and supporting architectures for both voice and data networked communications, and coordinating and integrating these with MEF, other components, JTF, theater, and national intelligence CIS and dissemination operations.
w Monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the MAGTF and ensuring that it is delivered to intended recipients in a timely fashion, is understood, satisfactorily meets their needs, and whether any new IRs result.
w Troubleshooting dissemination problems: identifying intelligence dissemination problems, recommending solutions, and ensuring timely corrective actions are initiated and completed.
w Evaluating the effectiveness of MEF and supporting IMINT collection and dissemination operations.
f. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell (SARC) OIC. The SARC OIC is also an immediate subordinate of the ISC and is responsible for supervising the execution of the integrated organic, attached, and direct support intelligence collection and reconnaissance operations (see figure 2-3). The SARC OIC is responsible to the ISC for accomplishing the following:
x Coordinating, monitoring, and maintaining the status of all ongoing intelligence collection operations. This includes:
x Missions, tasked ICRs, and current reporting criteria for all collection missions.
x Locations and times for all pertinent fire support control measures.
x Primary and alternate CIS plans for both routine and time-sensitive requirements, both for intelligence collectors as well as between the collectors or the SARC and key MEF CE and MSC C2 nodes, in order to support ongoing C2 of collection operations and dissemination of acquired data and intelligence to those needing it via the most expeditious means.
w Conducting detailed intelligence collection planning and coordination with the MSCs and intelligence organizations planners, with emphasis on ensuring understanding of the collection plan and specified intelligence reporting criteria.
w Ensuring other MAGTF C2 nodes (e.g., the current operations center, force fires center, etc.) are apprised of ongoing intelligence and reconnaissance operations.
w Receiving routine and time-sensitive intelligence reports from deployed collection elements; cross-cueing among intelligence collectors, as appropriate; and then rapidly

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1	disseminating reports to MAGTF C2 nodes and others in accordance with standing PIRs/IRs, intelligence reporting criteria and dissemination plans, and the current tactical situation.
2	intenigence reporting criteria and dissemination plans, and the current factical situation.
3 4	g. Production and Analysis (P&A) Cell OIC. The P&A cell OIC is the third principal
5	subordinate to the ISC, with primary responsibility for managing and supervising the MEF's all-
6	source intelligence processing, analysis and production efforts (see figure 2-3). Key
7	dissemination-related responsibilities include:
8	
9	w Planning, directing and managing operations of the all-source fusion platoon (to include
10	the fusion, order of battle, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and target
11	intelligence/BDA teams), the topographic platoon, the imagery intelligence platoon (IIP), the
12	direct support teams (DST), and other analysis and production elements as directed.
13	
14	w Coordinating and integrating P&A cell operations, estimates, and products with the
15	MEF G-2 section's G-2 operations branch and its <i>Red Cell</i> operations and intelligence estimates.
16	
17	w Maintaining all-source automated intelligence databases, files, workbooks, country
18	studies and other intelligence studies.
19	
20	w Planning and maintaining imagery, mapping and topographic resources and other
21	intelligence references.
22	
23	w Administering, integrating, operating, and maintaining intelligence processing and
24	production systems, both unclassified general service (GENSER) and SCI information systems
25	(e.g., the image product library [IPL], JDISS, IAS).
26	
27	w Conducting analysis and preparing all-source intelligence estimates, reports and other
28	products, briefings, etc.
29	
30	w Supervising and performing the sanitization of sensitivie compartmented information
31	(SCI) and its subsequent dissemination.
32	w Analyzing fusing and tailoring all source intelligence products to setisfy all supported
33	w Analyzing, fusing, and tailoring all-source intelligence products to satisfy all supported
34	commanders' stated or anticipated PIRs and IRs.
35 36	w Developing and maintaining current and future intelligence situational, threat, and
37	environmental assessments and target intelligence based upon all-source analysis, interpretation,
38	and integration.
39	and integration.
40	w Managing and fusing the threat (or red) COP/CTP inputs from subordinate units and
41	external commands and intelligence agencies into the MEF CE's threat COP/CTP.
42	
43	w Disseminating intelligence reports and other products throughout the MEF and to

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external organizations in accordance with the dissemination plan and current reporting criteria.

h. The Intelligence Watch Officer (IWO), Current Operations Center (COC). The COC IWO is responsible for implementing intelligence operations in the COC and thus is the focal point for all current intelligence and CI matters. Key tasks include: maintaining situational awareness of the current threat and the environment; monitoring ongoing intelligence, operations, CIS and other MAGTF activities; initiating intelligence actions as required; and monitoring the MAGTF-wide status of standing PIRs. The COC IWO has principal responsibility for:

• Providing intelligence support to G-3 current and future operations centers, force fires center, G-6 systems control, and other CE elements as appropriate.

• Continuous coordination with subordinate units' intelligence officers, JTF JISE watch officer, and other current intelligence watch elements in order to identify IRs and to provide intelligence support, as appropriate.

• Disseminating intelligence meeting alarm reporting criteria.

• Keeping other elements of the intelligence section and IOC aware of current tactical developments that require changes in previously established intelligence priorities or planned tactical and intelligence operations.

• Disseminating specified intelligence products (e.g., periodic intelligence summaries, COC briefings, current intelligence reports).

• Acting as net control for the MEF intelligence net (when established).

i. Special Security Officer (SSO). The SSO has primary responsibility for managing the MEF's sensitive compartmented information (SCI) program; planning and supervision of SCI communications; and the security, control and use of SCI materials, equipment and products. The SSO's dissemination responsibilities arise from the special security requirements of SCI. Prior to operations, he assists the intelligence dissemination effort by:

• Identifying SCI products for the MEF CE and all subordinate units.

• Assisting with identifying and acquiring mission unique SCI products in support of MEF requirements.

• Planning and coordinating MEF SCI CIS architecture integrated with joint, theater and national systems.

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• Identifying requirements for and planning and supervising SCI courier, electronic, and other CIS in support of garrison and contingency planning needs.

• Supervising the security of SCI sanitization efforts critical to the rapid and secure dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence to MEF elements lacking SCI access.

• Administering the SCI access program to ensure that all MEF personnel requiring regular or time-sensitive SCI access have satisfied necessary personnel security requirements.

• Establishing and ensuring the security of the MEF CE SCI facility and all SCI resources within it.

2004. Other Command Element Staff

a. G-1

• **Personnel Requirements.** The G-1 is responsible for all personnel requirements with regard to the intelligence effort. MEF intelligence dissemination operations may require personnel augmentation to satisfy all requirements, particularly to staff key contingency billets with the G-2 section and intelligence battalion. All such requests for intelligence personnel augmentation will be developed by the MEF G-2 and provided to the G-1 for either internal sourcing or for forwarding to higher headquarters for action (e.g., global sourcing).

• **Courier Requirements.** Additionally, the G-1 is responsible for the establishment, operation, and supervision of physical courier support.

• Tactical Employment of Units. The G-3 is responsible for planning, coordinating, and supervising the tactical employment of units. As such, the movement and operations of intelligence and supporting units must be coordinated by the G-2 with the G-3 for integration in future and current operations planning.

 • **Key Recipient of Intelligence.** Additionally, since the G-3 has primary responsibility for the planning and operations of maneuver and fires, he is a primary user of various forms of intelligence and sensor information. *The G-2 and G-3 must coordinate closely to ensure dissemination meets MEF operational and tactical needs.*

c. G-4

b. G-3

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• External Assets Requirements. The G-4 is responsible for the logistic support of the MEF, which may include dissemination-related assets from national, theater, joint, other-service, or allied sources. To ensure the required support is available, arrangements should be developed early in the deployment which meet the particular needs of the deployed supported unit.

• **Maps and Charts.** Additionally, the G-4 is responsible for all MEF supply support, to include the distribution of maps and charts.

d. G-5. The G-5 is responsible for all long-range (future) and joint planning matters. Normally, a G-5 is found only at the MEF and MARFOR levels; at lower MAGTF echelons future planning is the responsibility of the G-3. The G-5 needs to understand intelligence dissemination and the overall intelligence concept of operations, unique requirements, and other type of support required for intelligence operations.

e. G-6. The G-6 is responsible for CIS support to intelligence, including dissemination. The G-6 is responsible for providing for and protecting CIS connectivity and operations, both within and external to the MEF. This includes providing the communication paths, network accesses, radio nets and frequencies, telephone and other communication support to MEF intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operations. This requires extensive systems knowledge across the spectrum of intelligence CIS. *Intelligence CMDO*, *plans and operations personnel must coordinate extensively and continually with the G-6*.

2005. MEF Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) Intelligence Officers. All MSC intelligence officers are responsible for effectively using their intelligence and CIS resources for appropriate intelligence dissemination with higher, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate elements. Key tasks of MSC intelligence officers include:

• Planning and implementing a concept for intelligence support based on the mission, concept of operations, and commander's intent.

• Providing centralized direction of and support to command intelligence operations, to include intelligence elements attached to or placed in direct support of the unit.

• Consolidating, validating, and prioritizing unit IRs and dissemination needs.

• Submitting consolidated requests for external intelligence support to the MEF CE.

• Coordinating CIS links to pertinent supporting external intelligence collection, production, and dissemination elements and operations.

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1	 Providing timely, accurate feedback on the level of unit satisfaction regarding intelligence
2	dissemination support received.
3	
4	• Providing intelligence support to unit current and future operations and all C2 centers.
5	
6	 Analyzing and preparing intelligence products, esimates and reports.
7	
8	 Providing intelligence briefings to support unit operations.
9	
10	• Identifying problems and initiating corrective actions/solutions for unit intelligence, CI
11	and reconnaissance operations.
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	

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Chapter 3

1 2 3

Intelligence Dissemination Methodology

3001. Overview. Effective dissemination operations will only result if dissemination planning begins and is continually coordinated with development of the intelligence, operations, and CIS operational concepts and supporting intelligence collection and production plans. The line of departure for Corps-wide success begins with a common understanding of a simple dissemination methodology. Each intelligence requirement has three parts -- an intelligence collection requirement (ICR), an intelligence production requirement (IPR), and an intelligence dissemination requirement (IDR). Each dissemination requirement should be processed individually, using the methodology described below. Figure 3-1 depicts the steps in MAGTF intelligence dissemination methodology.




Figure 3-1. Dissemination Methodology

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3002. Determine Dissemination Requirements:

1 2

Identify what intelligence is needed, who needs it, where they are, when it is required, and assign priority.

a. *In the broad sense*: Commanders determine what intelligence is needed and when it must be available; intelligence personnel develop and implement the flow of intelligence.

b. From the intelligence dissemination perspective, there are several things to keep in mind:

• Think optimum utilization. It is critical that G/S-2 staffs exercise caution and review carefully when a request for intelligence is received. To preclude wasting precious time on unnecessary or lower priority tasks, intelligence personnel should determine exactly what intelligence is needed, who needs it, when is it needed, and where it needs to be sent for optimum utilization.

• Stay in contact with commanders and other intelligence requestors. Because all dissemination variables are subject to change--especially in a tactical environment--it is important that intelligence disseminators remain in frequent contact with the requestor in order to maintain timely and complete understanding of their IRs and thus minimizing intelligence operations changes and distribution delays.

• **Determine common intelligence requirements.** In conjunction with the MAGTF staff and subordinate commands' intelligence officers, the G/S-2 staff should determine what the common IRs are. The idea is to minimize human intervention in passing data, and design/model the CIS architecture and dissemination concept of operations, whenever possible, to allow users who routinely need certain kinds of information and intelligence to get it themselves. For example, if the G/S-4 has access to SIPRNET (as well as trained/cleared personnel), he can pull routinely needed intelligence from a database (e.g., on port characteristics) without having to compete for G/S-2 support. This is where "standing IRs" and supporting ICRs, IPRs, and IDRs come into play: design the information blueprint around standing IRs, then design the applications and architecture to support it.

• **Develop Planning Tools.** Use PIRs and IRs to guide dissemination requirements; develop collector reporting and intelligence dissemination flow diagrams and planning matrices (discussed in Chapter 4). Good reporting and dissemination flow diagrams and matrices assist in dissemination development, planning and execution. They also provide COC, P&A Cell, and SARC watch personnel with references to guide them in problem management and solving, and articulating dissemination decisions.

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1	
2	

c. During garrison operations, dissemination requirements determinations focus on:

1. Identifying operations and contingency plans (CONPLANs) that the MAGTF may be committed to.

2. Identifying and refining PIRs and IRs for each CONPLAN and OPLAN, and then specifying and interpreting associated ICRs, IPRs, and IDRs.

3. Establishing accessability of a supporting all-source intelligence reference library, files, databases and other intelligence support materials (e.g., imagery, geospatial, and associated intelligence products), ensuring composition is known to all MAGTF intelligence personnel, key intelligence users, and commanders.

4. Identifying supporting intelligence community databases exploitable via automated intelligence systems and networks, to include necessary user identifications (userid), passwords, and special considerations.

5. Coordinating development of unit-tailored and MAGTF-integrated statements of intelligence interest based upon the above requirements determinations.

6. Identifying intelligence address indicator groups (AIGs), DSSCS address groups (DAGs), and other electronic message addresses and groupings, common address designators (CADs) and other recurring or periodic electrical products disseminated by intelligence organizations pertinent to MAGTF's PIRs, IRs, and other areas of interest (AOI) and responsibility (AOR).

7. Using the above information to identify or refine -- by OPLAN/CONPLAN or potential contingency -- current known intelligence gaps based upon specified or most likely contingencies and missions.

8. Refining MAGTF dissemination routine and time-sensitive requirements identification SOPs, to include integration with other functional SOPs and across all command echelons.

9. Designing or modifying CIS architectures to include: organic intelligence and reconnaissance units, MEF-wide, afloat, joint or combined, and possible civil-military variations.

10. Regular and realistic training of all intelligence personnel to improve their understanding and operational capabilities.

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11. Regular and realistic training of commanders, operations, CSS, CIS and other personnel --particularly those serving as watch personnel in COCs/FOCs, FSCs/FFCs/SACCs, TACLOG, SYSCONs and TECHCONs, etc.

d. In response to developing crisis situations, receipt of an alert or warning order, or an actual operational commitment, dissemination requirements determinations focus on:

1. Disseminating throughout the MAGTF the most current available intelligence and CI estimates pertinent to the mission, situation, and AO.

11 2. Identifying and prioritizing PIRs, IRs, and supporting ICRs, IPRs, and IDRs, with emphasis on immediate mission analysis and planning needs.

3. Identifying and operational checking--or implementing—CIS capabilities throughout the MAGTF and with key external commands and intelligence elements.

4. Identifying, organizing and reviewing on-hand intelligence materials pertinent to the situation, ensuring composition and availability is known to all intelligence personnel and pertinent commanders and planners.

5. Identifing unique electronic messages, specialized databases and other intelligence products, JWICs and SIPRNET homepages, and the initial production and dissemination plans initiated by higher headquarters and supporting intelligence organizations (that are specifically focused upon the developing situation or mission); ensuring userid, passwords, etc. are obtained for all requiring access throughout the MAGTF.

6. Based upon initial higher headquarters' direction, MAGTF mission analysis, and commander's (to include subordinate units) intent, revising initial PIRs, other IRs and identifying associated LTIOV, who (MAGTF Commander, staff planners, subordinate units) requires answers to each and their current location, and priorities.

7. In coordination with production planners, identifying type products, formats, and primary and alternate dissemination means for priority intelligence products.

8. In coordination with production planners and the special security office (SSO), determining proper authority/sanitization and other special access requirements and authorities.

9. Reviewing MAGTF plan for periodic review and currency assessments of identified PIRs/IRs, to include procedures for periodically updating subordinate units on the status of these.

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10. Updating accurate intelligence AIGs, electronic message addresses and groupings, and CADs for dissemination operations.

11. Identifying, prioritizing, and initiating action for all dissemination deficiencies and immediate challenges (e.g., releasability to coalition forces).

3003. Determine Dissemination Form:

Identify the form that best meets the user's needs.

a. Considerations. Intelligence is disseminated in various forms (see Figure 3-2), depending on user needs, the amount of intelligence to be transmitted, timeliness requirements, and the quantity and echelons of the recipients. *The following must be considered:*

• **Best Form.** The best form(s) for dissemination is the one that best meets the needs of the user. It must answer the user's needs in the timeliest manner consistent with the urgency of the tactical situation. If the user is unsure of exact needs, a mutual understanding between the recipient and the producer usually results in a serviceable product.

• Formatting Considerations. Disseminators must be able to prepare and transmit the formatted intelligence in time to satisfy the user's LTIOVs or it is of little value. A well designed dissemination plan will take formatting factors into account and save manhours otherwise spent on re-drafting and copying. After selecting a pathway, disseminators must coordinate with producers to ensure the format of the intelligence product meets the needs of the mode of transmission. For certain recipients, such as at the MEF and JTF levels, graphical materials are often appropriate and desired. Graphics alone, however, will not suffice for targeting and mission planning needs. Further, during combat operations graphics typically do not work well at the regiment/MAG levels and below; with the result that most dissemination at these levels remains secure voice radio or telephone.

• **CIS Capabilities.** It is important to consider user's CIS capabilities. For example, the disseminator may initially plan to send most products via electronic message but, after taking into account that many of the intended recipients are in a highly mobile situation and thus have only point-to-point phone/radio communications, will employ alternate CIS means. Consequently, dissemination planners and managers must know the CIS capabilities – and current status – of all supported elements, to include those two or more echelons lower.

FORMS AND PATHWAYS FOR DISSEMINATING INTELLIGENCE

VERBAL HARDCOPY SOFTCOPY GRAPHICS

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Figure 3-2. Forms and Pathways for Disseminating Intelligence

b. During garrison operations, dissemination forms determinations focus on:

1. User's IRs, desires, and timeliness requirements.

 2. Assessing all MAGTF units and supporting intelligence production agencies personnel and technical capabilities to prepare and transmit all possible intelligence product formats (to include extensive CIS training).

3. Analyzing previous exercises and operational lessons learned to identify the most effective preferred and primary alternate dissemination forms. The goal is to specify -- by mission and principal tasks, cross-referenced by type MAGTF unit and/or staff section -- which dissemination forms generally best satisfy their intelligence needs. The product of this effort is format determination criteria that must be incorporated into MAGTF standing dissemination TTP. Additionally, this will further develop disseminators' tactical and technical knowledge and expertise, allowing for greater and more effective intuitive decision making during high tempo operations or unusual situations.

4. Determining planning estimates of the time needed to prepare and transmit each type intelligence product format to typical ultimate users.

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5. Regular and realistic training of all intelligence personnel to improve their understanding and operational capabilities.
c. In response to developing crisis situations, receipt of an alert or warning order, or an actual operational commitment, dissemination forms determinations focus on:
 Verifying planning timelines and each user's intelligence needs and associated LTIOV.
2. Maintaining awareness of MAGTF CIS architecture installation, operations and changes, as well as courier plans and capabilities.
3. Prioritizing and effectively managing intelligence processing, production and communication resources.
4. Using established format determination criteria and the above information, selecting formats that best satisfy user requirements.
5. Rapidly modifying SOPs consistent with METT-T and ensuring all are aware of any changes.
3004. <u>Determine Dissemination Mode</u>
Identify Dissemination Channels and Capabilities:
• Identify and select both routine and time-sensitive modes.
 Determine and prioritize both dissemination point-to-point and broadcast modes for the widest possible range of tactical situations, to include both standard and alarm situations and criteria.
 Maintain awareness of the status of all MAGTF and key external CIS plans and operations.
a. General. Intelligence can be conveyed by various means, depending primarily on the nature and
urgency of the intelligence, the tactical situation and the pathway available. Both broadcast and
point-to-point (including multiple echelons down) modes must be planned in detail. MAGTF intelligence staffsthrough coordination with communications personnelshould plan for several
dedicated pathways for intelligence dissemination as well as for primary and alternate
dissemination via common pathways. As always, it is important to economize on available CIS
bandwidth. Potential ways to distribute intelligence are depicted in figure 3-2.

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b. During garrison operations, dissemination channels identification focuses on:

1. Assessing, in coordination with the MAGTF G-3 and G-6, MAGTF internal and external standing CIS capabilities, architectures, SOPs and TTP.

2. Overlaying and analyzing (by mission, principal tasks and the six intelligence functions) for designated OPLANS or contingencies, the standing CIS architecture and most likely MAGTF task-organization to be employed for each. The intelligence planning focus is to determine availability and value of broadcast and point-to-point modes and pipeline and alarm channels across the spectrum of military operations. Critical information to determine includes type CIS pathways (e.g., secure telephone, single/multichannel radio, local and wide area networks, couriers, record communications, VTC), and for each, the network composition (i.e., which units/organizations are standing or as required net members), transmission capacity, physical entry/exit points, operating/accessing procedures, installation and restoration priorities.

3. Doing same for intelligence units' internal intelligence C2 and dissemination. This includes: from collector back to its principal CIC/IOC operational node; from collectors to other echelons' HQ (e.g., from force recon team to an infantry regimental HQ); and for integrated, cross collector operations (e.g., between a RadBn RRT and force recon teams).

4. Analyzing intelligence data and operational planning information flows within the G-2, and to other commands and sections (to include those of subordinate units) to establish dissemination procedures and identify potential problem areas.

5. Integrating the information into the standing intelligence concept of operation for each type mission and standing OPLANs/CONPLANs. The end product is a detailed intelligence dissemination concept and supporting architecture and TTP for each type mission (or, for standing OPLANs/CONPLANs, the actual dissemination contingency plan).

6. Identifying personnel and equipment deficiencies and then developing, planning and monitoring corrective or contingency actions.

7. Regular and realistic training of intelligence personnel and users to improve their understanding and operational capabilities.

8. Ensuring commanders, operations, CIS and other key non-intelligence personnel have on-line access and individual skills and abilities to "pull" intelligence from databases, www sites and other sources.

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c. In response to developing crisis situations, receipt of an alert or warning order, or an actual operational commitment, dissemination channels identifications focus on:

- 1. Rapidly assessing, in coordination with the MAGTF G-3 and G-6, MAGTF internal and external CIS capabilities, architectures and TTP.
- 2. Identifying and implementing required changes to these, and communicating and coordinating same with all concerned MAGTF units.
- 3. Integrating same as required with the CIS architectures and intelligence concepts of operations of the JTF headquarters, other services, allied, multinational and supporting intelligence organizations.
- 4. Verifying the reliability of MAGTF-wide dissemination primary and alternate channels -with emphasis on C2 of intelligence and reconnaissance units and time-sensitive and alarm channels -- initiating as necessary corrective actions and alternate paths.
- 5. Immediately identifying/validating personnel and equipment deficiencies and unique needs, and then initiating required corrective action (e.g., global sourcing, changes to dissemination plans, etc.).
- 6. Ensuring globally sourced MAGTF units and personnel are quickly trained regarding dissemination activities pertinent to their efforts.
- **3005.** Allocate Resources. There will always be more requirements and employment possibilities than available intelligence organizational, personnel, and equipment resources and capabilities. *Task* organization of intelligence support units, resources and capabilities is one of the principal ways for commanders to shape the intelligence effort.
- Regarding dissemination, the unique and greater capabilities of some intelligence units and resources can significantly enhance the ability of supported G/S-2 sections to access, develop and use timely, mission-focused intelligence. Most all intelligence, reconnaissance and CI units are task-organized to provide specific intelligence capabilities, as influenced by METT-T and the commander's guidance – in particular, the threat situation and capabilities, the supported unit's anticipated IRs (as determined through planning and IPB), the concept of operations, and the concept of intelligence support.
- It is critical for the commander and intelligence officer exercising centralized control to allocate

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resources to ensure that the needs of subordinate commanders – particularly those crucial to mission accomplishment – are properly addressed and supported. Detachments from one or more intelligence/reconnaissance/CI units may be placed in direct support (DS) or attached to subordinate units; or they may be used to create enhanced intelligence nodes in support of a subordinate unit or center (e.g., the rear area operations center; civil-military operations center). This must be done with the G/S-3 (for unit concept of operations and tactical task organization), the G/S-6 (for CIS resources), the G/S-1 (for personnel augmentation and courier support), the G/S-4 (for unique intelligence elements' CSS support) and within the G/S-2 section for effective management of dissemination personnel and assets.

Considerations When Allocating Dissemination Resources

• Concept of Operations and Tempo. The overall concept of operations (especially the designation of main and priority supporting efforts and the need for any specialized, non-routine intelligence node), the intelligence concept of support, and the nature of the PIRs and IRs (especially that of the threat and other key intelligence targets – e.g., those tactical units using low power radios) are key considerations.

• **Tactical Equipment.** The ability of a unit to integrate, plan and direct, and support (both CIS and CSS) attached or direct support intelligence elements. Regular, realistic tactical training during peacetime is the principal test of this readiness.

• Technical Capabilities. While significant, the MAGTF CIS architecture is optimized for certain task organizations and operating methodologies. Intelligence resource planners must comprehensively understand the unique strengths and weaknesses of the CIS architecture at all-command-echelons, as well as how those are affected when intelligence elements are attached to or placed DS to subordinate elements. For example, both single-channel voice and multi-channel data communications connectivity, operational capabilities and system administrative requirements may increase dramatically if a large number of intelligence elements must be integrated into a unit's main command echelon (typical at all GCE echelons). The supported unit's commander, operations officer and CIS officer must also thoroughly understand the effects of such intelligence task organization.

• C2 Effects. Even when intelligence elements are attached or placed DS to subordinate units, in most cases the MAGTF commander retains technical control of their operations, which he exercises via the G/S-2. This must be thoroughly understood and evaluated by commanders and operations officers as it directly affects their C2 authorities over, as well as the CIS support they must provide to, these intelligence elements.

- **3006.** Disseminate the Intelligence and Take Subsequent Action. As already stated, intelligence has no value until it has been provided to commanders and other users in time to support operations.
- Once prepared, an intelligence product must be disseminated as quickly as possible for use by all
 - users. Dissemination planners should always anticipate clogged or disabled communication links by

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planning alternate distribution means. Redundancy must be planned for and used as needed. Lead and manage the dissemination effort: apply "immediate action" dissemination remedies as needed.

Considerations During Dissemination

• Current Tactical Situation. The dissemination plan will provide guidance for when, to whom, and how to disseminate the various types of intelligence and products. Regarding time-sensitive intelligence and answers to most PIRs, disseminators must always further evaluate the intelligence against the current tactical situation and ask who in addition to planned recipients has a need for the intelligence, and then initiate necessary action.

• Status of Current CIS Readiness. The principal dissemination mode or channel maybe degraded or inoperable when needed – to include those used by intended recipients. Accordingly, dissemination managers must continuously know the status of all CIS resources and pathways – primaries and alternates – in order to immediately initiate and direct dissemination operations. Continuous coordination with the G/S-2 COC watch officer and the G/S-6's systems control (SYSCON) and technical control (TECHCON) centers is mandatory in order to rapidly know when problems are being experienced and what alternate means are available to meet immediate intelligence operations needs.

Leadership and Quality Control of Dissemination. Dissemination planning is predominantly centrallymanaged. Dissemination execution, however, is decentralized and will be conducted by a wide variety of individuals - P&A Cell, SARC, and COC intelligence personnel; intelligence, CI and reconnaissance collectors; and even operations, fires and other non-intelligence personnel. Additionally, with the fielding and greater employment of new CIS technologies and the implementation of newer operational concepts and functional methodologies, far greater intelligence access and intelligence dissemination are now possible from commands and organizations external to the force (and vice versa) to command echelons throughout the MAGTF. Together with the ability of all to pull information from non-military or intelligence sources - news media, academia, NGOs - and use it as (or in lieu of) intelligence is a major leadership and quality control challenge. Risks include incorrect, misleading, dated or incomplete data; excessive data; and "conclusive" data without seeing or understanding what it is based upon. Even for dissemination within the MAGTF, the many probable disseminators will intensify intelligence leaders' efforts to ensure all needing it have in fact received it, whether it is understood, the degree to which it has satisfied their PIRs and IRs, and the rapid identification, prioritization, and action on new IRs. Detailed, well-designed and practiced SOPs understood by all along with continuous coordination and effective C2 of MAGTF intelligence operations will be critical to successfully deal with these challenges.

3007. Evaluate Dissemination Effectiveness

a. General. After disseminating an intelligence product, dissemination leaders should ensure that it was indeed received **and understood** by all intended recipients. Intelligence products occasionally do get misrouted. Also, the individual actually taking the product may not be an intelligence Marine

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and thus may fail to recognize its importance or, more likely, may fail to inform all needing it or to initiate other necessary intelligence or operations actions. Verification of receipt can be accomplished through a quick telephone call or e-mail confirmation from select addressees. Follow-on contact to determine if intelligence needs were met or if the provided intelligence has led to any new IRs should also be made at some predetermined time following dissemination to ensure optimum use of intelligence. Never forget: you must get the operator what he needs when he needs it; in the form he needs it; and ensure it is understood and acted upon – or else the intelligence has little or no value!

b. During garrison operations, evaluating dissemination effectiveness focuses on:

1. Post-exercise or operations, obtaining detailed after action reports and lessons learned (to include from commanders, operations officers, CIS officers and other key personnel).

Analyze all thoroughly, with special attention to critical failures and problems – but also major successes. Identify and implement required improvements (SOPs, training, equipment, personnel).

2. Post-exercise or operations, analyzing of all MAGTF training -- to include questioning of subordinate commanders, other functional area staff planners, and all intelligence personnel - to assess the validity and currency of dissemination contingency plans and TTP – as well as other related aspects of intelligence operations -- in order to identify root causes of problems and initiate solutions. The departure point for this analysis will be acquiring each supported commander's personal assessment of how well overall intelligence operations, intelligence product formats, and the dissemination system fulfilled his tactical requirements.

3. Preparing and submitting to higher headquarters, the supporting establishment or other relevant organizations comprehensive reports detailing dissemination deficiencies beyond the MAGTF's ability to resolve. Concurrently, if any are particularly significant or complex, active personal involvement by the MAGTF commander may be essential to get necessary corrective actions. Note: Ensure these reports and recommendations are coordinated with and, as required, supported by the G-3 and G-6, to include concurrent actions in their functional areas, as appropriate. Also, ensure these reports are shared with other Marine Corps units, the other services, and the joint community, as appropriate.

c. In response to developing crisis situations, receipt of an alert or warning order, or an actual operational commitment, evaluating dissemination effectiveness focuses on:

1. Executing the plans and actions developed during all prior intelligence operations and dissemination methodology steps.

2. Intelligence collection, production and dissemination leaders maintaining regular communication with supporting and supported commanders and intelligence officers,

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keeping them apprised as to the status of open IRs, IDRs and ongoing intelligence operations.

3. Continous, close communications with commanders and planners (to include those of subordinate commands) to ensure disseminated intelligence is understood (especially critical early in operations planning); satisfies their needs; leads to new IRs or changes any previously established priorities; is in forms most supportive of their needs.

4. CMDO and other intelligence personnel periodically seeking assessments from commanders, intelligence officers and staff users throughout the MAGTF regarding dissemination operations, problems, concerns and future anticipated needs.

3008. Train Personnel in Dissemination Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) and SOPs.

Regular and realistic training of all intelligence personnel and users – commanders, operations, fires, CIS and others -- to improve their understanding of dissemination operational capabilities and limitations, their tactical abilities and judgments, and their technical skills and expertise.

This is the critical unifying action for all dissemination methodology steps -- and one of the most difficult challenges commanders and intelligence leaders will face. Confidence in the MAGTF's dissemination readiness, evaluating its effectiveness, and reaching accurate conclusions as to dissemination strengths and weaknesses will be accomplished only if MAGTF peacetime training aggressively challenges dissemination capabilities under a variety of realistic tactical scenarios and operating conditions. This is particularly critical for accurately assessing whether centralized intelligence management is effectively being supported by the MAGTF CIS system. Training emphasizes units' SOPs, but also other services, joint and intelligence agencies' TTP. The following must be developed, incorporated into the unit SOPs, and practiced in training:

• Ensuring that the intelligence operating concept and supporting dissemination TTP contain detailed procedures well integrated with collections and production procedures, so that during tactical operations dissemination problems experienced anywhere within the MAGTF are immediately brought to the attention of the appropriate personnel for fast corrective action.

• Procedures for maintaining awareness of the current operational status of all key intelligence and multipurpose CIS resources, channels, frequencies, etc.

• Procedures for confirming the receipt of disseminated intelligence.

• For intelligence provided in response to a PIR, using procedures which quickly verify that the PIR has been fully satisfied, and whether it generates any new IRs or affects others

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1		still open.
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3	•	Ability and expertise of commands, planners and other non-intelligence personnel to
4		"pull" intelligence from databases, www sites, publications and other intelligence
5		resources.
6		
7	•	Tactical and technical abilities of key dissemination and other intelligence leaders (e.g
8		COC and SARC watch officers) to recognize when, and effectively conduct time-
9		sensitive dissemination, to include using non-typical channels, means and modes.
10		
11	•	Dissemination to other services, joint, allied/coalition, and NGOs/PVOs.
12		
13	•	Integration of intelligence and reconnaissance units' (e.g., DST, UAV RRS, HET),
14		intelligence, C2 and CIS operations into headquarters of all subordinate organizations
15		down to the battalion/squadron/CSSD level.
16		
17	•	Specialized or unique intelligence dissemination or CIS capabilities – e.g., SCI
18		sanitization, CI RODKA, etc.
19		
20		
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Chapter 4

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1 2

Intelligence Dissemination Planning

4001. Dissemination Planning Process

a. Overview. Intelligence dissemination planning requires broad, multi-functional intelligence, operations, and CIS expertise to successfully identify, analyze, design, coordinate, and integrate a wide variety of complex issues. Dissemination planners must anticipate requirements prior to any exercise, contingency, or operation. The following general principles apply to intelligence dissemination planning:

• Grouping of IRs by type of intelligence and echelon of those needing it is the basis of the intelligence dissemination plan.

• With well-developed intelligence operations SOPs and TTP and established intelligence product formats, training and experience, IDRs can be anticipated and planned for by all intelligence personnel involved with dissemination.

 Finally, effective intelligence dissemination planning emphasizes the importance of integrated collection, production, and dissemination operations requiring continuous close coordination among all intelligence leaders leaders responsible for any aspect of intelligence operations.

b. The Basic Plan. A basic intelligence dissemination plan should be constructed by intelligence officers and their dissemination Marines to use as a MAGTF working model and rapid departure point. From that modifications can be made quickly when developing specific, tailored intelligence dissemination plans to support the spectrum of possible operations. This chapter lays out a process and addresses considerations for use in developing intelligence dissemination plans. Appendix K of this publication provides a sample intelligence dissemination plan format; Appendix G provides a sample intelligence CIS plan format.

c. Considerations. The following paragraphs address the most common considerations for each step of the planning process when developing and implementing intelligence dissemination plans. Although written from the MEF intelligence section perspective, it may be tailored to intelligence officers at any echelon consistent with the policies and TTP of the MEF, other components, JTF, and theater combatant command. Additionally, Appendix H identifies typical dissemination planning and execution actions of the MAGTF CE G/S-2 and Intelligence Battalion staff during each phase of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).

Since Marine units may be committed worldwide, it is imperative that MARFOR and MEF dissemination planners periodically coordinate their efforts, concepts of operations and SOPs with each other so that all have a thorough understanding of dissemination SOPs, TTP, policies, capabilities and differences among the various combatant and MARFOR commanders.

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1	4002. Identify Dissemination Requirements. Validated and prioritized PIRs and IRs drive
2	IDR planning. When identifying requirements, the four W's the "who, where, what and when'
3	questions – provide a good, four-step process for identifying the broad scope of dissemination
4	needs. Direct and continuous communications with dissemination and other intelligence
5	planners at each who is essential to precisely focus subsequent dissemination planning efforts.
6	Dissemination requirements depicting type of intelligence and level of recipient can be reflected
7	on a wall mapboard or in a computer file.

a. The *Who's*. The first step is to identify the *who's*. Commanders' preferences, standing theater OPLAN/CONPLANs, type mission analyses, unit SOPs, TTP, playbooks and previous post-exercise analyses and lessons learned reports all are key sources for identifying the *who's* -- organizations, units and other elements that the intelligence section must be capable of disseminating intelligence to. Identifying and grouping by typical command relationship/task-organization will provide the operational perspective to begin dissemination planning. Determine others who will/may need the support, and not simply those specifically involved with an IR, or immediate higher and lower echelon.

The following portrays a typical MEF dissemination readiness *who* needs:

-- <u>Higher Headquarters, External Intelligence Centers and Other Senior U.S. Government Organizations</u>:

• Joint task force (the J-2 and its key subordinate nodes: JISE, NIST, J-2X, JIDC, JDEC, JCMEC; the J-3's JRC via the MAGTF G-3; the J-6's JCCC via the MAGTF G-6; etc.)

• MARFOR component headquarters G-2 (and other staff sections and nodes, as required)

• Theater combatant command's joint intelligence center (JIC) or joint analysis center (JAC)

• U.S. embassy/country team

appropriate)

 National intelligence agencies (DIA/NMJIC, NSA/NSOC, CIA, NRO, NIMA)
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (and other services' intelligence centers, as

• Appropriate cryptologic shore support activity (CSSA)

 Appropriate regional security operations center (RSOC)
Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit (MCISU)

 Allied/coaliton partners' military and national intelligence organizations and elements.

- Adjacent or Detached Commands or Organizations:

- Intelligence sections of the Joint Force Land/Maritime/Air/Special Operations Component Commanders (or to those of any of their subordinates)
- Specialized task forces (e.g., Joint Psychological Operations Task Force)

		COUNDINATING DRAFT
1	•	6/5/00 Allied, coalition or multinational forces' intelligence sections
1	•	
2	•	Deployed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), MEU (SOC), MEF alert
3	_	contingency force and SPMAGTFs command elements intelligence sections
4 5	•	Intelligence sections of Army, Navy, Air Force, service component headquarters (and their subordinates, as appropriate)
6	•	Near-real-time (NRT) connectivity to the reporting of intelligence collectors organic
7		to or in direct support of these organizations (e.g., Joint STARS, GUARDRAIL)
8	•	Advance forces
9 10	•	Appropriate sections/offices of host government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs)
11 12	•	Appropriate U.S. law enforcement agencies (during domestic support, counternarcotics and other designated operations)
13		
14	- Internal	MEF/MAGTF Headquarters
15		
16	•	Current operations center
17	•	Future operations center
18	•	Future plans divisions
19	•	MEF tactical echelons (when deployed)
20	•	Force fires coordination center
21	•	Rear area operations center (when established)
22	•	Civil-military operations center (when established)
23	•	SYSCON
24	•	Rear command echelon
25		
26	- Subordi	inate Elements and Units
27		
28	•	Intelligence sections of the GCE, ACE and CSSE headquarters (and their
29		subordinates consistent with the concept of operations) ²
30	•	Organic/attached/direct support intelligence, CI and reconnaissance units for whom
31		the MEF retains full command or technical control (TECHCON) ³
32	•	Other C2 nodes and facilities, when required (e.g., DASC, EPW compound,

33 34 35

psychological operations detachment)b. The *Where*'s. The second step is to identify the *where*'s. In most cases this will correspond

Other unassigned subordinate or attached units (e.g., a supporting Army

POG/AACG/DACG, etc.)

Other MAGTFs and independent task forces

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b. The Where's. The second step is to identify the where's. In most cases this will correspond to the location of each identified who. However, command relationships, the specific operational phase, task-organization, or other METT-T factors may identify other answers to where

² Dissemination planning to those elements must be closely integrated with specific intelligence alarm and broadcast reporting criteria.

Dissemination CIS planning must be well-coordinated and integrated with the CIS established to support intelligence C2 of these intelligence and reconnaissance units.

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dissemination requirements. Intelligence dissemination planners must pay particular attention to special dissemination requirements during any of the following situations:

- Intelligence concepts of operations involving "reachback" or split-base operations.
- Units being globally sourced, not yet OPCON to the MEF or its MSEs.
- Location of unit C2 facilities during tactical operations displacements.
- Whether any unit is or will be collocated with and may benefit from another organization's CIS capabilities.
- Afloat operations and ship-shore movement phases.
- Heliborne or air movement operatons.
- Terrain, weather or atmospheric conditions which may affect dissemination.

c. The What's. With the above information in hand, dissemination planners now seek answers to the what of each requirement, the third step in the process. Here planners strive to establish or anticipate what type intelligence support -- finished deliberate intelligence, time-sensitive intelligence products, particular formats -- each who typically requires to support its planning and decisionmaking needs. As with the who determinations, commander preferences, standing MAGTF and theater OPLAN/CONPLANs, type mission analyses, unit SOPs, TTP, playbooks, and previous post-exercise analyses and lessons learned reports all are key sources for isolating what needs and will provide the dissemination SOP foundation. Then, during operations, these will be modified as required consistent with specific mission needs, the commander's intent (as well as those of higher and adjacent headquarters), concept of operations, endstate, and METT-T. Additionally, planners' research should encompass how differing intelligence resource task-organizations might affect what requirements and to how the possible what's historically have been combined to satisfy the who's requirements. Cross-referencing the who and what answers with the following groupings completes this step:

- Finished intelligence products (intelligence studies, estimates, reports, etc.)
- Address indicator groups (AIGs), DSSCS address groups (DAGs), collective address designators (CADs), and MAGTF units
- Alarm intelligence support (e.g., I&W reports, time-sensitive target of opportunity reporting, etc.)
- IMINT (to include standard scales, quantities, annotations)
- SIGINT (e.g., requirement for time-sensitive/non-codeword reporting; sanitized version SCI products)
- HUMINT (e.g., CI time-sensitive reports, tactical interrogation reports, special CI reporting)
- GEOINT (e.g., planning and operational map allowance requirements, terrain models and analyses, geospatial information (GI) needed for automated systems)
- Reconnaissance and surveillance (e.g., anticipated requirements as the GCE lead elements advance and deployed ground reconnaissance and ground sensor platoon (GSP) elements' reporting becomes more pertinent to their -- vice MAGTF CE -- current operations)
- Preferred level(s) of classified information that the *who* desires (further subdivided into what they require access to and what they can actually retain on-hand)

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 Releasability and formats for sharing intelligence with allied/coalition partners, NGOs, and PVOs

d. The When's. The final basic dissemination planning step is to determine each who's typical or stated when's – identifying timeliness requirements. The same sources used to research the previous W's likewise are recommend for acquiring initial when answers and baseline planning criteria. The obvious answer is: **the sooner the better consistent with quality information.** However, this factor is highly variable during tactical operations. Key planning considerations include:

• Rapidly assessing the feasibility of satisfying the commander's or planner's stated LTIOVs (intelligence already on-hand or accessible? Can organic assets acquire/produce needed intelligence? Will external support be needed?)

• Nature of the IR (i.e., routine dissemination, alarm criteria/time sensitive IDRs, is it a PIR or in support of another CCIR?)

Communication transmission requirements for the Who's desired format (voice, text, digital, bulk delivery, bandwidth, etc.)

• Capabilities and current status of the MAGTF CIS system, to include current CIS status of recipients

4003. Develop the Intelligence and Information Flow

a. Intelligence Flow. Dissemination planning must begin with analyzing the intelligence and information processes, not just drawing boxes for the location of the various automated systems and intelligence nodes. Once the flow of intelligence, in various forms, has been visualized, detailed planning can be worked out. The use of various types of flow diagrams and dissemination planning matrices can assist in the process. Figure 4-1 shows an example of a MEF intelligence support to targeting flow digram. No standard dissemination matrix has been developed for all dissemination planning functions, but some examples are provided in figure 4-2 (Intelligence Dissemination Requirements Planning Matrix) and Appendix J (Intelligence Reports Matrix). When building a MAGTF dissemination matrix, key dissemination recipients, such as the MSCs, must always be depicted.

MCWP 2-13, MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination




Figure 4-1. Example, MEF Intelligence Support to Targeting Flow Diagram

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Example: Notional MEF Intelligence Support to Targeting Flow

Targeting Related IR Management. Targeting-related IRs will be submitted by higher, adjacent and subordinate elements. These will be submitted to the CMDO in the IOC. The CMDO will consult with P&A Cell and other producers to determine if they can answer the request. If yes, they will do so per either the production or dissemination plan, disseminate products as appropriate, and also post the answer or the product on the intelligence homepage. If the analysts cannot answer the request, they will so notify the CMDO who will then prioritize and request collection.

Support to Time-Sensitive Targeting. Each potential source of time-sensitive targeting intelligence must make decisions on whether the combat information received constitutes high payoff target reporting (HPTR), and if it is targetable. Daily guidance reflecting changes to the commander's intent, G-3 force fires targeting priorities, the daily targeting board and the G-2/IOC's PIRs and intelligence reporting criteria provides this. A tracking and identification code/system should be established for these reports. Reactive targeting occurs when HPTs are located. This time sensitive intelligence is collected and disseminated through the organization responsible for reporting from the sensor concerned. Generally, information will come to the MEF G-2 and its IOC through either the: SARC or the COC intelligence watch (point of contact for friendly unit intelligence and combat information reporting). In special cases and when authorized, this flow may be direct from a specialized intelligence unit to designated recipients (e.g., from RadBn's OCAC to the COC).

Immediate Dissemination of High Value Target Reporting (HVTR). If the information is not an HPT or BDA, it is moved to the P&A Cell for analysis. The P&A Cell will review all reports to determine if it is high value, time sensitive intelligence. If yes, they will note who needs to see it and immediately disseminate it per the dissemination plan and intelligence reporting criteria. If no, it will be determined who needs to see it (internal to the G-2) and used for subsequent intelligence analysis and production.

Analysis and Dissemination of Intelligence Products. P&A Cell analysts will process the information against the current and estimated future enemy situation using other relevant intelligence and databases as appropriate. Time-sensitive intelligence will rapidly be incorporated by the analyst into an Intelligence Report (INTREP) to be disseminated immediately per the dissemination plan and current reporting criteria. Where immediate dissemination is not required, the analyst will likely forward the intelligence for possible inclusion in the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) or other intelligence products. Where targets are developed through the analytical process, the analysts will forward all targets to P&A Cell's target analysis/BDA team for follow-on support to the targeting process.

- **b. Intelligence Reporting.** An intelligence report matrix depicting standard and time-sensitive reporting guidance should be prepared for every operation. The particular format will be tailored to meet unit/force needs. The matrix should detail the flow of every intelligence report expected to be prepared or handled by the intelligence section and the IOC. For MAGTF elements, this should show the flow from the original reporter (collector, SARC, P&A Cell, etc.) to recipients for each type intelligence report. Appendix J shows an example of an intelligence report matrix.
- **c. IDR Planning Matrix.** The IDR planning matrix is a tool that assists the CMDO in managing the MAGTF intelligence dissemination effort. Using an IDR planning matrix helps keep the focus on the commander's decision points, PIRs and other key IRs. This format may be tailored as needed per unit SOP. Figure 4-2 provides one example, with amplifying information provided below. The following describes the information for each column of the matrix.

Requester: Identify the unit name or staff section who requested the intelligence or products. If the requestor has assigned the IR a control number, also list that here.

1 2	6/5/0 PIR/IR: Identify the supported PIR or IR. This may be either a short text description or its control number.
3 4 5 6	<u>Likely Collection Timeframe</u> : Can range from "anytime" to specific windows of opportunity for collection (e.g., related to anticipated time phase lines developed during IPR).
7 8	Source: Source of intelligence collection. This may be depicted either by intelligence discipline (e.g., SIGINT, ground reconnaissance) or by specific collector (e.g., UAV, EA-6B, HET).
9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Who Needs Intel First: Most immediate distribution recipient(s). This may be the original requestor, a list of units identified during COA wargaming, etc. – both internal and external to the unit. Note: While good planning will usually identify this, METT-T factors will drive specific instances. Identification may be by unit name, specific node, staff section, or main/supporting efforts.
16 17 18	<u>Timeliness</u> (hours, minutes, seconds): Factor in who need data streams from sensors, who needs full-blown finished analysis, and who needs semi-finished single-source analysis.
19 20 21 22 23	<u>Currency</u> (hours, minutes, seconds): Usually there is a direct proportional relationship between timeliness and currency requirements – but not always. Basic intelligence analysts, for example, may need current information for event by event analysis, but their timeliness requirements are less critical than that needed by other analysts and the G-3.
24252627	<u>Periodicity of Reporting</u> (days, hours, minutes, seconds, or as event occurs): Usually used when reporting surveillance results or tracking critical threat targets or emerging events. <i>Nothing Significant to Report</i> (NSTR) or negative reports are required unless otherwise directed.
28 29 30	General Product Type: Some examples follow:
31 32 33 34	 Structured text – usually to fill a database or correlator. Unstructured text – freeform Raw digital stream – usually to fill a database or correlator. (ex. Joint STARS feed the CGS) Analog voice Digital voice
35 36 37 38 39 40	 Digital voice Video (tape or digital stream) Raster graphic (scanned/bitmapped photos, maps) Vector graphic (vector maps, certain "change detection" imagery products) Datafiles – usually more than just packages of structured and unstructured text, such as updated programming
41 42 43 44 45	• Combination format Specific/Unique Product Requirements: For each General Product Type, identify any specific or unique product or format requirements. Some examples include specific wordprocessing (Word 7.0) or graphics files (.TIF, .JPEGBMP) formats, minimum annotations on imagery

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1	overlays, etc. This is absolutely critical when designing the MAGTF software applications
2	architecture. You may have to modify procedures when more than one type of application exists
3 4	across the network or, more typically, when interoperating with coalition/allied partners.
5	Standard Channels: Identify the primary and first alternate communication channel for routine.
6 7	non-time-sensitive dissemination (e.g., radio net name, homepage, secure e-mail, secure telephone, courier, etc.).
8	terephone, courier, etc.).
9 10	<u>Alarm Channel(s)</u> : Identify the primary and first alternate communication channel for timesensitive dissemination.
11	
12	Quantity: Usually only used for hardcopy dissemination. Identify specific quantity for each recipient.
13 14	recipient.
15	Deliberate Follow-up: Identify if positive personal follow-up is required with any recipient
16	subsequent to dissemination. If so, state who is responsible, with whom and when. Such follow-
17	up is typically required when answering a commander's PIR in order to ensure understanding
18	and to immediately identify any critical new IRs resulting from it.
19	
20	Acknowledge Receipt Necessary? Yes or No. It's best if the communications data network
21	can do this automatically (like some e-mail packages do).
22	
23	Keeping a database on subordinate units (based upon historical reliability, preferences and SOPs)
24	which lists much of the above (to include detailed data on alternate paths and channels, IP
25	addresses, e-mail addresses, radio nets, telephone lines, etc.) is essential for dissemination
26	management. Subordinate units must coordinate closely with higher HQ's dissemination
27	planners, providing as much of this data as possible via record correspondence, in order to ensure
28	their needs are most effectively met.
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4004. Intranet Management

a. General. This section standardizes the management of a MEF intranet. Each staff section is responsible for posting pertinent information to the MEF intranet and ensuring the information is updated and relevant. The MEF Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) will frame the type of information that will be posted. This allows information to be shared throughout the MEF and made available to every workstation that has access to a web browser. MSCs will also maintain a web server where both relevant and required information by the MEF can be posted. Invalidated information will not be posted on the web page.

b. Background. An intranet is a communication infrastructure based on the communication standards of the internet and the content standards of the world-wide web. The combination of the MEF web server with those of the MSCs and possibly external agencies that are granted access, forms the MEF intranet. The tools used to create an intranet are identical to those used for internet and web applications. Communications connectivity external to the MEF will be via JWICS, SIPRNET and NIPRNET; internally it is via SCI-TDN, S-TDN and U-TDN.

 c. Intranet Management. Relevant information is framed by the MEF CCIRs. The MEF's ability to maintain relevant information on the intranet is determined by its intranet infrastructure and its management roles. The intranet infrastructure relies on five distinct roles for managing the formal content; the web administrator, webmaster, publishers, editors, and authors.

(1) Web Administrator. The web administrator is responsible for facilitating cooperative opportunities among the MEF's various staff sections and administering the MEF's content management infrastructure. The content management infrastructure are those templates and forms that provide the framework for each website. The same person may serve as both the web administrator and webmaster, but it is not recommended. The G/S-6 is responsible for this function.

(2) Webmaster. The webmaster is responsible for the technical infrastructure of the Intranet. The G/S-6 likewise is responsible for this function.

(3) **Publisher.** Each staff section, based on functional responsibility, will determine what kinds of formal information will be created and maintained by their prospective sub-sections. Although the role of monitoring and implementation may be delegated to another person on the staff, responsibility remains with the section head. Within the MEF CE's G/S-2 and intelligence battalion operations, this function is the responsibility of the ISC.

(4) Editor. The editor determines what official information will be created for specific activities, manages the information creation and updates the process, to include formal review cycles. The P&A Cell OIC performs this function for all intelligence estimates and products posted on the MEF intranet. The Support Cell OIC performs this function for all organic and supporting intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operational products and information.

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(5) Author. Authors create the content and actually change and add to the webpages. Each staff section or battlespace function will have authors. Each section head or functional manager will designate authors in writing with a copy to the web administrators. MEF's generally uses two types of pages:

(a) Content Pages. They may be static pages, like the ones you are reading here, or they may be active pages, where the page content is generated "on the fly" from a database or other repository of information. Content pages generally are owned by a staff section.

(b) Broker Pages. Broker pages help users find relevant information. The MEF homepage is a broker page. A hyperlink broker page contains links to other pages, in context. It also may have a short description of the content to which it is pointing, to help the user evaluate the usefulness of the information contained on that page. On the other hand, a search oriented broker page is not restricted to the author's scope, but it also does not provide the same indicators of context to help the user formulate a decision on whether to go to that page.

d. Web Sites. The MEF maintains several websites:

(1) SIPRNET & S-TDN Sites. The MEF maintains a site on the SIPRNET (external to 20 MAGTF) and S-TDN (internal to the MAGTF). This is an intranet approved to handle 21 information classified up to GENSER SECRET. Here you will find information and hyperlinks 22 to homepages for other commands, and ongoing operations.

(2) **NIPRNET & U-TDN Sites.** The MEF maintains a site on the unclassified intranet located on the NIPRNET (external) and U-TDN (internal). This site can only be accessed by personnel with appropriate authorization. It acts as a conduit for unclassified and official use only information.

e. Formats And Requirements For Operational Web Sites. The formats for operational and exercise websites are standardized to make it easy to locate information and reduce download time. The following guide-lines are germane:

(1) Web pages will maintain the same look and feel throughout the MEF.

(2) Text files be converted to html and posted for viewing online whenever practical.

37 (3) The web pages and their sub-directories **WILL NOT** be used as "shared drive."

(4) To reduce download time operational web pages will:

- Use the minimum amount of graphics necessary to convey the information.

- Not use background images or frames.

(5) All pages will indicate the highest classification of information on that page.

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- (6) MSCs will post the following on their web sites:
 - Contact information to include electronic mail addresses and phone numbers.
 - Current Operations and Frag Orders.

- Current version of all recurring required reports.

f. Postings of Status Charts to Websites. Status charts (as outlined in Annex U to the OPLAN or OPORD) will be maintained and updated in accordance with the stipulated schedule (at least every four hours at the MEF CE level) on the operational web page by the responsible staff section.

4005. Develop the Dissemination Plan. The answers to the four *W's* can now be translated into the MEF intelligence dissemination plan and supporting plans. In doing this, dissemination planners must maintain close coordination with all intelligence, operations, and CIS officers as well as pertinent intelligence personnel at higher, adjacent, and other external organizations. The goal is to design and implement a plan that is fully integrated with MEF collections and production operations; that will clearly state how the intelligence will be delivered to the requestor; and that allows for sufficient flexibility to adapt to ongoing tactical developments. The dissemination plan must determine both the:

- Physical means of dissemination, and
- Procedures to be followed in transmission.
- a. Design and Coordinate the Dissemination Architecture. An intelligence dissemination architecture should be designed schematically so that it depicts links from the source to the recipient. It must depict organizations, type intelligence systems, and CIS connectivity among the forces' (MAGTF, joint, naval) intelligence collectors/producers and the supported decision makers/ planners and C2 nodes. Additionally, it must encompass the different types of intelligence support, from higher headquarters produced all-source intelligence down through the rawer forms of time-sensitive tactical intelligence information. To account for different types of data and intelligence, several linkages may need to be constructed for clarity. Further, since planned dissemination architectures must incorporate sufficient flexibility to adjust quickly to fast-developing tactical circumstances, it must depict both primary and alternate channels for both standard and broadcast dissemination. Chaper 5 of this publication discusses dissemination architecture planning in detail. The following must be incorporated:
 - Detail the various means for dissemination: digital networks, radio, wire, and courier communications channels, to include MAGTF common as well as dedicated intelligence systems and architectures. Close coordination with unit G/S-3 and G/S-6 personnel is critical.
 - Provide primary and alternate plans for pipeline (routine), alarm (time-sensitive), supply-push (critical), and demand-pull capabilities.

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The ISC has principle staff responsibility for dissemination architecture. The line of departure

unique security controls (e.g., SCI, RODKA, etc.).

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Account for different types of data/intelligence, to include that requiring special or

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for planning is to clearly state IDR architecture needs. In order that the sum of these are seen in 6 context, architecture needs should be stated within the broader intelligence C2 and CIS 7 requirements, approved by the G-2 and the commander, and then provided in a prioritized list to 8 appropriate G-3, G-5 and G-6 planners. Tailored copies should also be provided to higher and 9 subordinate intelligence officers to support collaborative detailed planning. 10 11 b. Establish Dissemination Procedures. Comprehensive MEF-wide integrated 12 intelligence/operations/fires/CIS policies and procedures are mandatory if intelligence 13 dissemination is to be effective. General dissemination procedures should be established for the 14 delivery of intelligence from the controlling producers or agencies. The precedence of 15 transmission-- ranging from routine to flash--should be agreed upon by all involved parties in 16 17 advance. Audiences should be predetermined as well by defining broadcast parameters (i.e., general or specific). Further, irrelevant intelligence can be better eliminated if reporting 18 19 thresholds and filters are identified early. 20 At a minimum, dissemination TTP must: 21 22 • Clearly identify dissemination responsibilities of the various intelligence staff 23 officers, cells, and centers. 24 25 26 • Coordinate formats for the various types of intelligence products. 27 • Integrate and coordinate procedures between the intelligence section and other staff 28 sections. 29 30 Develop detailed intelligence reporting criteria, filters and reporting methodologies. 31 32 33 • Detail procedures for both routine and time-sensitive dissemination. 34 Identify procedures and means for recording dissemination and related information to 35 aid with management and rapid problem-solving. 36 37 38 Describe procedures and means for maintaining awareness of the operational status of all MAGTF common and dedicated intelligence CIS. 39 40 c. Keep Practical Guidelines in Mind. Common sense and lessons learned, such as the those 41 offered below, should factor into dissemination planning decisions. 42 43 44 45

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(1) General

• Safeguarding intelligence knowledge, successes and challenges from the enemy is an essential consideration.

• Dissemination operations must focus on the importance and quality of the intelligence rather than its volume. Measures that help reduce the volume of intelligence traffic include limiting routine reporting, setting filters to rapidly identify and eliminate information not pertinent to the tactical situation, and establishing minimal reporting thresholds for the generation of intelligence reports.

• Dissemination plans must permit two-way communication, providing means for subordinate units to pass along data, information and intelligence that they collect or develop which identifies new enemy vulnerabilities or enhances situation development for the entire force.

• Intelligence dissemination will be via secure communication means. However, the overriding consideration is always the needs of the supported commanders. Finding the proper balance between security and wider dissemination is a matter of seasoned judgment based upon the tactical situation, the nature of the intelligence, and the sources involved.

• Besides the tactical situation, the form intelligence takes – report, graphic, etc. – has the greatest influence on how and to whom it is disseminated.

• Regardless of how intelligence is disseminated, each occurrence must clearly identify the time of intelligence (TOI) so that recipients can place it in context and rapidly assess its pertinence despite inevitable delays in receipt and during high tempo, high information volume situations.

• Who is authorized to approve the dissemination of any intelligence product or report is a critical determination that must be clearly identified and closely supervised in order to control traffic volume while also minimizing confusion (e.g., circular reporting).

Most dissemination will occur via common, multi-functional communication means.
 Support for intelligence purposes via dedicated means must be identified clearly and early, and well-coordinated with all affected organizations.

• Single-source intelligence reporting will usually be from the collector to the appropriate intelligence C2 node (e.g., the SARC, the ROC, the OCAC or the COC intelligence watch) unless otherwise directed in the specified reporting criteria.

• Automated software application standards must be established throughout the force. Dissemination planners must positively confirm, prior to operations, that all supported units and sections have these in order to preclude interoperability problems.

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- Critical intelligence (chemical-biological weapons employment, surface-to-surface missile attack, etc.) must be rapidly pushed and receipt confirmed with all recipients.
- Pull is used for dissemination of standard intelligence products, such as INTSUMs, generally to meet IRs of many users or to support more deliberate planning needs.
 - If users do not have SIPRNET/JWICS or reasonable capacity TDN capability, then they must be considered as lacking a push/pull capability.
- Even if we have good digital network capability, it must be remembered these systems experience problems and can be degraded or disrupted for many reasons. Back-up or alternate means to disseminate must be planned for to replace pull capabilities when necessary.
 - Intelligence databases, homepages dissemination planners must identify what is posted on homepages, down to what level, how often updated, who manages and how in order to effectively manage dissemination, minimize confusion, and ensure sufficient CIS support for all concerned.

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(3) <u>E-mail</u>

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- When using e-mail for official dissemination, it should be from/to official unit by section or billet accounts (such as Watch Officer to Watch Officer). Individual/personal e-mail accounts should be used only for routine coordination and communication.
- When using e-mail, do not assume transmission equals receipt by all users. Tactical displacements, network problems, etc. all can disrupt timely receipt. Likewise, automated delivery confirmations do not mean that e-mails have been received by intelligence recipients. Accordingly, when using e-mail for intelligence dissemination, originators must assess the criticality of the intelligence versus METT-T and when critical, implement positive confirmation procedures (e.g., secure telephone) to verify its receipt and understanding.
 - Setting up accurate address books for e-mail distribution is critical in successful disseminaton. Billet titles/personnel names and associated internet protocol (IP) addresses must be 100% accurate for all to whom dissemination may be required.
 - Avoid repeated, multiple dissemination of the same reports and information. Also, tailor
 dissemination vice routinely broadcasting it to a large group of addressees. This degrades
 CIS and the whole dissemination system. Example: The SARC, P&A Cell, and COC
 intelligence watch officers all send the same lengthy intelligence report to the same group
 addressees just to be sure it got to them.
- A list of e-mail account passwords should be maintained and controlled by dissemination managers.
- Standards should be established for the size of files that may be attached to e-mails. When these must be exceeded, approval authority should be restricted in order to maintain discipline. Also, files attached to e-mails must always be scanned for viruses prior to dissemination.

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(4) <u>Intelligence Homepage Dissemination</u>

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- You can't put everything on the homepage because it becomes too unmanageable and not everyone has access to SIPRNET or TDN.
- You must determine how to manage it and apply a policy of frequent inspection. Someone must be designated to view each branch's section to scrub for relevancy, easy accessibility.
 - You need to work out the layouts of the homepages with the MAGTF G/S-6 or Information Management Officer. Intelligence dissemination via homepage may be best organized by subject; but the Information Management SOP or appendix may direct organization by chronological receipt. Working out these issues ahead of time makes all the difference.
 - Decide whether to have a newsgroup or not.
 - Standards and guidelines must be articulated on how to monitor homepage dissemination for confirmation of dissemination (e.g., Will you use liaison officers?).

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- (5) <u>COMSEC Aspects</u>. The effectiveness of disseminated intelligence depends on the ability to maintain security and conceal intelligence techniques and success from the adversary. Accordingly, the commander must provide adequate protection to prevent the capture of intelligence facilities and personnel. In addition, intelligence acquires must be adequately
- intelligence facilities and personnel. In addition, intelligence couriers must be adequately protected, and positive measures must be taken to conceal courier runs and routes. Other
- 21 COMSEC planning considerations include:

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- Coordinate with the appointed special security officers (SSOs) in all units authorized to receive and use SCI.
- Adhere to SCI security handling, processing, and storage requirements.
- Obtain authority and establish procedures for the sanitization of SCI products, reports and other information.
 - Determine and coordinate SCI and GENSER LANs and WANs and unique intelligence requirements.
- Determine and coordinate both SCI and GENSER courier requirements and operations.
- Determine unique COMSEC material system (CMS) requirements for intelligence and SCI communications.
 - Determine communication requirements between TSCIFs, mobile SCIFs, supporting security forces, and supported units.

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4006. Allocate Resources. The intelligence officer--in concert with the unit's communications officer--should allocate available personnel and equipment resources to support dissemination requested. For critical deficiencies, global sourcing should be pursued. Requirements must be estimated and resources allocated for routine and time-sensitive operations, with sufficient redundant capabilities for each. For additional discussion, see paragraph 3005.

- The allocation of intelligence resources is most critical during mission execution. A detailed and well-thought-out concept of intelligence support (to include dissemination support), developed in accordance with the commander's intent and concept of operations, will provide an appropriate
- allocation of dissemination capabilities between the main effort and supporting efforts and

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between the intelligence support to execution of current operations and the continuous planning effort for future operations. It is particularly important that Marine Corps force (MARFOR), MAGTF, and major subordinate commanders who control the tasking of intelligence units and capabilities provide access to critical intelligence resources for their subordinate elements.

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4007. Monitor Execution. Intelligence dissemination will be occurring continuously; it is critical to constantly evaluate its effectiveness, the quality of support to all subordinate commanders, and the rapid identification and resolution of problems.

• Develop a dissemination tracking matrix to record receipt of major/critical intelligence and products by intended recipients. (See figure 4-3 for an example of a dissemination tracking matrix.)

UNIT	WatchO		HQ BN		G-1		TAC		MOBILE		G-3		G-4		G-6		2d MAR		6 th MAR	
PRODUCT	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	rec	sent	re

Figure 4-3. Sample, Dissemination Tracking Matrix

• Determine if the user is satisfied with the quality and quantity of intelligence.

• Supervise adherence to specified dissemination priorities and reporting criteria.

• In particular, ensure that no precedence abuse exists or information overload occurs to degrade or overload communication channels.

• Maintain awareness of the operational status of all supporting CIS, as well as the status of PIRs, IRs and IDRs, in order to rapidly make necessary changes consistent with ongoing operations and METT-T.

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MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination Architectures

Chapter 5

"The success of any crisis deployment hinges on the existence of a reliable command and control system and of a flexible, reliable system for gathering, analyzing and disseminating strategic and tactical intelligence."

-- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA¹

5001. Introduction. CIS architectures provide a framework of C2 functional and technical relationships for achieving access, interoperability and compatibility among military and supporting C2 personnel, nodes and systems. Each MAGTF operational architecture is the basis from which the *systems and technical* aspects of intelligence dissemination is visualized and planned. However, MAGTF intelligence dissemination plans must be continually tailored, updated, and adapted to reflect specific METT-T factors, and must include those aspects of intelligence dissemination which are not CIS-based (such as couriers).

This chapter provides doctrine and TTP principles, methodologies and notional architectures to assist in MAGTF intelligence dissemination CIS architecture planning. It discusses principal C2 nodes, lists CIS objectives and planning goals, explains intelligence CIS architecture planning methodology, and provides brief descriptions of basic intelligence CIS requirements. Appendix I provides notional MAGTF intelligence CIS architectures for integrated all-source intelligence operations.

5002. Background. Intelligence architectures are one part of the broader MAGTF C2 support system. They provide the means to interconnect national, theater, JTF, multinational and other intelligence and reconnaissance operations with the MAGTF's internal intelligence architecture and operations in order to plan and direct, collect, produce, disseminate and use intelligence in support of MAGTF needs. Such architectures are based upon joint and Service doctrine defining operational, organizational and functional missions, command relationships, C2 concepts of operations, and information needs and exchange requirements.

The MAGTF intelligence effort is heavily dependent upon secure, reliable, fast and far-reaching CIS support to receive JTF, other components, theater, and national all-source intelligence, and to transmit organically collected and produced intelligence products and reports throughout the MAGTF. CIS are also required for the command and control of MAGTF and supporting intelligence units and their integration with other intelligence and reconnaissance operations. Every MAGTF mission and situation -- METT-T -- is unique, requiring some modifications to the supporting CIS architecture. Generally, the focus of effort prior to the execution phase of an operation is on JTF/theater/national assets in support of planning. Upon execution, the focus

¹ General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, USCINCCENT, Operation Desert Storm, 1991.

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shifts to tactical intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance efforts and support to subordinate
elements. Detailed planning and close coordination between the MAGTF G/S-2, G/S-3, and
G/S-6, and all pertinent operational and intelligence organizations is critical for establishing
reliable and effective intelligence CIS support. ²

5003. Intelligence and Related C2 Nodes

a. References. The intelligence CIS architecture for any given operation is dynamic and heavily METT-T influenced. Key references with respect to specific theater or MAGTF operations include:

(1) Combatant command, JTF and MAGTF intelligence plans developed for various OPLANS.

(2) MAGTF command element intelligence standing operating procedures and combatant commanders intelligence TTP.

(3) Annexes B (Intelligence), C (Operations), J (Command Relationships), K (Communications and Information Systems), and U (Information Management) of the MAGTF and JTF OPLANs and OPORDs.

b. MAGTF Intelligence CIS and External Organizations.

(1) National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)

 (a) All-source national intelligence agencies' assets may deploy in support of JTF (and even directly in support of MAGTF) operations as well as providing critical support via reachback and collaborative capabilities. The NIST is the most typical method used. The NIST is a task-organized unit generally consisting of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and, as appropriate, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) personnel and equipment. Its mission is to provide a tailored, national level all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders (generally at the JTF headquarters level, but support could be provided to other commands) during crisis or contingency operations. Depending upon the supported unit's requirements, a NIST can be task-organized to provide coordination with national intelligence agencies, analytical expertise, I&W, special assessments, targeting support, streamlined and rapid access to national intelligence databases and other products, and assistance facilitating RFI management (see figure 5-1).

² See MC WP 6-22, *Communications and Information Systems*, for a detailed review of MAGTF communications and information systems (CIS) and supporting tactics, techniques and procedures.

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


Figure 5-1. National Intelligence Support Team Capabilities

(b) DIA, through the joint staff J-2, controls the NIST for deployment and administrative

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purposes (see figure 5-2 for an overview of a NIST's deployment cycle). During operations a NIST will usually be in direct support of the joint force commander (JFC), who exercises C2 of it via the JTF J-2. Once deployed, any of the intelligence agencies with representatives on the NIST can provide its leadership. The basic C2 relationship between the NIST and the JTF (or other supported commands) is direct support. The NIST will be under the staff cognizance of the JTF J-2, performing intelligence support functions as so designated. The basic NIST concept of operations is to take the J-2's RFIs and collection and production requirements, discuss and deconflict these internally within the NIST to determine which element(s) should take these for action. Each NIST element leader, and as coordinated by the NIST team chief, will conduct liaison with their parent national intelligence organization. All intelligence generated by the NIST is available to the JTF J-2 joint intelligence support element (JISE), the JFC, and other

elements of the JTF with the usual restriction based on clearance and programs.




Figure 5-2. NIST Deployment Cycle

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(c) The composition and capabilities of each NIST deployment is unique based on the mission, duration, agencies' representation, and capabilities required (see figure 5-3). A NIST, however, is not a totally self-contained element. Rather, it requires logistic and other support from the supported command. Depending upon the situation, support that a NIST may require from the supported unit includes information systems technical support and an access controlled secure area (generally within the supported unit's tactical sensitive compartmented information facility, or TSCIF).

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


Figure 5-3. Notional Composition of a National Intelligence Support Team

 (d) A NIST's organic capabilities generally encompass only intelligence and some unique CIS support. NIST CIS capabilities will be task-organized. It may range from a single agency element's voice connectivity to a fully equipped NIST with JDISS and JWICS video teleconferencing (VTC) capabilities (see figure 5-4 for one of a NIST's key sophisticated CIS capabilities). Current methods of operation continue to rely on both agency and supported command-provided communications paths to support deployed NIST elements. The systems that each element is capable of deploying are discussed in greater detail in appendix C, "NIST Systems", of Joint Publications 2-02, *National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

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Figure 5-4. NIST JWICS Mobile Integrated Communications System

(2) JTF J-2 and the Joint Intelligece Support Element (JISE)

(a) The JTF J-2 organizational structure and capabilities will be situation and mission dependent as determined by the JFC and the JTF J-2. The JISE is the principal intelligence C2 node within the JTF J-2. The JISE is the focus for JTF intelligence operations, providing the JFC and component commanders with situational awareness and other intelligence support regarding adversary air, space, ground and maritime capabilities and activities. Figure 5-5 depicts a generic joint intelligence architecture.

(b) All intelligence collection, production and dissemination activities will be conducted within the JISE. Once initial basic and current intelligence products and support have been provided to the JTF and its components, updates will be accomplished by the JISE using push/pull dissemination techniques. Intelligence CIS based on the JDISS/JWICS functionality provide the JTF with the ability to query theater and national intelligence servers and databases for the most current intelligence. (See Joint Publication 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, and Joint Pub 2-02, *National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, for additional information on national and JTF intelligence operations.)

(1) Collection. The JTF J-2 collection manager will plan, coordinate and direct intelligence operations in support of the JTF and subordinate components. A wide range of theater and JTF collection assets may be employed. Depending upon the situation, specific

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collection missions, and time-sensitivity of the collected information, MAGTF interfaces with these external collection operations may be direct between the MAGTF CE and the collector (e.g., between Joint STARS aircraft and intel bn's Joint STARS common ground station) or will support will be received post-mission via the established JTF CIS architecture.

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(2) Production. MAGTF IRs will be managed by the JISE in accordance with the JFC's PIRs and other validated IRs. Connectivity is provided via the established JTF CIS architecture -- principally JWICS and SIPRNET -- and MAGTF production elements.

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(3) Dissemination. Once basic and current intelligence have been provided to a deploying JTF and its components, updates and new intelligence will be accomplished using push/pull dissemination techniques. Intelligence CIS based on the the JTF JDISS/JWICS/SIPRNET and the MAGTF's IAS/SCI-TDN/S-TDN architecture provide the JTF with effective interoperability and the ability to query theater and national intelligence organizations, servers and databases for the most current intelligence.

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


Figure 5-5. Joint Intelligence Architecture

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(3) Theater, Combatant Commands' Joint Intelligence/Analysis Centers (JIC/JAC).

geographic combatant commanders and their subordinate commanders. The JICs and JAC are

the primary source from which subordinate JTFs receive intelligence support for their areas of

interest, providing finished intelligence products in support of theater mission planning and

The combatant commands' JICs and JAC are the cornerstones for fulfilling the IRs of the

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w Collection. The combatant commander's J-2 retains full collection management authority (i.e., to validate, modify, or non-concur) over all intelligence collection requirements against targets within their area of responsibility. Such authority may be delegated to a subordinate JFC. All validated collection requirements that cannot be satisfied by organic JTF means will be submitted to the combatant command's JIC/JAC. w Production. Combatant commands, services and defense agencies intelligence

production centers' production responsibilities are clearly delineated within the DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP). The DODIPP is structured to capitalize on the analytical and production resources of the entire DOD intelligence production community. It supports the efficient use of production resources, prevents duplication of effort, and enhances timely support to user IRs. The Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM) automates DODIPP procedures for stating and tracking theater IRs and other intelligence production requirements. Results may be incorporated into all-source or singlesource intelligence products, or into various intelligence databases. MAGTF access to these will be via the procedures described earlier and the established JTF CIS architecture.

w Dissemination. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), using principally JWICS for connectivity, is the primary intelligence system used by the JIC/JACs for both the receipt and dissemination of intelligence products. Using these systems, multimedia intelligence dissemination (voice, data, imagery, record message, e-mail, graphics, video) can be supported. File servers maintained by the JIC/JACs are key components of intelligence support. These file servers can be accessed using JDISS and IAS, providing subordinate commands and other users the ability to pull intelligence when required. The JICs have access to all of the government-owned, common user networks used by the intelligence community: Defense Message System (DMS), Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS), NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS, and the Defense Switched Network (DSN). Access to military satellite systems includes the Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) and the Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM). Commercial satellite access is also available through the International Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT) and INTELSAT.

(4) Multinational Operations. Combined and multinational operations are today the norms, making critical the sharing of intelligence between the MAGTF and allies. There is no existing multilevel security system to facilitate the automated dissemination to combined or multinational partners of disclosable and releasable intelligence or geospatial information. Combatant

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- commands and subordinate JTFs can request through DIA, NIMA, NSA, or CIA that intellience
- 2 information be either disclosed or released to coalition and/or allied nations as necessary. A
- 3 subordinate joint force must be interoperable with, and have access to, theater intelligence
- databases, as well as allied and/or coalition force databases and dissemination systems. For
- 5 example, intelligence products may be stored on systems such as the Linked Operational
- 6 Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE), the primary automated system for exchanging information
- 7 with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. A similar capability exists in Korea with the
- 8 Pacific automated data processing (ADP) Server Site Korea.

(a) <u>Planning</u>. When planning CIS requirements, the combatant command/JTF J-2 identifies the type of mission, formulates the concept of operations, considers joint and service doctrine, and determines the specific mission requirements. The MAGTF G/S-2 must work closely with the J-2 and J-6 and, in the case of a JTF, with subordinate commanders, to determine intelligence CIS data bandwidth requirements, recommended priorities of data transmission, and the development of primary and alternate plans. Supporting communications paths will require connectivity with the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) to allow for the transmission of large (especially GI/GEOINT/imagery) files.

(b) <u>Mission Objectives</u>. As specific mission objectives of the JFC and each of the subordinate component commanders are developed, the JTF J-2 develops a list of the subordinate joint force intelligence assets and those assigned from national and service sourcing. The MAGTF G/S-2, with the specific activity timelines for planned operations, will produce an estimate of the data bandwidth and other CIS requirements necessary to fill shortfalls in intelligence data transmissions.

(c) CIS Plan. The JTF J-6 determines the specific CIS plan to support intelligence operations throughout the to the MAGTF and to adjacent/higher commanders. The plan will include a node-to-node layout of existing and planned data transmission routes and the identification of all organizations or units to be included in the communications architecture.

(5) Amphibious Task Force Intel Center (AFTIC). During amphibious operations, amphibious task force (ATF) and the MAGTF's CE intelligence sections generally will integrate their operations. The principal intelligence C2 node is the AFTIC located aboard the ATF flagship. The ATFIC is composed of designated shipboard spaces with installed CIS systems that support the intelligence operations of both the ATF and landing force (LF) while reducing duplicative functions and producing more comprehensive and timely intelligence for the entire naval task force. Standard CIS connectivity is available – JWICS, SIPRNET, NIPRNET, AUTODIN, DSN. Access is provided via the flagship's GENSER communication center and the special intelligence communication center within the ATFIC's ship's signals exploitation space (SSES). Embarked intelligence specialists with associated equipment must be integrated into the CIS network for access to the ship's communication capabilities for receipt and dissemination of intelligence. Coordination with the ship's communication officer is critical to support access to the national production network and distributive production support. Access is necessary for

pulling intelligence and data from support facilities and for "pushing" tailored mission products

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1	to embarked LF elements and forward to support LF operations ashore using split-based,
2	reachback and other methodologies.
3	
4	c. Principal Intelligence C2 Nodes. The following are the principal C2 nodes from which
5	MAGTF intelligence operations are planned and directed:
6	
7	(1) MEF Command Element Intelligence C2 Nodes Combat Intelligence Center and
8	Intelligence Operations Center. The CIC and its subordinate elements is the principal MAGTF
9	intelligence C2 node that provides the facilities and infrastructure for the centralized planning,
10	direction and C2 of the MEF's comprehensive intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operations
11	(see figure 5-6). Since the CIC must effectively support the <i>entire</i> MAGTF, it must remain
12	responsive to the requirements of <i>all elements of the MAGTF</i> . Understanding the CIC and its
13	subordinate elements is essential to effective intelligence C2 and planning, integrating and
14	executing effective intelligence collection, production and dissemination operations.

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Combat Intelligence Center (CIC)—overarching intelligence operations center established within the MEF or MEB main command post. Encompasses the primary functions of the MEF intelligence section and Intelligence Battalion. It includes the following sub-elements.

- **G-2 Plans**—main element of the G-2 section for coordinating and providing intelligence support to the MEF CE future plans team; and leadership and direction of the G-2 section's imagery and mapping, SIGINT, and weather sections.
- **G-2 Operations**—main element of the G-2 section for coordinating and providing intelligence support to the MEF CE CG, battle staff, current and future operations center elements; target intelligence support to force fires operations; G-2 section intelligence requirements management activities; Red Cell support; and MEF intelligence liaison with external commands and organizations.

Intelligence Operations Center (IOC)—principal MEF intelligence operations and C2 center that is established by Intel Bn. Performs intelligence requirements management, staff cognizance of ongoing organic and supporting collection operations, intelligence analysis and production, and intelligence dissemination. It includes three integrated, mutually supporting intelligence operations cells:

- * **Support Cell**—primary element for conducting MEF-wide intelligence requirements management; weather support; collections and dissemination planning and direction; and intelligence staff cognizance of MEF organic and supporting intel and recon operations.
- * Production and Analysis (P&A) Cell—primary analysis and production element of the MEF. Processes and produces all-source intelligence products in response to require- ments of the MEF. Additionally, it is the principal IMINT and GEOINT production element of the MEF.
- * Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell (SARC)—primary element for the supervision of MEF collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence collection operations conducted by organic, attached, and direct support collection assets.

CI/HUMINT Company Command Post—primary element for conducting CI/HUMINT planning and direction, command and control, and coordination of MEF CI/HUMINT operations with external CI/HUMINT organizations.

Operations Control and Analysis Center (OCAC)—main node for the C2 of radio battalion SIGINT operations and the overall coordination of MEF SIGINT operations. Processes, analyzes, produces, and disseminates SIGINT-derived information and directs the ground-based electronic warfare activities of the radio battalion.

Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC)—main node for the C2 of force reconnaissance company's operations and the overall coordination of MEF ground reconnaissance operations. Processes, analyzes, produces, and disseminates ground reconnaissance-derived information in support of MEF intelligence requirements.

Figure 5-6. MEF CE's Combat Intelligence Center and Intelligence Battalion's Intelligence Operations Center Key Elements

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2	In supporting this objective, the CIC supports both G-2 section and intelligence battalion
3	operations. While integrated, the organizational approach differs some for each of these.
4 5	w G-2 Section. The G/S-2 serves as the intelligence officer for the MAGTF commander,
6	with the CIC serving as the primary intelligence C2 and operations node for the <i>entire</i> MAGTF.
7	As such, the CIC <i>must</i> remain responsive to the requirements of <i>all elements</i> of the MAGTF. In
8	this intelligence support concept, the CIC provides the facilities to allow the MAGTF
9	intelligence section and intel bn to perform the following tasks:
10	
11 12	(a) Provides centralized direction for MAGTF intelligence operations.
13	(b) Consistent with the commander's priorities, consolidates, validates, and prioritizes IRs
14	of the entire force.
15	
16	(c) Plans, develops, and directs the MAGTF collection, production, and dissemination
17	plans and operations.
18	
19	(d) Maintains a consolidated, all-source production center in the MAGTF P&A cell.
20	() D' (d
21	(e) Directs the employment of MAGTF organic collection assets through the SARC and
22 23	the operations control and analysis center (OCAC).
24	(f) Submits consolidated requests for external intelligence support through the Marine
25	component headquarters to appropriate agencies.
26	
27	(g) Links the MAGTF to national, theater, joint, other-Service, and multinational
28	intelligence assets and operations.
29	
30	
31	The key G-2 section nodes are organized to effectively align and support the MEF CE's staff
32	cross-functional cellular staff organization and concept of operations. The G-2 plans branch is
33	aligned to provide intelligence support to the MEF CE's future plans cell efforts. The G-2 operations branch is aligned to provide intelligence support to the MEF CE's COC, FOC, force
34 35	fires center and to direct and manage the G-2's Red Cell and the MEF's external intelligence
36	liaison teams (see figure 5-7).
37	nuison teams (see figure 5 1).
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


Figure 5-7. MEF CE Cross-Functional Cellular Organization and Intelligence Support

CIS facilities, CIS and other support must allow the AC/S G-2 and G-2 section to perform the following major tasks:

(a) Developing and answering outstanding MEF and subordinate units' PIRs and IRs by planning, directing, integrating and supervising MEF organic and supporting intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operations.

(b) Planning the MEF concept of intelligence operations for approval by the AC/S G-2 and subsequent implementation by the ISC based upon the mission, threat, commander's intent, guidance, and concept of operations.

(c) Recommend CI and force protection measures and countermeasures.

(d) Preparing appropriate intelligence plans and orders for the MEF, to include reviewing, coordinating, and integrating the intelligence plans of JTFs, theaters, and other organizations.

(e) Coordinating, providing and facilitating the use of intelligence to the MEF CG, the battlestaff, the future plans cells, the FOC, the COC, and the force fires center.

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14 15 16 (f) Planning, directing and supervising MEF liaison teams to external commands (e.g., the JTF, service and joint functional components headquarters, as appropriate) and intelligence organizations (theater, national, multinational).

(g) Coordinating and supervising the transition of intelligence planning and operations from G-2 plans to G-2 future operations, and from G-2 future operations to G-2 current operations, in order to effectively support the MEF" "single battle" transition process.

w Intelligence Operations Center. The IOC is the other principal MEF CE intelligence node. The three key subordinate elements within the IOC and their typical composition are the support cell, the SARC, and the P&A cell (see figure 5-8). It provides the facilities, CIS and other support to allow the ISC and intel bn to perform the following tasks:




Figure 5-8. Intelligence Operations Center Elements and Composition

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x Provide centralized direction for MEF intelligence operations under the staff cognizance of the AC/S G-2. The IOC is the core for this task, with key assistance from the G-2 plans and G-2 operations elements.

x Consistent with the commander's priorities, consolidate, validate, and prioritize IRs of the entire force. The key CIC element providing for this is the CMD section within the IOC's support cell. Intelligence specialists from all disciplines generally are organic to this section.

 ${\bf x}$ Plan, develop, and direct the MEF collection, production, and dissemination plans and operations. The key CIC elements providing for this are the CMD section within the IOC's support cell and the P&A cell.

x Submit consolidated requests for external intelligence support through the Marine component headquarters (or appropriate functional component headquarters if the JFC is employing a functional C2 concept) to appropriate agencies. The key CIC element providing for this is the CMD section within the IOC's support cell, with assistance from the P&A cell and the G-2 operations branch.

x Allow the ISC to exercise, per AC/S G-2 cognizance, principal staff cognizance of MEF organic and supporting intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operations, to include SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, CI, MASINT, ground reconnaissance, and aerial reconnaissance operations.

x Coordinate and manage the employment and reporting of MEF organic collection assets through the IOC's SARC. Within the SARC will be representatives from most organic and supporting intelligence and reconnaissance units to provide C2 and reporting of ongoing intelligence operations.

x Maintain a consolidated, all-source intelligence production center in the MEF in the IOC's P&A cell. The other nodes with significant intelligence production involvement are the radio battalion's OCAC and the CI/HUMINT company's CP. Similar to the CMD section, intelligence specialists from all intelligence disciplines generally are organic to the P&A cell.

x Link the MEF CE to national, theater, joint, other-Service, and multinational intelligence assets and operations. All intelligence intel bn and G-2 section nodes have common and unique capabilities to perform critical tasks to accomplish this function. In addition to MEF CE common communications pathways and TDN provided by the communications battalion, the IOC generally will also have unique intelligence communications capability, such as Trojan Spirit II.

w **CIS Support.** CIS support to CIC and IOC operations will vary from operation to operation based upon METT-T. Generally all nodes will have or will have access to IAS and JDISS (each with COLISEUM and other specialized applications) and connectivity with the full range of communications (JWICS/SCI-TDN, SIPRNET/S-TDN, NIPRNET/U-TDN, DSN,

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DMS, voice radio and telephone, video-teleconferencing, etc.) via either MEF CE common communications or unique intel bn CIS capabilities. Examples of unique intelligence CIS capabilities are those integral to the VMU squadron remote receive station (RRS), the radio battalion technical control and analysis center (TCAC) and the AN/MSC-63A special security communications central, the GSP's tactical remote sensor system, the IIP's tactical exploitation group (TEG), the VMAQ squadron's tactical electronic reconnaissance processing and evaluation system (TERPES), the CI/HUMINT automated tool set (CHATS), manpack secondary imagery dissemination (Manpack SIDS), Trojan Spirit II (TS-II), and the Joint STARS common ground station. See figure 5-9 for a depiction of a notional MEF overarching intelligence CIS architecture.




Figure 5-9. Notional MEF Intelligence Communications and Information Systems Architecture

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w The MEF G-2 section and intelligence battalion's overall command and control relationships and resulting all-source intelligence support flow throughout the MEF are as indicated in figure 5-10.




Figure 5-10. MEF G-2 and Intelligence Battalion C2 Relationships and MEF Intelligence Support Flow

(2) MAGTF Subordinate Units' Intelligence Centers and Elements. IAS or the intelligence operations workstation (IOW) will be available at all command echelons down to the maneuver battalion/squadron levels. Communications connectivity between the MEF CE and its MSC HQs are predominantly provided by SATCOM, supplemented where practical with terrestrial line-of-sight and troposcatter multi-channel radio systems. Connectivity to the MSC HQs and down to the regiment/MAG level may be provided via U-TDN, S-TDN, SCI-TDN and various multichannel radio resources. Finally, communications connectivity below the regiment/group level depends principally on single channel radio primarily designed for voice traffic, with

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- 1 limited range and limited data capacities (1.2 Kbps to 16 Kbps), secure telephones, and couriers.
- 2 Although these units possess tactical data systems, their ability to exchange data traffic is
- currently limited due to the far less available bandwidth. 3

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- (3) Special Security Communications Elements and Teams. The mission of the special security communications elements and teams is to provide special intelligence (SI) communications support to the MAGTF. SI communications support for the MAGTF CE is provided by the special security communications element (SSCE) of the radio battalion. SI communications support for the division and MAW HQ is provided by special security communications teams (SSCT) -- small force units organic to each division and MAW. These teams operate under the staff cognizance of the AC/S, G-2/Special Security Officer. The special security element or team provides the personnel and equipment to install, operate, and maintain SI and SCI communications terminals. The communications circuits are provided by the
- 13 communications unit supporting the HQ—the communications battalion for the MAGTF CE, the 14
- communications company for the division HO, and the communications squadron for the MAW 15
- HQ. Close coordination is maintained by SSCE or SSCT with the supporting SYSCON and 16
- TECHCON to ensure adequate support and circuit priority. The special security elements/teams 17
- also may provide personnel augmentation to man ship's signals exploitation spaces (SSES) 18
- communications facilities as necessary to support landing force requirements. When done, those 19
- 20 personnel consolidated will normally be with ATF special security communications personnel to
- operate on integrated ATF/LF special security communication center (SSCC). 21

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5004. External Architectures. At the MEF CE level, the G-2 must maintain detailed information on the intelligence CIS systems and architectures of every theater combatant commander to which the MAGTF has contingency responsibilities, those of potential supporting national intelligence organizations, those of other U.S. military services' forces with which they may operate in a JTF and, as appropriate, those of allied/multinational countries' intelligence organizations.

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5005. MAGTF CIS Architectures

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a. Baseline Architectures. For each potential contingency, the intelligence officer must determine the architecture needed to provide the necessary intelligence support throughout the MAGTF and then develop the plans and conduct the training required to establish that architecture upon activation of the contingency. Since each contingency will have a specific mission, task organization, and unique operational environment, and each theater and JTF will have a mission-tailored intelligence architecture, MAGTF intelligence architecture planning must be both detailed and dynamic.

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- **b.** Tailored Architectures. Although baseline MAGTF CIS capabilities will provide the initial point of departure for intelligence architecture planning, changes will likely be needed to meet mission specific needs. Working closely with the MAGTF G/S-3, G/S-6 and G/S-1 (for messenger/courier service requirements), and higher, adjacent and subordinate intelligence officers, the MAGTF G/S-2 must plan and help prepare an internal intelligence CIS architecture
- that provides the MAGTF with access and interoperatibility with the broader intelligence system-45

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-in order to acquire needed tactical intelligence support for all MAGTF elements. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, the G/S-2 must (1) rapidly validate or update standing intelligence CIS requirements; and (2) identify specific intelligence CIS priorities to support effective collaborative planning.

5006. Intelligence CIS Architecture Objectives and Planning Goals. Intelligence CIS architecture plans must reflect the broad range of potential missions and MAGTF task organizations; the wide range of available communications, information and intelligence systems in use today; and supporting organizational and functional SOPs to support all levels of the MAGTF.

a. The fundamental objectives of any CIS system are equally applicable to intelligence CIS architecture planning and development.

(1) <u>The principle goal</u>: allow rapid and comprehensive all-source intelligence fusion to produce a picture of the battlespace intelligence that is accurate, available to all MAGTF commanders and planners (as appropriate) in a timely manner and useable form, and satisfies MAGTF tactical IRs.

(2) Support unity of effort, both within the MAGTF as well as the broader joint (to include integration and interoperability with other services or functional components) and multinational force.

(3) Exploit total force capabilities and support operational tempo through a responsive, quickly installable, reliable and easily operated and maintained CIS system.

(4) Properly respond to and support the dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence to commanders and other decisionmakers needing it.

b. Additional intelligence CIS architecture planning goals include:

(1) Early and continuous connectivity with JTF, theater, national, allied, naval and other component intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance organizations.

(2) Connectivity with tactical assets, to include combat and CSS units and all reconnaissance and surveillance elements throughout the MAGTF in contact with the enemy.

(3) Phased expansion of tactical CIS capabilities in support of all MAGTF forces commencing with the initial contingency alert/planning, during the subsequent deployment and movement phase, and on through rapid establishment of full capabilities upon arrival within the AO and subsequent operations.

(4) Establishment of an internal MAGTF intelligence architecture that supports the six principal intelligence functions.

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(5) Determination of unique CIS architecture requirements for each intelligence discipline (i.e., SIGINT, CI, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, GEOINT, OSINT, ground and air reconnaissance, etc.).

(6) Standardization of intelligence methods, modes, databases, product formats, procedures and other relevant intelligence CIS functional activities.

5007. Intelligence CIS Architecture Planning Methodology. The following intelligence CIS planning methodology (see figure 5-11) provides a simple framework for intelligence CIS architecture contingency preparations and peacetime training opportunities. As with the intelligence cycle, this intelligence CIS planning methodology is not a purely sequential process. Rather, it is a dynamic process that seeks to anticipate and plan for future CIS requirements while concurrently adjusting to current operational and tactical circumstances.




Figure 5-11. MAGTF Intelligence CIS Planning Methodology

a. Step 1 -- Develop Command, CIS and Intelligence Mission Objectives and Operational Scenarios. During this step, intelligence planners endeavor to clarify, specify and assess command missions, supporting objectives and tasks, and preliminary multi-functional concepts of operations in order to establish the broad intelligence CIS architecture needs. Key information to consider includes:

(1) Multi-echelon commanders' intents, situational assessments, concepts of operations and their desired endstates, initial planning guidance and PIRs/IRs.

(2) MAGTF, JTF, and other forces committed to or supporting the operation, with special attention to available intelligence reconnaissance and CIS resources (personnel and equipment).

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- (3) Command relationships, with special attention to ownership and tasking authority of supporting CIS and intelligence collection, production and dissemination resources.
- (4) Estimated planning and execution timelines, focusing on operational phases.

- (5) Characteristics of the operating area, the nature and capabilities of the threat, and the nature and capabilities of other significant political, military, economic and sociological players in order to identify early PIRs and other unique factors which may influence CIS architecture development.
- (6) Early anticipated MAGTF operational activities -- such as the deployment of an alert contingency force, a special-purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) or lead echelon of the MEF -- and associated intelligence needs.
- b. Step 2 -- Identify and Prioritize Intelligence Functions Required to Support the Operations Plan, Intelligence Flow and Associated CIS Needs. The nature of the mission (conventional combat, disaster relief, NEO), the information acquired in step 1, already available intelligence, available time and the JTF/Components'/MAGTF's (and subordinate elements') operational, CIS and intelligence concepts of operations will provide the minimum information required for this step. The endstate is a clear listing and prioritization of intelligence CIS requirements. The intelligence officer must continually assess and determine the relative priorities among the six basic intelligence functions and ensure that the most critical priorities receive essential CIS support until conditions allow for the establishment (or restoration) of full JTF and MAGTF CIS capabilities. The intelligence concept of operations and functional priorities determined by the MAGTF intelligence officer will set the direction for subsequent intelligence CIS planning.
- **c.** Step 3 -- Design Intelligence Information Linkages on a Node-to-Node Basis. This step compiles all acquired information into a node-to-node depiction of intelligence C2, information management, and CIS activity. Nodes are used to represent headquarters (or more specifically, intelligence, C2, fires and other elements within a HQ, such as the IOC or the COC) and external supported/supporting organizations. Connectivity requirements, sometimes called *needlines*, between nodes will identify as appropriate the intelligence function(s) they serve, specific associated intelligence and communications systems, an estimate of communication volume and priority, and essential technical characteristics associated with the needline.
- (1) For planning purposes, a useful technique to use when depicting the MAGTF's intelligence CIS architecture is to break it down into two distinct elements.
- -- That portion which depicts the command and key staff CIS nodal linkages among principal warfighting units or their C2 nodes (e.g., from the MEF Command element G-2 to the JTF J-2 and Marine Division HQ G-2).

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1	That portion which depicts nodal linkages among intelligence and reconnaissance
2	units and specific command posts (e.g., from deployed ground reconnaissance or Joint STARS
3	aircraft and the SARC).
4	
5	(2) Upon completion of this step, MAGTF intelligence CIS planners – principally
6	intelligence battalion's CMDO will provide to the MAGTF G/S-6 (and the G/S-1 for courier
7	requirements) the prioritized listing of intelligence CIS requirements. Copies should likewise be
8	provided to the MAGTF G/S-3 and to higher and subordinate units' intelligence officers (and
9	other intelligence planners, as required) to support concurrent multi-echelon intelligence CIS
10	architecture development. The G/S-6 will then coordinate the CIS plan to satisfy these
11	requirements consistent with the commander's overall operational, C2 and CIS priorities.
12	
13	(3) When stating requirements to CIS planners, intelligence planners' focus should be on the
14	intelligence function and associated unique technical and operational requirements in order to
15	allow the G/S-6 maximum flexibility regarding how to satisfy the requirement. The following
16	information, at a minimum, must be specified.
17	
18	Intelligence CIS Requirement statement regarding the intelligence function/role
19	to be performed for the G/S-2 section, intelligence battalion and of organic and supporting
20	intelligence and reconnaissance units. Initially, each intelligence CIS requirement should be
21	separately stated. Subsequent G-6/G-2 CIS planning will determine if an option will support
22	multiple requirements (e.g., an option may support both intelligence dissemination and C2, vice
23	being dedicated to one or the other).
24	
25	• <u>Priority</u> relative priority vis-a-vis other intelligence CIS requirements.
26	• <u>Link/net subscriber composition</u> listing of commands and/or intelligence
27	organizations that will be participants/users.
28	
29	Operational requirements these should address operational factors that add
30	focus to each requirement. Operationally oriented information that may be useful includes:
31	
32	 Date/time for initial activation of the requirement.
33	 Physical location of command posts or intelligence units.
34	 Necessary placement within an intelligence C2 node of certain CIS terminals.
35	• Whether the requirement is necessary for all or select phases of an operation.
36	• Whether the needline is required for 24-hour continuous usage or as required
37	availability.
38	• Whether there is a requirement for access to restricted or special security
39	communications (e.g., RODKA, SCI).
40	• Whether inclusion of the units on distribution for additional address indicator
41	groups (AIGs), collective address disgnators (CADs) and DSSCS address
42	groups (DAGs) is needed.
43	Whether requirement is necessary during intelligence C2 node displacements
44	and, if so, identifying with what intelligence C2 node/echelon each is

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1	associated and any acceptable modifications to routine operating
2	characteristics.
3	 Standard message/reports formats.
4	 Distribution of messages, to include to whom and quantity: record,
5	automated, manual.
6	 Type of dissemination channel and mode desired.
7	
8	<u>Technical requirements</u> these should address any unique technical factors that
9	have bearing on the requirement's satisfaction. Technical information that may be pertinent
10	includes:
11	
12	• Type service required (e.g., data, voice, video, LAN, WAN, facsimile, etc.).
13	• Type operation (e.g., full duplex, multi-point receive only, etc.).
14	 Estimates of link usage activity or volume (for both routine and surge
15	operations).
16	 Recommended circuits and systems restoration priorities.
17	 Minimum security classification and any special handling considerations for
18	information to be processed/transmitted.
19	 Message formats and reports to be processed.
20	 Wide and local area network requirements: use of homepages, server
21	requirements, IP addresses, etc. Generally this should clearly differentiate
22	between WANs and LANs internal and external to the MAGTF.
23	 Systems administration procedures, database access & types, database
24	maintenance, etc.
25	 Precedence levels (flash, immediate, priority, routine).
26	 Specific minimum speed of circuit requirements: number of channels,
27	bandwidth, rates.
28	 Frequency ranges of organic equipment.
29	 Routing indicators (for SCI communications only).
30	 Whether additional off-line peripheral equipment, unique software
31	applications, or special personnel expertise is needed.
32	 Power outputs and available antenna support.
33	 Details regarding telecommunication service request preparations (SCI CIS
34	requirements only).
35	 Known unique cryptographic requirements and account codes.
36	 Known unique tempest requirements.
37	 Desired quantity of terminal drops (e.g., for telephone and LAN stations
38	within an intelligence C2 node) and recommended drop names (e.g., the name
39	of the telephone's primary user, or the preferred e-mail account name for the
40	LAN station).
41	
42	d. Step 4 Develop the Detailed CIS Support Plan. Effectively developing this plan

and its supporting branch plans -- is a true multi-echelon, J/G/S-2/6/3 effort. The CIS officer's focus is on providing the necessary communication channels, interfaces and media necessary to

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- 1 move intelligence throughout the MAGTF, and to lateral elements and higher echelons. The
- intelligence officer remains focused on the employment of allocated and other available CIS 2
- resources in performance of the MAGTF's current and anticipated future intelligence missions. 3
- Additionally, the G/S-2 must maintain close coordination with J/G/S-3s regarding current and 4
- future operational missions and requirements. 5

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5008. Basic Standing Intelligence CIS Requirements. Regardless of the size of the MAGTF, there are certain standing intelligence CIS requirements which must be satisfied. These requirements are:

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a. Ability to Command and Control Subordinate Units. Intelligence officers and intelligence and reconnaissance unit commanders/OICs must be capable of positive C2 of subordinate units and organic/attached intelligence elements, and the integration of their operations with broader MAGTF and external intelligence and operations C2. Traditionally single-channel radio (SCR) and record message traffic have been used to support C2 of MAGTF intelligence units. In semistatic situations, secure e-mail via WANs/LANs or telephone may be the method of choice, while in highly fluid or mobile scenarios, cellular, SATCOM, and VHF and HF radio may be used.

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- b. Ability to Receive and Transmit Collected Data and Information from Collection and
- 20 **Deployed Elements.** The MAGTF intelligence CIS architecture must provide connectivity
- between organic and supporting collection or deployed elements (such as the HUMINT support 21
- teams, SIGINT collection or DF teams, the Tactical Exploitation Group (TEG), GEOINT support 22
- teams (GISTs), and reconnaissance elements); IMINT (IIP), GEOINT (Topo Platoon), SIGINT 23
- (RadBn OCAC and VMAO TERPES), CI/HUMINT Co. CP) analysis and production centers, 24
- 25 and supported MAGTF operations and intelligence centers (P&A Cell, COC, FOC, FFC).
- Requirements include the access to high capacity JWICS, SIPRNET, and NIPRNET networks for 26
- external communication and SCI tactical data network (SCI-TDN), SECRET TDN (S-TDN), and 27
- unclassified TDN (U-TDN) for internal MAGTF communications, as well as the capability to 28
- 29 transmit collection files and reports digitally via fiber-optics, wire, or radio/telephone in formats
- (both voice and data) that are readily usable by the analysts and in a format allowing rapid 30 dissemination. 31

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c. Ability to Receive and Disseminate Indications and Warnings. I&W intelligence is disseminated in a variety of means to include voice, record messages, tactical reports, e-mail, and intelligence broadcasts. Having the capability to receive the information, recognizing the I&W intelligence as such, and possessing a C2 and CIS method to disseminate this I&W intelligence to the affected units and decisionmakers are key to satisfying this requirement.

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- d. Ability to Provide Intelligence to Supported Commanders. The required intelligence CIS architecture must support the commander's (and subordinate commanders') intent, concepts of
- operations and intelligence, command relationships, and standing PIRs and IRs. The MAGTF 41
- intelligence architecture must be capable of integrating CI/HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, 42
- 43 and reconnaissance element C2 and supporting CIS operations (to include special
- communications capabilities and channels unique to intelligence reporting) with the primary CIS 44
- channels used by supported commanders for MAGTF C2. Such CIS requirements must support 45

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- 1 both push and pull capabilities. Push capabilities are needed so that topographic and other
- 2 intelligence elements can send updated files and products to MAGTF command echelons or
- specialized distributions. Pull capabilities are needed so that commanders, planners and 3
- intelligence personnel at all MAGTF echelons can access, review, and retrieve data files, reports 4

and other products pertinent to their intelligence needs. 5

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- 7 e. Ability to Share Intelligence Products and Reports. The MAGTF intelligence CIS
- 8 architecture must provide the means to share products and reports from the various intelligence
- disciplines with MAGTF intelligence elements and all-source production centers, and with 9
- specialized and all-source JTF, components, theater, and national intelligence centers. The 10
- traditional means for providing this capability are MAGTF GENSER secure record and voice 11
- communications, the SCI-secure Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) for 12
- record communications, and operator's communications (OPSCOM) circuits for SIGINT analyst-13
- to-analyst exchanges and coordination. While these techniques continue to be used at the MEF 14
- and MSC levels, they are rapidly becoming secondary in importance to the use of JWICS, the 15
- SIPRNET, and specialized CIS capabilities (such as NSA NET) which allow participants to 16
- access each others unique products and databases and to immediately pull required intelligence 17
- data and products. Similar capabilities exist within the MAGTF with SCI-TDN, S-TDN 18
- employed with intelligence systems such as IAS, TCAC (technical control and analysis center), 19
- TEG, TPC (topographic production capability) and CHATS (CI/HUMINT automated tool set). It 20
- 21 is important to note that at the lower tactical levels, the ability to operate a WAN is limited when
- regiments, battalions, etc. are engaged or on the move. Therefore, the ability to transition the 22
- dissemination of critical intelligence from automated data processing (ADP) systems to single 23
- channel radio or other means is vital. 24

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- f. Ability to Receive Intelligence Broadcasts. Broadcast receivers currently being fielded and
- under development will allow MAGTFs to receive multiple channels of JTF, fleet, theater, and 27
- national intelligence broadcast data. This data includes all-source intelligence, SIGINT and 28
- IMINT on enemy operations as well as friendly positional and other information. Effective 29 planning, design, and integration of SCI and GENSER CIS and proper information filtering,
- 30
- 31 correlating, and tailoring prior to dissemination or display is necessary to provide timely
- reporting to supported commanders while preventing information overload. 32

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5009. MAGTF Dissemination SOPs, Plans and Orders

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- 36 **a.** Responsibilities. The AC/S G-2 has overall responsibility for MAGTF intelligence
- dissemination SOPs, plans and orders. The ISC is responsible for the preparation of the 37
- intelligence dissemination plan and the intelligence CIS plan, with his CMDO executing this 38
- authority. 39

- b. OPLAN/OPORD Background. The principal intelligence CIS planning guide/tool for a 41
- MAGTF operation is Tab D, Intelligence CIS Plan, to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations 42
- Plan) of an OPLAN/OPORD's Annex B. Most other portions of Annex B, however, will 43
- likewise include key intelligence CIS information, particularly: Tabs A, B, and C to Appendix 16 44

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(respectively, the collections, production and dissemination plans); Tab E (Intelligence Reports) 1

to Appendix 16; and Paragraph 5 (Intelligence C2) to the basic Annex B. 2

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Besides the Annex B, there are key portions of Annex K (CIS) that will be significantly 4 influenced by intelligence CIS architecture planning. These include: 5

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- Appendix 14, Communications Restoration
- 8 Appendix 23, Task Organization/Communications Guard Shifts
- Appendix 26, Radio Battalion/SSO Communications 9
- Appendix 31, Communications Support for Intelligence 10
- Appendix 34, IP Assignments 11
- 12 Appendix 35, CIS Support for Information Management

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24 25 **c.** Standing Operating Procedures. Although there is no established format for an SOP, one of two formats is generally used. An SOP may be formatted as an all-inclusive document containing in the main body sections and paragraphs detailing the duties and responsibilities of subordinate units and, where applicable, of personnel. This format does not have annexes or enclosures. The other approach is to publish the main body of the SOP as a basic document containing instructions of a general nature with annexes for technical details and specific instructions for individual units and/or personnel. For example, the basic document could contain information for the communications battalion as a whole with annexes for different functional areas such as TECHCON and systems planning and engineering. SOPs prepared by subordinate units must comply with and be coordinated with pertinent parts of the SOP of the

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higher command. SOPs should not repeat practices of procedures governed by other directives or documents that are readily available to all elements of the command unless such repetition is required to clarify local operating practices. Suggested content:

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- References (such as MCWPs, field manuals, technical manuals, regulations, and the SOPs of higher commands).
- Planning checklists. 30
- Training instructions outlining general training standards. Detailed instructions are normally 31 32 contained in quarterly training schedules.
- 33 Information systems security instructions that address both COMSEC and computer security. Instructions should be limited to those that are applicable to all elements of the command and 34 are not contained in the command CEOI, as the purpose of this section should be to develop 35 and maintain CIS security awareness throughout the unit. 36
- Physical security instructions designed to develop an awareness for physical security and to 37 38 promulgate and standardize physical security procedures throughout the unit.
- Instructions for the operation of communications centers, including location and procedures 39 for transmittal, receipt, and processing of record traffic. 40
- Procedures covering the exchange of organizational and individual e-mail. The authorization 41 for use and the records to be maintained should be prescribed. 42
- Directory service information, guidance for obtaining communication service, and 43 instructions for maintenance of equipment and lines should be considered. 44

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- Instructions pertaining to the planning, installation, operation, and maintenance of SCR equipment, and guidance for the composition and operation of intelligence radio nets.
- Instructions on procedures to be employed by all users for the dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence and the use of alternate means of dissemination
 - General procedures to be employed by all users for the planning, installation, operation, and maintenance of intelligence and SCI facilities.

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d. Intelligence CIS Concept. After developing the CIS estimate and gaining the commander's approval, the CIS officer prepares the CIS concept. The concept outlines how CIS are to be employed to support command and control throughout the operation. The CIS concept includes information such as:

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- Numbers, types, classification levels, and locations of intelligence C2 facilities.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, locations, and mode of operation of intelligence SCR nets.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, locations, and channelization of intelligence multichannel radio circuits, including location of transmission equipment.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, and locations of intelligence-related wire circuits, including location of terminal equipment.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, and locations of intelligence-related radio-wire integration facilities.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, and locations of intelligence-related LANs.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, and locations of switching centers, routers, and gateways.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, locations, and channelization of intelligence-related satellite links, including location of intelligence CIS terminal equipment.
- Numbers, types, classification levels, and locations of terminal devices (computer, facsimile, etc.).
- Frequency requirements.
- Call sign requirements.
- Visual, sound, and messenger communications.
- Communication control procedures, including number, types, and location of communications control facilities.

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- The above list is not all-inclusive. It provides general guidance for preparing the CIS concept.
- 36 Concept development should be closely coordinated with OPLAN/OPORD development. The
- 37 concept is modified and refined as necessary and then promulgated as Annex K to the
- 38 OPLAN/OPORD.

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- e. Tab C (Intelligence Dissemination Plan) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan) to an Annex B of an OPLAN or OPORD. Annex K of this publication provides an example
- 42 format of an intelligence dissemination plan. Additionally:

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• This is the principal intelligence dissemination planning guide/tool for an actual operation.

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- Its purpose is to explain how intelligence dissemination elements under the command or supporting the MAGTF will be used to support intelligence dissemination operations.
 - An intelligence dissemination plan will generally be produced by the MEF and MSC G-2s, and may be prepared by other subordinate S-2s.
 - While it is focused on dissemination, the intelligence dissemination plan must be well-integrated with the collection and production plans.

f. Tab D (Intelligence Communications and Information Systems Plan) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan) to an Annex B of an OPLAN or OPORD. Annex G of this publication provides an example format of an intelligence CIS plan, which should include architecture graphics in the tabs. The intelligence CIS plan should accomplish three purposes:

 (1) Provide necessary text and graphics to identify CIS plan for each intelligence & reconnaissance discipline – SIGINT, IMINT, CI, HUMINT, GEOINT, Remote Sensors, Ground Recon, and Air Recon. This will clearly identify how intelligence C2 over these operations is supported via CIS, and how these disciplines' collection, reporting and production is supported by CIS.

(2) Provide an integrated, overarching unit intel CIS picture. This is especially valuable for commanders, planners, and key watch personnel in places like the COC, FOC and FFC, as these are the CIS means they will get most of their intelligence support via.

3) Provide a detailed CIS plan/graphic showing key intelligence systems and supporting communications pipes/terminal capabilities within a command post or, especially in the case of large intel ops, key intel C2/ops nodes (e.g., the Support Cell, the SARC, the P&A Cell, & the intelligence section watches in the COC, FOC and FFC). This will mostly be intelligence systems, networks (S-TDN) and big pipes, but also at least an identification of generically typical single channel radio nets in places like the SARC, OCAC, COC, etc. Additionally:

- This is the principal intelligence CIS planning guide/tool for an actual operation. Its purpose is to explain how intelligence-related CIS under the command or supporting the MAGTF will be used to support intelligence dissemination operations.
- An intelligence CIS plan will generally be produced by the MEF and MSC G-2s, and may be prepared by other subordinate S-2s.
- There is no standard format for the intelligence CIS plan; however, it must reflect unit SOP, METT-T factors, and the complexity of the unit's C2/intelligence/CIS operations.
- In most cases, a graphical depiction of the intelligence CIS plan/architecture is recommended and may be sufficient to support planning.
 - While it is focused on dissemination, the intelligence CIS plan must be well-integrated with the collection and production plans.

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g. Tab E (Intelligence Reports) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan) to an Annex B of an OPLAN or OPORD

- Specificed formats for all intelligence reports will be identified here in Annex B.
- The CMDO is responsible for this tab to appendix 16; however, he must closely coordinate with the P&A Cell OIC, SARC OIC, and all intelligence and reconnaissance unit commanders/OICs to ensure its accuracy, sufficiency, and understanding.
- Normally, only changes from unit SOPs will be identified and laid out here. However, if significant global sourcing of units occurs, or if the Marine unit will have either attached or in direct support any joint or other services' intelligence/reconnaissance elements, then the appendix will normally be included and will identify ALL intelligence reports formats to be used.

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Chapter 6

Intelligence Estimates and Studies

 6001. Overview. Intelligence estimates, studies, reports, and briefings, the principal intelligence products disseminated during MAGTF operations, are discussed within the context of dissemination in chapters 6, 7, and 8 of this publication. Detailed information on preparing each of the above is contained in MCWP 2-12, *MAGTF Intelligence Analysis and Production*, and other intelligence series MCWPs.

Whether oral, text, or graphic, intelligence products should use standard formats whenever possible. Standard formats facilitate ease of preparation and dissemination, as well as usability of the intelligence product. The basic intelligence products used in MAGTFs (e.g., IPB templates and matrices, intelligence estimates, summaries, reports, and briefings) have baseline formats. Individual units may modify formats to suit METT-T factors, but modifications may have an impact on interoperability within and external to the MAGTF -- and thus must be thoroughly coordinated with all. The bottom line is that intelligence must be presented so that all supported commanders and other decisionmakers truly understand its significance in terms of effects on the battlespace and on friendly and threat military operations.

6002. Intelligence Estimates and Studies

a. Purpose. The purpose of disseminating intelligence estimates and studies is to provide large amounts of detailed data in support of general operational planning. Although most estimates and studies are normally scheduled production documents--especially at national-level agencies and senior-level military commands--certain indepth estimates and studies must be produced and distributed quickly if a rapidly developing crisis may lead to commitment of a MAGTF.

b. Dissemination Considerations. Due to their detail, composition and size, the most efficient means of distributing intelligence estimates and studies to a wide audience usually is via hardcopy, floppy disk, and CD-ROM mail-out to a predetermined distribution list or softcopy transmittal via a secure datalink. In most cases, broader dissemination will be possible by posting these products on homepages accessible via S-TDN, SCI-TDN, SIPRNET and/or JWICS.

c. Advantages. Intelligence estimates and studies provide consumers with large quantities of intelligence and information—often complete with overlays, color graphics and other aids -- in a standardized format. Once disseminated, the documents are available for continuous reference by intelligence staffs. Users can select and utilize those portions that apply to specific command requirements.

d. Disadvantages. While intelligence estimates and studies can serve as invaluable background references, they require significant time and resources to produce. Also, all such products are

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prepared with a specific information or intelligence cut-off time, and once written, they are difficult to update quickly. In a crisis situation, intelligence estimates and studies are cumbersome to reproduce mechanically for rapid dissemination to all necessary subordinate units. Finally, reproduction or reformatting of imagery and geospatial information materials can be particularly cumbersome.

6003. Types

a. Intelligence Estimate

(1) **Description.** The intelligence estimate is the primary means for providing basic and current intelligence and results of the IPB effort focused on a specific mission. It is usually the first significant intelligence product developed to support initial orientation, immediate mission analysis and other planning needs. An intelligence estimate can be prepared at any level, from the battalion/squadron through the MEF command element and MARFOR headquarters levels, and should usually be disseminated at least two echelons higher and lower than the originating command. The scope and detail of the estimate will be governed by the level of command preparing it, the nature of the operation it is intended to support, already available intelligence, identified IRs, prior contingency planning, and the time and resources available. The intelligence estimate should be succinct, yet provide commanders and staffs the necessary intelligence for planning and early decisionmaking. Serving as a summary of basic intelligence, the estimate normally uses supporting studies for indepth treatment of specific aspects of the enemy situation or the area of operations. When contained in an OPLAN or OPORD, the intelligence estimate will be Appendix 11 to Annex B.

(2) Format. Whenever possible, the intelligence estimate should clearly present the analysis and conclusions developed during IPB. The finished estimate may be written, graphic, or verbal in form, but should follow the general five paragraph format shown in Appendix C. Subparagraphs and tabs may be added and omitted as necessary, based on their relevance to the stated mission. For topics that require a large amount of data, information and intelligence (i.e. beaches, weapons capabilities and technical characteristics, etc.), the salient facts and conclusions should be summarized in the body of the estimate with details included as a tab(s).

b. MAGTF Contingency Intelligence Study. This is a baseline intelligence study prepared in advance for standing OPLANs and likely contingencies. In written form, it is based on the intelligence estimate format and can be relatively quickly updated and converted into an intelligence estimate when an alert or warning order is received. Many of the products produced in the IPB process can be prepared either as supporting graphics or as stand-alone products. The format can be modified to suit the user, or METT-T, especially for military operations other than war (MOOTW).

- **c. Intelligence Studies.** Intelligence studies deliver detailed intelligence on specific aspects of the AO or threat--such as enemy beaches, minefields, HLZs, hydrography, or airfields. As indepth examinations of specific items of interest, studies directly support intelligence estimates.
- Wherever possible, standardized formats should be used, and essential intelligence should be

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transformed into graphics. Unit intelligence studies should be disseminated at least two echelons upward and downward, especially if the intelligence contained in the study is derived from organic collection assets.

d. IPB Products. IPB is a continuous, systemic process of analyzing the threat and environment presented in the intelligence estimate. These provide supported commanders and planners with a graphic portrayal of the battlespace. By integrating, analyzing, evaluating, interpreting and fusing vast amounts of textual information into symbols, IPB products convey easily-understood "snapshots" to operators and planners – but always with detailed supporting intelligence available in supporting text products or intelligence databases. Overlays, such as MCOO, LOC and fields of fire overlays, quickly and effectively depict such key terrain and enemy characteristics as mobility corridors, obstacles, terrain trafficability, and threat courses of action (COAs). While IPB products can be developed independently, most are initiated as part of the intelligence estimate process in the planning phase. IPB overlay updates should always be disseminated as rapidly as possible to other staff sections and subordinate units. Standardized formats for IPB products should be used to the maximum extent possible (see MCWP 2-12, *MAGTF Intelligence Analysis and Production*; MCWP 2-12.1, *Geographic Intelligence*; and MCRP 2-12A/FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace [draft]*), tailoring as appropriate according to the situation or a user's unique needs.

e. Target/Objective Studies

(1) Purpose. Target/ objective studies are focused, detailed intelligence products which aid in the application of fires or the maneuver of forces against a specific target set or area. These studies can also be utilized by small units, such as MEU(SOC)s, for mission preparation and execution. IPB impacts development through the evaluation of terrain and weather, and the association of threat forces at specific times and locations within the battlespace. Situation, event, and decision support templates identify named areas of interest (NAIs). Once identified, NAIs can then confirm or deny a threat's activities or adoption of a particular COA. Additionally, decision points and target areas of interest (TAIs) are identified which require key intelligence that supports either fire or maneuver. From the IPB and wargaming processes, HVTs and HPTs are derived.

(2) Content. Target/objective studies are graphically oriented and may utilize many of the graphics derived during the IPB process. One such product is a target folder, which contains the following information depending on the specific mission:

* Orientation Graphic

* Time-Distance Graphic

* Weather Forecast

* Hydrographic Forecast and Astronomical Data

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1 2	* Intelligence Briefing Notes For Mission	
3	* Graphic Intelligence Summary	
4		
5	* Objective Area Graphic Enhancements	
6 7	Orientation Graphic (10-20 KM around Objective)	
8		
9	Mission Planning Graphic (5 KM around Objective)	
10		
11	Objective Area Graphics	
12		
13	Objective Area Imagery	
14	* Income and Compliant of Leasting Delicts	
15	* Imagery and Graphics of Insertion Points	
16 17	* Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Plan	
18	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) I fair	
19	* Challenge and Password	
20	Chancing and Lassword	
21	* Mission Specific Data as Required	
22		
23		
24	(3) Forms and Uses. This intelligence product is used to provide basic tailored, detailed,	
25	mission-specific intelligence in support of small unit execution. There is one basic form, but	t
26	many variations can be used. Usually, it consists of both text descriptions supported by grap	hics.
27	Graphics are the main part annotated imagery, map enhancements, terrain models,	
28	blueprints/diagrams/schematics. Target folders consist of intelligence required to engage or	
29	operate against a particular target and are most often utilized by aviation or artillery units,	
30	MEU(SOCs), and raid forces. It can also be used to support regular combat operations (e.g.	
31	rifle company attacking or defending a hill). Although containing both textual descriptions	and
32	graphics, target folders are most useful to operators if constructed primarily with annotated	
33	imagery, map enhancements, diagrams, schematics, and mapping products. In a tactical	
34	situation, target intelligence becomes highly perishable and must be disseminated as quickly	as
35	possible to controlling, coordinating, and delivering units.	
36 37	f. Other Typical Study Products. A wide range of other studies are typically used by Mar	inac
38	The below identifies the most common. See the associated MCWP for additional information	
39	each.	JII OII
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Publication	Title	Type of Study
MCWP 2-12	MAGTF Analysis and Production	MCOO
MCWP 2-12.1	Geographic Intelligence	Tactical Study of the Terrain
MCWP 2-14	Counterintelligence	Various counter-HUMINT, counter-SIGINT, and counter-IMINT products
MCWP 2-15.2	Signals Intelligence	SIGINT Product Reports
MCWP 2-15.4	Imagery Intelligence	Target folders Beach studies HLZ and DZ Studies Airfields and Ports Studies

6004. Preparation Principles. In preparing intelligence estimates and studies, very close coordination is needed between production and dissemination leaders and all supported intelligence officers. Dissemination methods and means available to subordinate units must be considered in order to allow for maximum and rapid distribution of products throughout the MAGTF. To enhance effective dissemination:

• State requirements clearly -- so that intelligence production and resulting products will meet needs without being reformatted and can most effectively be disseminated to all requiring these. IPR identification also should include anticipated needs and times for updates to disseminated estimates and studies.

• Always clearly identify the information/intelligence cut-off time used in a product's development.

• Use standardized formats -- to the maximum extent possible.

• Coordinate dissemination planning among all echelons – but be aware of reproduction limitations and time delays -- to include those of subordinate units which may have need to further disseminate the intelligence to their subordinates.

• Use executive summaries technique. In assembling estimates and studies for dissemination, intelligence personnel should always summarize key intelligence findings and assessments from the body of the document in an executive summary format. Indeed, in crisis situations, the executive summary may be the only part of an estimate or study that can be disseminated quickly enough to support tactical commanders. Supplemental detailed information can then be attached as appendices or supporting studies, or if the MAGTF TDN can support it, via intelligence homepages or accessible intelligence databases.

• Use graphics. Graphics should be used wherever possible, keeping in mind that certain units

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may have limitations in display and reproduction technologies. For example, colored graphics do not reproduce well in black-and-white if symbology is not obvious in the absence of color.

• Cross-check for clarity. All numerical data should be carefully cross-checked for accuracy, especially quantities of enemy units/resources and map coordinates. If place names-especially those written in native languages--are mentioned in text, they should always be shown on corresponding graphics for clarity.

• Use standardized units of measure -- understandable by both U.S. and allied forces. Each estimate or study should employ standardized units of measure to avoid confusion.

• **Provide linkage to supporting intelligence**. Disseminated intelligence estimates and studies should include clear identification to other intelligence reports, products and databases that provide detailed intelligence in support of the basic estimate or study. If these are accessible via automated means, then pertinent information should be provided. If not, then include information for how these may be obtained (unit/cell name, POC, telephone number, e-mail address, etc.).

6/5/00 Chapter 7 1 2 **Intelligence Briefings** 3 4 5 6 **7001.** General. Intelligence personnel at all command levels will frequently use intelligence 7 briefings – formal and informal – to disseminate intelligence to commanders, staffs and others. The ability to prepare and orally convey relevant intelligence in a clear, concise manner is an 8 9 essential skill for intelligence personnel. 10 **7002.** Purpose. Intelligence briefings are used to convey specific intelligence and intelligence 11 operations details to a selected audience in a concise, mission-oriented format. Depending on 12 available preparation time, briefing styles can range from formal presentations with detailed 13 hand-outs and graphics to strictly oral updates. Even in the absence of formal tasking to prepare 14 an intelligence briefing, intelligence personnel will informally disseminate intelligence at every 15 opportunity through coordination with staff counterparts and other commands. 16 17 18 **a.** Advantages. Briefings are an effective way to disseminate intelligence quickly. They permit interaction with the intended audience, and the audience can provide instant feedback to the 19 briefer concerning content, conclusions, and questions or new IRs. In non-tactical situations--20 and given sufficient lead-time--formal briefings can be supplemented with multimedia products 21 that create long-lasting visual memories. In combat situations, intelligence can be relayed rapidly 22 through short oral updates that explain or estimate changes regarding the threat, environment or 23 friendly intelligence operations. 24 25 26 **b. Disadvantages.** Preparation for briefings can be time-consuming in an already timeconstrained situation. To convey a large amount of intelligence, hardcopy hand-outs or graphics 27 covering key briefing points should accompany the oral presentation. Time constraints, however, 28 may preclude this. Further, briefings usually reach only a selected audience in a tactical 29 30 situation--such as the commander's staff. To compensate for this, G/S-2 personnel are encouraged to videotape key briefings or prepare concise intelligence reports in order to 31 disseminate critical intelligence to subordinate units and other external organizations. 32 33 7003. Common Forms of Briefings, Common forms of briefings include the information 34 35 brief, decision brief, and confirmation brief. 36 37 **a.** Information Brief. The most common form of briefing given by the intelligence Marine is the information brief. Its primary purposes are initial situation orientation for initial planning and 38 39 to enhance situational awareness and understanding. Common examples are the initial staff orientation enemy, weather and terrain brief and the commander's morning update or 40 "boardwalk" brief. 41 42

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b. Decision Brief. A second common form is the decision brief, with the intended purpose of getting a decision from the commander. An example would be briefings conducted to convey the

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results of wargaming and gain a decision from the commander regarding his desired course of action, allocation of forces and resources, and priorities.

c. Confirmation Brief. A third type of briefing is a confirmation brief, which is conducted as a final review of a planned action to ensure those participating are certain of the objectives and synchronized with each other.

7004. Intelligence Information Brief Format

 a. Overview. Of the three most common types of military briefings --information, decision, and confirmation-- intelligence personnel will most often be required to provide intelligence information briefings. The intent of the intelligence information brief is to enhance situational awareness and impart understanding. Intelligence information briefings may be as simple as a quick verbal update to a commander in front of a situation map, or as complex as a MEF or JTF level daily update to the commanding general and his staff. Briefings at lower tactical levels, where the element of time is often scarce, will be generally less formal, but often short-notice. Higher commands generally employ regular, scheduled, daily update briefings, of which intelligence is only one part. Regardless of the degree of formality or the level of command, a standard briefing format or outline can assist intelligence personnel in rapidly and effectively organizing for the brief.

b. Guidance. The keys to developing and delivering an effective intelligence information brief are as follows:

• **Know your audience.** Is it the commander, his staff, his subordinate commanders? Who is the focus of the brief? What is their level of knowledge concerning the subject? Does the commander have any personal preferences as to how he is briefed?

• **Be sure of the purpose and intent of the briefing.** Is the brief an update on critical events in the last couple of hours, or is it intended to describe in detail the threat and area of operations prior to the initiation of crisis action planning?

• Concentrate on essential information and intelligence, but be prepared to provide details or expanded intelligence should questions arise.

• Use clear, concise, readable graphics. If presenting to a large audience, ensure the graphics can be seen from the rear of the room or, at a minimum, by your primary target audience.

• **Know your information.** If you anticipate questions on subjects where you have little depth, either arrange to have someone there that does, or take the question for follow-up research. Admit when you don't know something; never make up an answer.

• Always distinguish between what you know (facts), what you don't know (gaps), and what you think (estimates).

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c. "Boardwalk" Brief. The most common types of intelligence information briefing are the "boardwalk" and, at higher command echelons, the commander's morning/evening update briefs. The boardwalk is an informal, on-demand brief conducted using the COC map boards or screen displays from automated systems. The brief is generally by exception, meaning only significant changes to threat capabilities or courses of action are briefed. It is also an opportunity for the

d. Commander's Update Brief. The morning/evening update briefs are usually more formal and detailed. As the name implies, they are scheduled for set times either once or twice per day, the schedule being determined by the planning, decision execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycle or unit SOP. In addition to briefing the current situation and significant events, the brief may also address the commander's PIRs, collection/production/dissemination plans and status, weather, and estimates of future threat actions. Intelligence may be only part of the overall briefing, and often the briefing is presented using software such as Microsoft PowerPoint.

e. PIR Focus. The principal general guide for what to brief in either case is by orienting on the commander's PIRs. By focusing on intelligence and events that correspond to the commander's PIRs, the briefer not only has a quick method of organizing the information and intelligence, but also ensures that the commander is given the most essential information in the shortest amount of time. This does not preclude additional information being presented; if something of significance occurs that will affect the current or future plans, the commander must be informed. Good judgment must prevail.

f. Content. Below are listed the elements of an example update briefing. Note that the elements closely follow the elements of the web-based graphic INTSUM. Given that both are often created in software such as PowerPoint – and in essence provide the same intelligence and other information – using the same format and graphics can save time and resources.

- Weather
- Weather Effects Assessment

commander to ask directed questions.

- PIRs and IRs
- Situation (ground, air, air defense, etc., all keyed to PIRs)
- Collection, production, and dissemination plans/status
- Intelligence estimate (at a minimum, most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action)

Note: To save time, those categories that have not changed since the last briefing can be briefed as "no change." Generally, however, the weather forecast, PIRs, plans status, and intelligence estimate should always be briefed.

7005. Types of Briefings. Appendix D provides sample formats for common types of MAGTF intelligence briefings.

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a. Initial Intelligence Orientation Brief

(1) **Purpose.** The purpose of the initial intelligence orientation brief is to disseminate important characteristics of the AO and the threat. Its goal is to indoctrinate key personnel to the overall intelligence perspective concerning an impending operation and to help rapidly focus commanders and key planners on mission critical factors.

(2) Content. The initial intelligence orientation brief should generally follow the intelligence estimate format, supplying all relevant intelligence on the AO and the enemy. Much of the content of this type briefing is derived from higher-echelon studies and estimates and is presented as background basic intelligence. Because this type briefing can easily become too long or too overwhelming in detail for timely dissemination, particular care should be exercised to employ graphics wherever possible.

b. Intelligence Estimate of Supportability

 (1) **Purpose.** The purpose of an intelligence estimate of supportability briefing is to evaluate friendly COAs based on the capabilities and limitations of organic and supporting intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance forces. Its goal is to assist the commander in understanding intelligence operations capabilities, alongside all other friendly functional capabilities, in order to decide the most promising friendly COA and to identify IRs.

(2) Content. The intelligence estimate of supportability brief addresses key factors identified by intelligence personnel that may influence friendly intelligence operations. These key factors include terrain; weather; the current political situation; possible reactions from the civilian populace; the enemy's relative strengths, weaknesses, and susceptability to friendly deception or psychological operations. The briefing then addresses enemy COAs, analyzes enemy COAs versus friendly COAs based on the key factors, identifies the preferred friendly COA, and offers any other recommendations to the commander.

(3) **Approaches.** The particular approach used by the briefer will vary based upon commanders' preference, nature of the operation, complexity and scope of friendly intelligence operations, echelon of command, or other METT-T factors. Two useful approaches are:

• Threat COA Focused. The intelligence estimate of supportability brief will address each current estimated threat COA, associated PIRs and other key IRs, probable friendly collection and production operations, and significant gaps or deficiencies.

• **Friendly COA Focused.** With this approach, the briefer will detail probable collection and production operations and significant gaps or deficiencies for each friendly COA under consideration.

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c. Mission/Target Intelligence Brief

(1) **Purpose.** The purpose of the mission/target intelligence brief is to provide detailed and tailored intelligence to support execution of a specific mission. Examples of such missions include reconnaissance unit inserts and operations, raids, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). The goal is to provide timely and relevant intelligence to support mission accomplishment.

(2) Content. The mission/target intelligence brief has no prescribed format but should contain all pertinent intelligence impacting on a specific mission or target. A superb starting point for organizing and preparing such briefs is the "Mission Profiles" section of the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook published by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. Examples include a ground reconnaissance unit mission brief, aircrew mission brief, and raid site brief. Normally, this type briefing provides any intelligence and other information on activity occuring or expected to occur within a predetermined radius from the target/mission and within a predetermined amount of time from target/mission commencement. At a minimum, it should include an area orientation and detailed descriptions of entry points, the objective area, and threat composition, locations, dispositions, capabilities and vulnerabilities. Graphics should be employed extensively to quickly portray potential enemy COAs strengths and vulnerabilities in response to friendly operations.

d. Intelligence Update

 (1) **Purpose.** The purpose of the intelligence update brief is to review intelligence activity since the last briefing, to present the current intelligence situation, and to estimate anticipated enemy activities that may affect friendly COAs. Intelligence updates are usually scheduled briefings and are designed to address predetermined periods of time such as every 12 or 24 hours. Examples include watch turnover briefs in the unit COC, IOC, or SARC.

(2) Content. The intelligence update brief follows a temporal outline, commencing with the reporting of any significant enemy activity--including any enemy losses--since the last update. It then presents the current enemy situation, followed by weather forecasts and intelligence estimates of enemy COAs and activity during the next reporting period. The update should also address any current or impending friendly intelligence collection, production and dissemination operations that could supplement intelligence disseminated in the briefing.

e. Technical Intelligence Brief

 (1) **Purpose.** The purpose of the technical intelligence brief is to provide detailed intelligence on a specific enemy weapon system, piece of equipment, or functional capability and limitations. This type of briefing is used to disseminate a substantial amount of technical and scientific intelligence in a condensed format.

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- 1 (2) Content. The technical intelligence brief has no prescribed form but should, at a minimum,
- 2 provide a detailed description of the threat or weapon system and its attendant characteristics,
- 3 capabilities, and vulnerabilities. If the system has associated unique visual or electronic
- 4 signatures, ensure all known operating parameters are disseminated to intelligence, targeting and
- 5 key maneuver personnel. The briefing should also describe how the enemy employs the system
- 6 (i.e., tactics, processes and procedures) and where it is currently deployed (i.e., OOB). Graphics
- should be used wherever possible to quickly convey this type of complex information.

 7006. Preparation Principles. The #1 requirement for any intelligence briefing is that it focuses on the commander's PIRs and key planner IRs. The three chief principles of briefings are accuracy, brevity, and clarity. Dissemination considerations must take all three into account.

a. Accuracy. In achieving accuracy, ensure that source reliability--often found in reference material--is conveyed to the audience. Unless specifically asked, do not offer personal opinions. (Note: Refer to Chapter 3, "Analytical Thinking," of MCWP 2-12, *MAGTF Intelligence Analysis and Production* for a detailed review of intelligence analytical methodologies, the forms of reasoning, and analytical pitfalls.)

b. Brevity. In striving for brevity, resist the temptation to disseminate all that is known on a topic. The commander's guidance and PIRs, current and estimated situation, and planned friendly actions will help focus briefs on what is important and what is not. In planning how to use the time available for the brief, always incorporate sufficient time for questions from the audience.

 c. Clarity. In attaining clarity, present the intelligence and other information as clearly as possible--both orally and graphically. Use short and crisp sentences. Define any unfamiliar terms or acronyms, ensure any item referred to orally is depicted in the corresponding graphic, and summarize key points at the end of the presentation. Most importantly of all, keep the brief focused on the PIRs and other IRs that it is providing intelligence in response to.

7007. Intelligence Briefing Methodology. The same methodology applies to both formal and time-sensitive tactical intelligence briefings, differing only in time available and level and detail of the IRs and intelligence to be provided.

• <u>Formal intelligence briefings</u> usually are allocated more lead-time and require a more structured methodology in disseminating information. Generally, such briefings will address a broader range of IRs and other intelligence needs. Also, such briefings typically entail a more open-ended timeframe. The intelligence estimate format usually provides the departure point for these briefings.

• <u>Time-sensitive tactical intelligence briefings</u> should follow the format of formal briefings as much as time allows. Given that lead-times for briefings are much shorter in a field environment however, tactical briefing formats vary widely. Ones most frequently used include:

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 1. Standard TACREP or SALUTE format

- 2. Standard INTREP format (see appendix F)
- 3. Use if DRAW-D framework. At a minimum, the most likely and most dangerous threat options should always be briefed.

Figure 7-1 depicts six steps for preparing an intelligence briefing. A more extensive guide for preparing formal intelligence briefings is provided in Appendix E.




Figure 7-1. Briefing Preparation Steps

- a. Analyze Your Briefing Objectives The "Five W's and H: Who, What, Where, When, Why and How -- to aid with briefing preparations.
 - Audience's background commanders, planners and others? Familiarity with topic? How much technical detail? Also, which intelligence personnel will give the brief? And which others are needed for questions and other support?
 - What? Related PIRs and IRs? If topic is assigned, what is required? If topic is chosen, what is the scope? What must the audience take away to understand the briefing and immediately use the provided intelligence?
 - **When?** What day and time is the briefing? How much time is allotted for the briefing? What intelligence cut-off time will be used?
 - Where? What facilities are available? Any distractions at briefing site such as a nearby runway (noise) or commercial facilities (security)?

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• Why? What is the purpose of the briefing? How does it relate to the audience? How can the audience best use the information disseminated in the briefing? Would the audience benefit from hand-outs to take away from the briefing? How does this briefing fit into the overall briefing schedule?

• <u>How</u>? What audiovisual or information technology equipment will be available and how does it work? What other equipment must be brought? Will the audience all be physically present, or will some be via VTC or other means? Who will record questions or new IRs that will require follow-up action? What other intelligence products are/will be developed that may reinforce the brief?

b. Research. The PIRs/IRs will drive your research efforts! Access all available intelligence reference material to learn as much as possible concerning the briefing topic. Allow lead-time to request information and intelligence not easily accessed at local commands. As research progresses, ensure notecards are prepared to consult later in answering questions. Reduce quantity of intelligence in favor of increasing quality of briefing. Use the intelligence cut-off date/time previously selected.

c. Draft. Organize information, intelligence and other materials in a logical fashion-functionally, geographically, temporally, threat/friendly COAs, etc. Make an outline from these and later fill in key words, phrases, quotations, facts, and graphics. Ensure the outline follows an "introduction, body, conclusion" format and carries appropriate security classifications.

d. Prepare Supporting Materials. Decide how to disseminate the intelligence. Prepare maps and charts in colorful and readable formats and ensure there are no misspellings. Decide in advance if pointers, lecterns, or special lighting are needed. Coordinate closely with other intelligence personnel preparing reinforcing intelligence products.

e. Rehearse. Enlist a willing audience from staff colleagues to practice presentation delivery. Rehearse as many times as necessary to gain confidence and proper tempo of the briefing. Time all rehearsals, using all planned graphics or special effects. <u>Key</u>: Do a last check with intelligence analysts and check principal intelligence references to confirm the currency and accuracy of your brief!

f. Give Brief. Arrive early enough to ensure the location and all equipment are prepared and operational. Also, use available time to determine if the audience will include any significant changes or if any unanticipated questions are likely. Then, give the brief. Remain focused on the IRs and other objectives. Answer all questions to the best of your ability. Also, ensure someone else records all unanswered questions or new IRs: who asked, unit/section, telephone numbers, special needs, and if any response times were promised.

MCWP 2-13, MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination

	COORDINATING DRAFT
1	Chapter 8
2	
3	Intelligence Reports
4	
5	
6	8001. Overview. This chapter focuses on common discipline-specific and all-source
7	intelligence reports. Appendix F provides basic formats for the all-source intelligence reports
8	discussed in this chapter. Intelligence discipline-unique reports are addressed in other
9 10	intelligence series MCWPs and MCRPs.
11 12	a. Purpose of Intelligence Reports. The purpose of generating intelligence reports is to disseminate intelligence quickly to a wide audience for immediate use. If generated and
13	disseminated judiciously, reports provide excellent support for each of the six intelligence
14	functions: support to the commander's estimate, situation development, I&W, support to force protection, support to targeting, and support to combat assessment. Because reports normally
15 16	contain perishable intelligence, they usually are transmitted by secure radio, digital datalink, e-
17	mail, telephone, facsimile or message. Intelligence reports should be disseminated in accordance
18	with either collection or reporting criteria or the dissemination plan. <i>Reports are not a substitute</i>
19	for regular communication between intelligence officers and staff counterparts. Regular
20	collaboration among all intelligence officers is critical for effective planning and direction, C2,
21	and understanding the use of intelligence.
22	
23	b. Summary Intelligence Reports. The purpose of summary intelligence reports is to provide
24	the commander with an overview of significant enemy activity within a specified period of time
25	and to project anticipated enemy actions during the next reporting period. Summary reports are
26	usually scheduled products disseminated at specific times as dictated by unit SOPs or
27	OPLANS/OPORDs. Standard summary reports, disseminated at scheduled times, are well-
28	suited for demand-pull dissemination, such as being posted on the MAGTF S-TDN. Keep in
29 30	mind, however, that dissemination below the MSC level may require other means. For example,
30 31	hard copy dissemination via courier is still often used from MSC to subordinate units (the S-TDN extends to lower echelons), with select dissemination of critical excerpts via other means,
32	such as secure radio or telephone.
33	such as secure radio of telephone.
34	c. Specialized Intelligence Reports. Specialized reports include event-driven intelligence
35	reports, such as SALUTE reports, and various intelligence discipline-unique intelligence reports,
36	such as tactical electronic intelligence (TACELINT) reports, initial photographic interpretation
37	reports (IPIRs), CI spot reports, surf observation reports, bridge reports, etc. Specialized reports
38	are disseminated as required. See each of the MCWPs in the MCWP 2-15, Intelligence Support
39	Series, for a complete discussion of these reports.
40	
41	8002. Periodic Summary Text/Voice Intelligence Reports
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a. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). The INTSUM is a text or text/graphic intelligence report that provides a summary of the intelligence situation covering a specific period normally

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prescribed by the unit SOP for intelligence or the intelligence annex to the operation order (for a 1 MEF-level operation, usually every 12 or 24 hours). It is used to report threat activities, changes 2 to threat capabilities, and the results of further analysis and production. It is designed to update 3 the original and subsequent intelligence estimates. At lower commands, particularly JTFs and 4 combatant commands, a DISUM (or daily intelligence summary) will usually be published every 5 24 hours. INTSUM distribution will be in accordance with the dissemination plan, but generally 6 will be disseminated at least to immediate higher and subordinate commands. Using the basic 7 format, units can tailor the INTSUM to fit the situation. With new automated information 8 systems, INTSUMs are increasingly produced in graphic form and posted on networks for wide 9 10 dissemination, with links to detailed supporting intelligence products, reports and databases. The graphic INTSUM is maintained either on computer screens linked to intelligence databases or on 11 conventional maps with displayed/accessible supporting information. See Appendix F for the 12 basic MEF-level INTSUM format. INTSUMs address the following: 13

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INTSUM Topics

Together, the text and graphic INTSUM depicts and reports all current and estimated intelligence concerning enemy:

- Ground, Air, and Naval Activity and Losses
- Movement
- **Equipment**
- **New Units**
- **Personalities**
- **Obstacles**
- **Administrative Data**
- **Weather and Terrain Conditions**
- **Capabilities and Vulnerabilities**
- **Anticipated Enemy Direction.**

The INTSUM should also include:

- **Unit's Current Threat Estimate COAs, vulnerabilities**
- **Revalidation of Previously Stated PIRs**
- **Identification of New PIRs**
- **Current and Planned Organic Intelligence Operations.**

b. Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM). At higher command levels, particularly JTFs and Unified Commands, a daily intelligence summary (DISUM) will usually be published every 24 hours. While INTSUMs, particularly at lower tactical echelons, provide a generally fine-grained tactical perspective, the DISUM is broader in scope, potentially encompasses more aspects of a threat country's elements of national power, and focuses on operational-level intelligence analysis and estimates. MAGTF command elements tasked as JTF headquarters will generally be required to submit DISUMs to the combatant command CINC. See the combatant

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command's TTP for the DISUM format. Although generally the same, formats may vary from theater to theater. DISUMs usually address the following:

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DISUM Topics

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Prepared in narrative format, the DISUM should address:

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General Enemy Situation

9 10

Enemy Operations During the Reporting PeriodCounterintelligence Situation

11 12

• Other Significant Intelligence Events (e.g., OOB changes; new weaponry sightings)

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The DISUM should also include:

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• Unit's Current Threat Estimate

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• Revalidation of Previously Stated PIRs

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Identification of New PIRs Current and Planned Organic Intelligence Operations.

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Additional information that may be included: BDA intelligence and weather forecasts.

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c. Periodic Intelligence Summary (PERINTSUM). The PERINTSUM is an expanded INTSUM covering a greater period of time as dictated by the commander. It is a means for

INTSUM covering a greater period of time as dictated by the commander. It is a mean disseminating more detailed intelligence than that provided in INTSUMs or DISUMs.

PERINTSUMs are normally issued by the MAGTF CE for higher, lower, and adjacent

dissemination. Subordinate units, however, may also be tasked to prepare them if the

commander so directs. PERINTSUMs can be either hardcopy or softcopy summaries--complete

with available graphics--and should convey all known intelligence collected on the enemy. The format for PERINTSUMs generally is the same as used for DISUMs.

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8003. Graphic Intelligence Reports

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Graphics should be incorporated into intelligence reports when appropriate, depending on a unit's capability to receive graphic material. Because symbolic representations are especially effective in small unit tactical environments, these units' intelligence and communication officers should attempt to ensure that secure facsimile and digital datalink capabilities are incorporated into intelligence architecture plans.

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42 43 Sitmaps--with annotations and enhancements such as tables, marginal data, and schematics--are the preferred means of quickly conveying large amounts of current intelligence. Overlays can then provide updates as needed. Supplementary diagrams, imagery, and text should be supplied as required.

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With the exploding use of information technologies, greater standardization of military symbology is essential to enhance interoperability and understanding while minimizing errors. MIL STD 2525B is now the current symbology. Also, use MCRP 5-12A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, for additional information on military symbology.

8004. Event-Driven Text/Voice Intelligence Reports

The purpose of generating event-driven intelligence reports is to disseminate significant intelligence to the commander or to intelligence operations personnel that could immediately alter the tactical situation or to support situation development. Event-driven intelligence reports are generated as required. Detailed direction will be established in either current collection reporting criteria or the dissemination plan. To further manage this, dissemination planners – in coordination with collection and production planners – should establish reporting thresholds.

a. SALUTE Report. The SALUTE report is a basic intelligence report that may be used by any unit to report key intelligence information. Its contents are those of the acronym SALUTE: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time of Observation, and Equipment. SALUTE reports may be used for either routine or time-sensitive intelligence reporting. They are issued by any unit--normally MAGTF subordinate entities--observing or in contact with enemy forces or as otherwise directed in the current reporting criteria. They are disseminated at the highest precedence possible, usually via secure voice radio transmission, to a predetermined distribution. If time permits, secondary dissemination should be generated via electronic data transmission. See Appendix F for the SALUTE report format.

b. Intelligence Report (INTREP). The INTREP is a standardized report which, based on its importance to the current situation, is disseminated without regard to a specific time schedule. That is, an INTREP is not prepared on a periodic basis, but as information is acquired, assessed and intelligence estimates are produced. It is the primary means for transmitting new and significant intelligence when facts influencing threat capabilities have been observed, or when a change in threat capabilities has taken place. It is prepared at all echelons by the first intelligence element acquiring the information and forming the intelligence estimate, and is disseminated as rapidly as possible to all units which may have need of the reported information. It may be prepared on any item of intelligence, regardless of source. Generally each report will concern only a single item. When time permits, the INTREP should include the originator's interpretation of the information or intelligence being reported. See Appendix F for the INTREP format.

c. BDA Reporting. The intelligence officer (at the MEF CE level, the ISC) ensures BDA reports conform to the operational plan, report the nature of damage inflicted or unit/systems destroyed, and assess the degree of mission success as it relates to the initial objective. When possible, BDA reporting includes the physical damage assessment and an analysis of the consequence of the damage on the threat unit. The intelligence officer or ISC must attempt to obtain visual verification of the target damage and destruction.

6/5/00 1 MAGTFs and their subordinate elements are primarily concerned with conducting Phase I 2 BDA/physical damage assessment (PDA). Sources of information for Phase I/BDA include: 3 4 Mission reports (MISREPs) and in-flight reports (INFLTREPs) 5 6 Aircraft cockpit video (ACV) or weapons systems video (WSV) 7 8 Imagery and IMINT including national, theater, and tactical imaging systems and UAVs 9 10 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) 11 12 Human resource intelligence (HUMINT) 13 14 Open source intelligence (OSINT), including television and radio broadcasts, newspapers, 15 etc. 16 17 Visual reports from combat units, air controllers, or forward observers. 18 At each echelon, the intelligence officer compiles, refines, and validates the various sources of 19 BDA and develops consolidated PDAs and/or combat strength assessments. The MSCs/MSEs 20 21 will forward consoldiated BDA reporting of their subordinates and forward a summary BDA report to the MEF, usually covering set time periods. See Appendix F for an example of a 22 23 summary BDA report format. 24 At the MEF level, the P&A Co, intel battalion, is responsible for compiling the overall Phase 25 I/PDAs for the MEF, and for adjusting the master OOB databases to reflect threat combat losses. 26 The BDA Cell will also prepare and disseminate formal Phase I BDA reports in accordance with 27 theater and national policies and procedures. The DIA Defense Intelligence Reference 28 Document, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Reference Handbook (U), DI-2820-1-97, provides 29 30 detailed joint procedures for formats regarding BDA analysis, reporting formats, standard 31 terminology, and resources. This document is available on-line via INTELINK-S and INTELINK. See Chapter 7 of MCWP 2-12 for additional information on BDA analysis and 32 33 reporting. 34 35 d. Mission Report (MISREP). Mission Reports (MISREPs) are used by aviation units to 36 report significant results of aircraft missions and non-imagery sightings along flight routes. They employ a standardized format that includes air task/mission number or nickname, location 37 identifiers, time on target/time of sighting, results/sighting information, and remarks. Upon 38 39 completion of post-flight debriefing, squadron S-2s should disseminate MISREPs to the MAGTF G/S-2 by the most expeditious means possible. See Appendix F for the MISREP format. 40

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43 44 e. Response to a Request for Intelligence (RRFI). RRFIs are non-scheduled products designed to fill gaps in knowledge identified by subordinate tactical units. In short, they are used to provide specific intelligence to the user requesting it. Because IRs are normally tagged with

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an LTIOV requirement, RRFIs should be answered and disseminated as quickly as possible. If time does not allow for electronic data transmission, then responses should be distributed over secure telephone or radio. Appendix F provides a sample RRFI format; specific formats used will be per unit SOP.

8005. Intelligence Reports Plan and Matrix. METT-T factors will influence the types, uses, formats and dissemination of intelligence reports during a particular operation. While well developed and practiced SOPs are invaluable, for most operations detailed guidance and instructions must be established to ensure MAGTF-wide effectiveness, efficiency and accuracy.

An effective technique to accomplish this and achieve widespread understanding is the use of an *intelligence reports matrix*. The CMDO is responsible for its development and updating. The particular format of the matrix will be per unit SOP; see Appendix J for one useful format. The intelligence reports matrix will be an exhibit to the intelligence reports tab to the intelligence operations plan of an OPLAN/OPORD's Annex B.

8006. Intelligence Report Preparation. The process for preparing intelligence reports for dissemination generally follows the *five W's and H* analytical process used for estimates/studies and briefings. You must determine what intelligence is needed, who needs it, what the deadlines are for utilization, and where recipients are located within the architecture. To enhance effective dissemination of reports:

• Select formats for internal MAGTF reporting. For internal MAGTF use, dissemination can be done via LAN, voice, facsimile, and courier. Standardized intelligence reports are to be used by all MAGTF units, with modifications in accordance with unit SOP only when absolutely necessary. If modified, format changes should be kept to a minimum to preclude disrupting MAGTF interoperability (e.g., standardization is especially critical to allow immediate and smooth interoperability with Marine forces globally sourced from outside the parent MEF). Indeed, to enhance intelligence flow, templates for report formats should already be built into word processing and other software. Free-text reporting formats are acceptable if timeliness is critical.

• **Select formats for external reporting.** For dissemination of MAGTF intelligence reports external to the MAGTF, reporting must adhere to the formats and guidance from the JTF or the combatant command's TTP.

• **Preformat and preprogram.** Construct preformatted templates and preprogrammed distribution lists (IP addresses, etc.) prior to operations. For globally sourced Marine units and all non-Marine forces, close cooperation among intelligence officers is critical to ensure full accuracy, understanding and capability.

• Reduce voice report contents to the bare minimum. Keep it simple and short to preclude possible misunderstandings and facilitate timeliness. This objective is significantly enhanced through the use of standardized reports formats and regular training – both of those initiating

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1	such reports as well as all intelligence, operations, fires and other Marines who may receive
2	such reports.

• Cross-check data elements. All data elements contained in intelligence reports should be cross-checked for accuracy before dissemination, particularly numerical elements such as geographical or grid coordinates, times, and enemy unit designations.

• **Avoid circular reporting.** Reports should convey new information and intelligence. In the event other intelligence must be included in the report for understanding, care must be taken to ensure such intelligence is clearly identified to preclude confusion, false confirmations, or other errors.

Chapter 9

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1 2

Intelligence Dissemination and Support to the MAGTF's Common Tactical Picture

9001. General. The common operational picture (COP) and common tactical picture (CTP) is the means by which all MAGTF commanders develop the situation – i.e., see the operation. When maintained properly, the CTP will provide all a near real-time view of both friendly and enemy forces – and thus tremendously improved command and control, planning, and decision making capabilities than have ever been possible in the past.

Joint and all services doctrine and TTP on COP and CTP concepts of operations and management, however, remain in their infancy. The most useful broad guidance today on this are contained in the following:

• CJCSI 3151.01, Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements (10 June 1997)

• MCRP 6-23A, Joint Task Force Information Management" 1

• MCWP 6-2, MAGTF Command and Control (draft, January 2000)

• MCWP 6-23, Information Management (draft anticipated Spring 2000)

The pace of information technology development along with many innovative operational and warfighting functional developments, however, clearly indicate significant changes in COP and CTP operations as new procedural and technical capabilities advance.

Because of this, Marine Corps intelligence doctrine and TTP is likewise in its infancy. The following information is provided as an initial foundation to support Service requirements. It is drawn from the best intelligence SOP now in use within the operating forces. For exercise or actual operation support, close coordination between intelligence planners and the G/S-3 information management officer, the G/S-6, and all subordinate units' intelligence officers is critical to ensure full understanding of the process and procedures that will be used to establish and maintain the COP/CTP during the operation.

 9002. MAGTF CTP Concept of Operations. Each echelon of command, beginning at the tactical manuever battalion/aviation squadron level, reports and manages the track database for its own units and those attached to or in direct support of it. Track data will be autoforwarded via broadcast up to the next higher echelon until it reaches the MAGTF CE. Once

¹ This publication is a multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures publication that all four services have concurred with.

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- correlated, track data is rebroadcasted back down to each subsequent echelon as the MAGTF
- 2 CTP. As track data is updated it automatically updates each echelon database and CTP. Auto-
- forwarding and broadcast times for each echelon must be set correctly or "track looping" may
- 4 occur. Track looping is an anomaly within a networked system where creation, editing or delete
- 5 commands pass one another in transmission without accomplishing the desired effect. For
- 6 example, if the division and its regiments are broadcasting at the same time interval, the
- 7 regimental TCO delete command would transmit at the same time the division TCO CTP
- 8 broadcast is being transmitted. Thus, a track a regiment is trying to delete remains in the system
- 9 causing a "track loop". Additionally, if broadcasts are too frequent it will slow down the entire 10 TDN.

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- **9003. MAGTF CTP Planning.** Prior to employing the system during a deployment or contingency, key planners will meet to coordinate CTP efforts. These meetings will be directed by the G/S-3 information management officer and include all staff system administrators, G/S-6 representatives, and G/S-2 and G/S-3 representatives. Key tasks will be to coordinate IP addresses, broadcast parameters and physical layout. Senior/subordinate relations
- will also be refined, and additional directives from the higher commands will be declared.
- Additionally, any component issues will be raised, clarified and resolved.

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- 20 **9004.** Architecture. Figure 9-1 depicts a typical notional operational network architecture for
- 21 CTP actions. Figure 9-2 provides a more granular depiction of the architecture within the
- MAGTF CE's main command echelon. Regiments, MAGs and CSSDs will normally be the first
- 23 points where friendly and threat unit locations are inputted. These echelons will electronically
- 24 plot their battalions, companies, etc. A command will only update information for those units
- 25 assigned under its command, or those attached or in direct support to it. These echelons will
- 26 auto-forward all track data, via broadcast or via the S-TDN, to the next higher echelon. This
- 27 information will enter the MSC headquarters system as "ambiguities" that need to be resolved
- 28 before further broadcast. The MSCs' information management officers (IMOs) coordinate
- resolution of these ambiguities, ensuring that the track data is correct, input any additional
- required track data, and broadcast that track data up to the MAGTF CE. The MAGTF CE
- 31 receives ambiguities as well. Resolution of these likewise will be coordinated by the MAGTF
- 32 IMO, with results then inputted into the track database. These tracks as well as the tracks the
- 33 MAGTF CE is required to input into the broader JTF CTP/COP will then be auto-forwarded up
- 34 to the MARFOR or JTF, and rebroadcast down the chain to all MSCs. In turn, the MSCs will
- rebroadcast these tracks down to the regiments, MAGs and CSSDs.

36

- This comprises the CTP. A track creates an ambiguity only when first entered into a system.
- From that point on the track will automatically update as its owner makes changes. **Only the**
- 39 creator/owner will edit or delete a track in their database in accordance with the overall
- 40 MAGTF CE assignment of responsibilities (see annex U to the OPLAN or OPORD).
- Additionally, broadcast and display filters will be used to define what type of tracks will be transmitted and/or displayed.

43 44

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DASC

RACE TOD

FSSG

TOO

IAS

Component

MARFOR
GCCS

MEF

C2PC

TCO
LAS

TCO

MAGs & CSSDs CZPC Regiment CZPC Group CZPC CSSD

Battalion CZPC TCD

Wing

1.439

Threat Track Data
Friendly Track Data
Combined Track Data

394041

CZPC


Regiments,

Figure 9-1. MAGTF CTP Notional Network Architecture

Division

45

6/5/00



Manuever Data
Threat Data
Fire Support Data

50

Figure 9-2. MAGTF CE Main Command Echelon Notional Network Architecture

6/5/00

9005. Responsibilities.

a. MAGTF Command Element. The MAGTF CE is the hub for CTP data receipts and transmissions. All information received at this level is auto-forwarded down via broadcast to all MAGTF MSCs, and externally to the MARFOR or JTF headquarters as the MAGTF's CTP (in accordance with the JTF's COP/CTP reporting criteria established in the JTF's information management plan). All new tracks must be validated prior to forwarding; the IMO will coordinate this effort overall for the MAGTF CE. Additionally, the G/S-3 COC watch officer and the P&A Cell OIC must closely coordinate to provide each other with friendly and threat track data respectively. The following is germane.

(1) **BLUE FORCE Track Management** -- G/S-3 COC Watch Officer Responsibility. The COC uses the TCO system for tracking friendly unit positions. The G/S-3's COC Track Manager is responsible for managing ground Blue Force (friendly) track data received from the MAGTF's subordinate commands. The COC Track Manager will de-conflict and consolidate Blue Force data and then broadcast the CTP to the network, to include G-2 COC and FOC watch officers and all key nodes within intel bn's IOC. The G/S-3 COC watch officer is further responsible for updating friendly unit locations as prescribed by the MAGTF's information management plan.

(2) RED FORCE Track Management

(a) <u>P&A Cell OIC Responsibility</u>. The P&A Cell uses the IAS system to conduct analysis of enemy track data. The P&A Cell's track manager is responsible for managing threat data received from the MAGTF's subordinate commands. Once the P&A Cell is aware of a threat unit's location, the P&A Cell Track Manager will generate a new threat track, annotate required analyst comments, and forward that track to the G/S-3's COC Track Manager. The P&A Cell OIC is further responsible for updating threat unit locations as prescribed by the MAGTF's information management plan.

(b) <u>CMDO Responsibility</u>. The CMDO, through the intelligence systems officers, is responsible for intelligence systems and technical support to maintenance of the Red Force track management within the CTP.

(3) Friendly Intelligence, CI and Reconnaissance Units Track Management. The ISC is responsible for accurate maintenance of friendly intelligence, CI and reconnaissance units tracks within the Blue Force CTP.

b. MSC Responsibility. MEF MSCs also transmit via auto-forward friendly and threat broadcasts both up and down the chain. They receive their initial data information from the regiments, MAGs and CSSDs, and auto-forward it to the MAGTF CE. Likewise, they receive data information from the MAGTF CE and auto-forward it back down to the regiments, MAGs and CSSDs. Thus, each echelon has the same CTP and track database. Each MSCs COC G/S-3 watch officer and G/S-2 intelligence operations officer is responsible respectively for their echelon's blue and red track data and coordinating their interaction within the command echelon.

6/5/00

c. Regiment/MAG/CSSD Responsibility. Regiments, MAGs and CSSDs have the
 TCO and IAS systems to support their CTP requirements. They will also send and receive track
 data to and from the next higher echelon. These units will also share friendly and enemy track

data in the same fashion as the MAGTF CE and MSC headquarters.

d. Other Units Responsibility. Other units that require a CTP from the MAGTF CE or a MSC headquarters will coordinate directly with that unit's G/S-3 COC watch officer and ISC/ intelligence operations officers. The same basic requirements apply: they are to provide track data for themselves. They generally do not provide any enemy track data. However, should the need arise to pass such enemy track data, the P&A Cell OIC or intelligence operations officer should be included in any decision to pass such traffic. Non-USMC units normally do not have systems that allow them to input into the CTP. Instead, their date must be inputted manually at the lowest possible level.

e. Reporting. The IMO at each echelon of command is overall responsible for de-conflicting data received from lower echelons, working in close coordination with the COC G/S-3 and P&A Cell OIC. Blue force track data will be forwarded to the MAGTF COC via a "filtered" S-TDN broadcast allowing only Blue Force track data to be sent. A "continual threat data assessment" will be conducted by the P&A Cell OIC on Red Force track data received from organic assets. Upon completion of the "immediate assessment," the threat data will be forwarded via a "filtered" S-TDN broadcast to allow only threat track data to be sent.

9006. MEF G-2/IOC CTP Operations

a. Background. There are several crucial steps in the process of creating and maintaining an accurate Red Force picture within the MEF CTP.

(1) First, it is essential that the unit locations are created and entered correctly into the IAS.

(2) Second, MEF MSCs are given ownership of threat units which are resident in their AORs. Positive control of every threat track is essential in maintaining an accurate CTP. The MSC's AOR will be determined by the MEF by the use of geographical boundaries, which assign ownership of threat tracks to the MSCs.

(3) Third, only the MSCs responsible for a given threat track may edit, move, or delete that track. The CTP is in jeopardy of corruption when a threat track crosses a geographical boundary, and either no one or multiple MSCs are editing that threat track. Thus, the need to maintain positive control.

Friendly tracks are transmitted to the MEF IAS via broadcast from the G-3. This broadcast occurs at a regular time intervals according to G-3 information management SOP. The friendly CTP is also broadcast to each of the MSCs from G-3 TCO to MSC's TCO according to the G-3 information management SOP. *Only threat tracks will be broadcast from the MEF IAS to the MSCs' IAS'*.

6/5/00

b. Procedures

 (1) MEF CE G-2/Intelligence Battalion. The MEF G-2 is responsible for the overall Red Force track management within the CTP. He executes this responsibility through the ISC. Through the use of a *Track Management Matrix* and battlespace boundaries, the MEF AC/S G-2 will assign ownership of threat tracks to the MSCs. The Track Management Matrix defines the MSC's AOR and identifies the number and location of the threat tracks that belong to each MSC. This generally is merely a textual version of the geographical boundaries set by the MEF G-3. In general, the GCE is responsible for the threat ground order of battle (GOB) in their zone. The ACE is responsible for the air order of battle (AOB) minus surface to surface missiles. The CSSE or Rear Area Operation Group (RAOG) has responsibility of the rear area, if not already assigned to the IOC. Finally, the IOC is responsible for the deep battle (portions of the AOR's CTP not being covered by the MSCs). Geographical boundaries depict the MSC's battlespace as their area of responsibility for the CTP. This information is then manually entered into the IAS. Once all the threat tracks have been entered into the IAS, a broadcast is sent to each of the MSC's IAS, as well as to the MEF TOC within the COC and FOC.

(2) MSCs

(a) The MSCs have control of all the threat tracks within their AOR. As these tracks move or change, the MSC will send manual transmissions, via IAS, to the MEF IAS. Additionally, the MSC must communicate the change using one of the following methods: IAS-to-IAS chat, secure phone, or e-mail (in order of priority). These are also the recommended means of coordination and troubleshooting. Once an hour, each of the MSCs will count the exact number of tracks in their AOR and then transmit that number to the MEF P&A Cell via one of the above means. This will ensure every track is being maintained. MSCs may transmit and receive track data with their subordinates via means consistent with their unit SOPs.

(b) It is essential that the MSCs validate tracks transmitted to the MEF. Once received in the P&A Cell's IAS, tracks are broadcast to all MEF subordinates and to the MEF COC, FOC and other nodes via auto-forward. Therefore, tracks sent in error can quickly propagate throughout the entire CTP. As a backstop, MSCs are requested to backup their CTP to 8mm tape at least every two hours to enable data recovery in the event of system failure or accidental deletion. Also, the P&A Cell OIC will provide the MSCs the entire Red Force CTP via the S-TDN if required.

c. Personnel

(1) <u>Red Force Track Managers</u>. The P&A Cell OIC will designate Red Force Track Managers who are responsible for the overall Red Force CTP maintenance and mangement. Track Managers will supervise the IAS operators, coordinate and resolve CTP problems with the MSCs' intelligence officers, report system problems to the system administrators, and de-conflict erroneous track data with the MSC's Red Force Track Managers. MSCs will also assign Track

1 2	Managers to accomplish the same mission at their level. Red Force Track Manager responsibilities include:
3	responsionates merade.
4	(a) Planning Phase
5	(w) 1 mining 1 miss
6	- Identify the systems and units that will be participating in the operation to include
7	G/S-2, other staff elements, adjacent units, and all organic and supporting intelligence, CI and
8	reconnaissance units.
9	
10	- Diagram the information flow to include auto-forward tables, broadcasts, and
11	manual transmissions.
12	
13	- Ensure system's time is synchronized.
14	
15	- Coordinate what type of tracks will be used.
16	
17	- Ensure IAS training is conducted.
18	
19	- Ensure C2PC training is conducted.
20	
21	- Identify what means of communication connectivity will be used to report,
22	troubleshoot, and/or deconflict Red Force track data with subordinate, adjacent, and higher units
23	
24	- Identify the chat room(s) and chat server(s) to be used.
25	
26	- Develop a Red Force Track Matrix and assign responsibilities.
27	
28	- Determine what maps will need to be loaded into the IAS or IOW (AO-dependent).
29	
30	(b) Deployment and Set-Up Phase
31	
32	- Ensure all maps are loaded into the IAS/IOW, to include those of the MSCs.
33	Encymainitial Dad Forms treak data is some at loaded into the IAC and discominated
34	- Ensure initial Red Force track data is correct, loaded into the IAS, and disseminated
35	throughout the MEF via the S-TDN.
36	(c) Execution Phase
37 38	(c) Execution Finase
39	- Continually monitor the CTP for accuracy at the MEF and the MSCs.
40	- Continually monitor the CTT for accuracy at the MILIT and the MISCs.
41	- Communicate with other Red Force Track Managers (subordinate, adjacent, and
42	higher) to ensure Red Force track totals are accurate.
43	ingher, to endure read roller thank totals are accurate.
44	- Ensure MSCs adhere to the Track Matrix and other Red Force track management
45	direction.

MCWP 2-13, MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination

	COORDINATING DRAFT
	6/5/00
1	
2	- Ensure Red Force tracks are backed up every hour.
3	
4	- Receive Red Force track change notification from the MSCs.
5	(2) S
6	(2) System Administrators. The ISC, through the CMDO or intelligence systems officer, will
7	designate someone to serve as System Administrator to coordinate, establish, and maintain the network communication link from pre-deployment through redeployment. System
8 9	Administrators are responsible for defining the network parameters, troubleshooting system
10	related problems, and maintaining system support. MSCs will also assign System Administrators
11	to accomplish the same mission at their level. System Administrator responsibilities include:
12	to decomption the same important at their level. System rightmestator responsionates metade.
13	(a) Planning Phase
14	
15	- Identify CIS network requirements.
16	
17	- Assist Red Force Track Manager with information flow diagrams.
18	
19	- Identify mail JWICS/SCI-TDN, SIPRNET/S-TDN, and NIPRNET/U-TDN
20	requirements.
21	T1 ('C
22	- Identify power requirements.
2324	- Identify the IRC chat server(s) IP and alternate IP addresses.
24 25	- Identity the IRC chat server(s) if and alternate if addresses.
26	- Create account names (max of eight characters) for both UNIX and NT IOWs.
27	create account names (max of eight characters) for both of the and it is to the
28	- Determine how message traffic will enter the system. (e.g., serial or IP address).
29	
30	- Build guard lists for messages.
31	
32	(b) Set Up Phase
33	
34	- Assist with system setup.
35	
36	- Configure systems on the network (router and host-tables).
37	Sat up DNS Wah browsing for SIDDNET
38	- Set up DNS Web browsing for SIPRNET.
39 40	- Set up e-mail.
41	Set up e man.

- Build communication channel.

- Set up IRC chat on IAS and IOWs.

42 43

		6/5/00
1	- Build DDN host table.	
2		
3	- Set up IOW gateways.	
4		
5	- Configure WAN userids.	
6		
7	- Set system time and synchronize workstations and IOWs.	
8		
9	- Build message profiles (what messages are routed to what accounts).	
10		
11	(c) Execution Phase	
12		
13	- Assist IAS operators with administrative and system related problems.	
14		
15	- Maintain the servers.	
16		
17	 Conduct backups of messages and tracks. 	
18		
19	- Monitor network and ensure MSCs capabilities are operational.	
20		
21	- Monitor communications channels to prevent backlog of incoming and outgoing	ng
22	messages.	

1	APPENDIX A
2	
3	GLOSSARY
4	Continu I
5	Section I
6	Agranyma
7	Acronyms
8	
9	Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities,
10	doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole
11	authoritative sources for official military acronyms:
12	1 Laint Dublication 1.02 Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated
13	1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
14	Terms.
15 16	2. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of
10 17	Military and Associated Terms.
18	Withtary and Associated Terms.
19	ABCairborne corps
20	A/CS
21	ACE
22	element
23	ACVaircraft cockpit video
24	ADPautomated data processing
25	AFP
26	AFATDSadvanced field artillery tactical data
27	system
28	AIGaddress indicator group
29	AO area of operations
30	AOA amphibious objective area
31	AOBair order of battle
32	AOIarea of interest
33	AORarea of
34	responsibility
35	ATARSadvanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system
36	ATF amphibious task force
37	ATFICamphibious task force intelligence center
38	ATO
39	AWACSairborne warning and control system
40	BDA battle damage assessment
41	C2
42	C4command, control, communications, and
43	computer

1	CAD
2	CATcrisis action team
3	CCIR
4	CD-ROMcompact disc-read only
5	memory
6	CEcommand element
7	CGcommanding
8	general
9	CHATS
10	CIcounterintelligence
11	CIA Central Intelligence Agency
12	CIC combat intelligence center
13	CINC
14	CIScommunications and information
15	systems
16	CLF commander landing force
17	CMDcollection
18	management/dissemination
19	CMDOcollection management/dissemination
20	officer
21	CMSCOMSEC material
22	system
23	COAcourse of action
24	COC
25	COLISEUMcommunity on-line intelligence system for end users and managers
26	COMINT communications intelligence
27	COMSEC communications security
28	CONOPS concepts of operations
29	CONPLANoperation plan in concept format, concept plan, contingency plan
30	CONUS
31	COPcommon operational picture
32	CPXcommand post exercise
33	CSS
34	CSSDcombat service support detchment
35	CSSE
36	CTAPScontingency theater automated planning
37	system
38	CTPcommon tactical picture
39	
39	DAG
39 40	DAGDSSCS address group
	DAG
40	DAG
40 41	DAG

1	DMSdefense message
2	system
3	DOD
4	DODIPPDOD Intelligence Production Program
5	DPdecision point
6	DRAW-Ddefend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay
7	DSdirect support
8	DST direct support team, decision support template
9	DSSCSdefense special security communications system
10	DSVTdigital subcriber voice
11	terminal
12	DZdrop zone
13	e-mailelectronic
14	mail
15	EEFIessential elements of friendly information
16	ELINT electronic intelligence
17	EOBelectronic order of battle
18	EW electronic warfare, early warning
19	FFC
20	center
21	FFIRfriendly force information
22	requirements
23	FLTSATCOM
24	system
25	FMfield manual
26	(Army)
27	FOC
28	FSC
29	FSSG
30	GCCSglobal command and control
31	system
32	GCEground combat element
33	GENSERgeneral service
34	GEOINTgeographic intelligence
35	GI&Sgeospatial information and
36	services
37	GISTgeographic intelligence support team
38	GOBground order of battle
39	GSgeneral support
40	GSPground sensor platoon
41	HAhumanitarian
42	assistance
43	HETHUMINT exploitation team
44	HFhigh frequency

1	HLZhelicopter l	anding
2		
3	e i	•
4		•
5		1.1
6	8 ,	3
7	6. 6.	
8	$\mathcal E$	_
9		_
10	C	lysis system
11	ICMintelligence collection	
12	C	
13		requirement
14	IDMintelligence dissemination	
15	management	
16	\mathcal{E}	-
17	IIPimagery intellige	ence
18	platoon	
19	IMinformation	
20	management	
21		
22	IMOimagery & mapping officer; information manage	ement
23	officer	
24	INFLTREPin-	flight
25	report	
26	INMARSATinternational maritime sate	ellite system
27	INTELINK inte	lligence link
28	INTELINK-S intelligence lin	ık-SECRET
29	INTREPintelli	gence report
30	INTSUMintelligen	ce summary
31	IOCintelligence opera	itions center
32	IOWintelligence-operations	
33	workstation	
34	IPintern	net protocol
35		battlespace
36	IPIRinitial photo interpret	ation report
37		
38		
39		
40		requirement
41		_
42		•
43		
44		coordinator
	8	

1	JACjoint analysis center
2	JCS
3	JDISSjoint deployable intelligence support system
4	JFCjoint force commander
5	JICjoint intelligence center
6	JISEjoint intelligence support element
7	JMCISjoint maritime command information system
8	JSIPSjoint service imagery processing system
9	JTFjoint task force
10	JWICSjoint worldwide intelligence communications system
11	KOCOAkey terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover & concealment,
12	obstacles,
13	mobility corridors
14	LANlocal area network
15	LFlanding force
16	LOClines of communication
17	LOCELinked Operational Intelligence Centers Europe
18	LTIOV latest time information of value
19	LZlanding zone
20	MAGMarine aircraft group
21	MAGTF
22	Force
23	MARFORMarine Corps forces
24	MASINTmeasurement and signature
25	intelligence
26	MAWMarine aircraft
27	wing
28	MCDPMarine Corps doctrinal
29	publication
30	MCIAMarine Corps Intelligence
31	Activity
32	MCISUMarine Corps Imagery Support Unit
33	MCOOmobility corridors and obstacle
34	overlay
35	MCPP
36	MCRP
37	MCWPMarine Corps warfighting
38	publication
39	MEBMarine expeditionary brigade
40	MEF
41	MEUMarine expeditionary
42	unit
43	METT-Tmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
44	available

1	MEU(SOC)Marine expeditionary unit (special operations
2	capable)
3	MISREP mission report
4	MOOTWmilitary operations other than war
5	MSCmajor subordinate
6	command
7	NAnot
8	applicable
9	NAI
10	NEOnoncombatant evacuation operation
11	NGOnon-governmental organization
12	NIMA
13	NIPRNETnon-secure internet protocol routing network
14	NIST
15	team
16	NSANational Security
17	Agency
18	NSTRnothing significant to report
19	OCACoperations control and analysis
20	center
21	OOBorder of battle
22	OPCONoperational control
23	OPLANoperation
24	plan
25	OPORDoperation order
26	OPSEC. operations security
27	OSINTopen-source intelligence
28	P&Aproduction and
29	analysis
30	PDAphysical damage
31	assessment
32	PERINTSUM periodic intelligence
33	summary
34	PIRpriority intelligence requirement
35	POCpoint of contact
36	PRproduction requirement
37	PVO. private volunteer organization
38	Rad Bn
39	RAOG
40	RFI request for intelligence; request for information
41	ROCreconnaissance operations center
42	RRFIresponse to request for intelligence
43	RRSremote receive station
44	RRTradio reconnaissance team
	Tagio recoillaissance team

1	SACCsupporting arms coordination
2	center
3	SALUTEsize, activity, location, unit, time of observation,
4	equipment
5	SARC surveillance and reconnaissance cell
6	SATCOMsatellite
7	communications
8	SCAMPsensor control and management platoon
9	SCI sensitive compartmented information
10	SCIF sensitive compartmented information facility
11	SCI-TDNsensitive compartmented information - tactical data network
12	SCRsingle channel
13	radio
14	SEREsurvival, evasion, resistance,
15	escape
16	SIspecial
17	intelligence
18	SIDSsecondary imagery dissemination
19	system
20	SIGINT signals intelligence
21	SIPRNETSECRET internet protocol router network
22	SOPstanding operating procedure
23	SPMAGTF special-purpose Marine air-ground task force
24	SPOTREPspot report
25	S-TDNsecret-tactical data network
26	SSCCspecial security communications center
27	SSCEspecial security communication
28	element
29	SSCTspecial security communication team
30	SSESship's signals exploitation
31	space
32	SSOspecial security officer; special security
33	office
34	SSTSIGINT support team
35	SYSCONsystems control
36	TAItactical area of interest
37	TACLOGtactical-logistical group
38	TACELINTtactical electronic intelligence report
39	TACREPtactical report
40	TCACtechnical control and analysis
41	center
42	TCO
43	TDN
44	TECHCON technical control

1	TEG	tactical exploitation group
2	TERPES	tactical electronic reconnaissance processing and evaluation
3	system	
4	TOI	time of
5	intelligence	
6	Topo	topographic
7	Topo Plt	topographic platoon
8	TOR	time of report
9	TPC	topographic production capability
10	TS-II	Trojan Spirit II
11	TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
12	UAV	unmanned aerial
13	vehicle	
14	UHF	ultra high
15	frequency	
16		user identification
17		unclassified tactical data network
18		universal transverse mercator
19		very high frequency
20		
21		
22	squadron	
23		video
24	teleconference	
25	WAN	wide area network
26		weapons of mass
27	destruction	
28		world wide web
29	WSV	weapons systems video

1	Section II
2	
3	Definitions
4	
5 6	Note: Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are
7	the sole authoritative sources for official definitions of military terms:
9	1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
10	Terms.
11	Terms.
12	2. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of
13	Military and Associated Terms.
14	
15	$\underline{\mathbf{A}}$
16	
17	all-source intelligence Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that
18	incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence
19	imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open
20	source data, in the finished intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21	
22	amphibious objective area - A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for
23	purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the
2425	amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea,
26	air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27	
28	area of interest - That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
29	adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned
30	operations. This area includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the
31	accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (Joint Pub 1-02)
32	
33	area of operations - An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and
34	naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the
35	joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish
36	their mission and protect their force. Also called AO. (Joint Pub 1-02)
37	_
38	<u>B</u>
39	
40	basic intelligence - Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources,
41	capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information
42 43	relating to the same subject. (Joint Pub 1-02)
44	relating to the same subject. (Joint 1 at 1-02)

6/5/00

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1 2	battle damage assessment - 1. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
3	application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle
4	damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air,
5	ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations.
6	Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and
7	coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage
8	assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA.
9	(Joint Pub 1-02) 2. The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application
10	of military force. BDA estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that
11	target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. (MCWP 5-12C)
12	
13	battlespace - All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum
14	which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)
15	
16	branch(es) - A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course
17	of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the
18	force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions
19	caused by enemy actions. See also sequels. (MCRP 5-12C)
20	
21	$\underline{\mathbf{C}}$
22 23	collate - 1. The grouping together of related items to provide a record of events and facilitate
24	further processing. 2. To compare critically two or more items or documents concerning the
25	same general subject; normally accomplished in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle.
26	(Joint Pub 1-02)
27	(tolk 1 do 1 o2)
28	collection - The gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the identified
29	requirements. (MCWP 5-12C)
30	
31	collection agency - Any individual, organization, or that has access to sources of information
32	and the capability of collecting information from them. (Joint Pub 1-02)
33	
34	collection asset - A collection system, platform, or capability that is supporting, assigned, or
35	attached to a particular commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)
36	
37	collection management - 1. The process of converting intelligence requirements into collection
38	requirements, establishing priorities, and tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection
39	sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. (Joint Pub 1-02)
40	collection manager - An individual with responsibility for the timely and efficient tasking of
41 42	organic collection resources and the development of requirements for theater and national assets
42	that could satisfy specific information needs in support of the mission. Also called CM. (Joint
44	Pub 1-02)
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1 collection plan - A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence 2 requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02) 3 4 5 combat data - Data derived from reporting by operational units. (MCWP 5-12C) 6 7 **combat information** – Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical 8 commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirements. 9 (Joint Pub 1-02) 10 11 12 combatant command - A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of 13 Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 14 Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02) 15 16 **combined operation** - An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting 17 together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (Joint Pub 1-02) 18 19 command and control - 1. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 20 21 commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 22 communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 23 coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 24 25 called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. (MCRP 5-12C) 26 27 commander's critical information requirements - Information regarding the enemy and 28 friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining 29 situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also 30 called CCIR. NOTE: CCIRs are normally divided into three primary subcategories: priority 31 intelligence requirement; friendly force information requirements; and essential elements of 32 friendly information. (MCRP 5-12C) 33 34 **commander's intent** - A commander's clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or 35 more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement which 36 guides the exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C) 37 38 39 commander's planning guidance - Directions and/or instructions which focus the staff's course 40

of action development during the planning process. Also called CPG. (MCRP 5-12C)

41 42

communications intelligence - Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT. (Joint Pub 2-0)

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communications security - The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called COMSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

- **component command** One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force.
- 7 Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components.
- 8 The Service component command consists of its Service component commander and all those
- 9 Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the
- 10 command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or
- further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordination - The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary. (MCRP 5-12C)

counterintelligence - 1. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on the behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. Within the Marine Corps, counterintelligence constitutes active and passive measures intended to deny a threat force valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. Also called CI. (MCRP 5-12C)

crisis action planning - The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical information - Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical intelligence - Intelligence which is crucial and requires the immediate attention of the commander. It is required to enable the commander to make decisions that will provide a timely and appropriate response to actions by the potential/ actual enemy. It includes but is not limited to the following:

- Strong indications of the imminent outbreak of hostilities of any type (warning of attack)
- Aggression of any nature against a friendly country
 - Indications or use of nuclear-biological-chemical weapons (target)
 - Significant events within potential enemy countries that may lead to modification of nuclear strike plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

1	
2	critical node - An element, position, or communications entity whose disruption or destruction
3	immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat
4	operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
5	
6	critical vulnerability - An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most
7	significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it
8	undermines a key strength. Also called CV. (MCRP 5-12C)
9	
10	<u>D</u>
11	
12	daily intelligence summary - A report prepared in message format at the joint force
13	headquarters that provides higher, lateral, and subordinate headquarters with a summary of all
14	significant intelligence produced during the previous 24-hour period. The "as of" time for the
15	information, content, and submission time for the report will be specified by the joint force
16	commander. Also called DISUM. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17	data. Democratation of foots, concerts on instructions in a formalized manner suitable for
18 19	data - Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic means. Any
20	representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning or insight is or might be
21	assigned. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22	assigned. (Joint Lub 1-02)
23	database - Information that is normally structured and indexed for user access and review.
24	Databases may exist in the form of physical files (folders, documents, etc.) or formatted
25	automated data processing system data files. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26	
27	database replication - Process by which like databases reflect commonality in information and
28	timeliness of that information. (MCRP 5-12C)
29	
30	debriefing - Interviewing of an individual who has completed an intelligence or reconnaissance
31	assignment or who has had knowledge, whether through observation, participation, or otherwise,
32	of operational intelligence significance. (MCRP5-12C)
33	
34	decentralized control - In military operations, a mode of battlespace management in which a
35	command echelon may delegate some or all authority and direction for warfighting functions to
36	subordinates. It requires careful and clear articulation of mission, intent, and main effort to unify
37	efforts of subordinate leaders. (MCRP 5-12C)
38	And the second of the second o
39	decision point - An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly
40 4.1	commander will make a critical decision. Also called DP. (MCRP 5-12C)
41 42	deliberate planning - A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned
42 43	forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely
+3 44	heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed.
45	(Joint Pub 1-02)

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4	deliberate targeting - The methodical identification, compilation, and analysis of potential fixed
5	and semifixed targets followed by the decision of which potential targets will be attacked, when,
6	and/or by what weapon and ordnance. It is practiced primarily during the planning phase of an
7	operation, when planning for an attack, or when the tempo of combat is slow. (MCRP 5-12C)
8	
9	descriptive intelligence - Class of intelligence which describes existing and previously existing
10	conditions with the intent to promote situational awareness. Descriptive intelligence has two
11	components: basic intelligence, which is general background knowledge about established and
12	relatively constant conditions; and <i>current intelligence</i> , which is concerned with describing the
13	existing situation. (MCRP 5-12C)
14	
15	detachment - 1. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A
16	temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17	
18	direction finding - A procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters by using a
19	highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receive or ancillary equipment.
20	(Joint Pub 1-02)
21 22	direct support - A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it
23	to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 24	to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance. (Joint Fuo 1-02)
25	dissemination - Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26	dissemination Conveyance of intenigence to users in a saturate form. (some rate of o2)
27	dissemination management - Involves establishing dissemination priorities, selection of
28	dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The
29	objective of dissemination management is to deliver the required intelligence to the appropriate
30	user in proper form at the right time while ensuring that individual consumers and the
31	dissemination system are not overloaded attempting to move unneeded or irrelevant information.
32	Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls which do not impede the
33	timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting intelligence sources and
34	methods. (MCRP 5-12C)
35	
36	${f \underline{E}}$
37	
38	electronic intelligence - Technical and geolocational intelligence derived from foreign non-
39	communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or
40	radioactive sources. Also called ELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
41	
42	electronic reconnaissance - The detection, identification, evaluation, and location or foreign
43	electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.

44 45 (Joint Pub 1-02)

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1	electronic warfare - Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to
2	control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within
3	electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.
4	Also called EW. (Joint Pub 1-02)
5	
6	essential elements of friendly information - 1. Key questions likely to be asked by adversary
7	officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities so
8	they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (Joint Pub
9	1-02) 2. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries
10	to plan and execute effective operations against our forces. (MCRP 5-12C)
11	
12	estimative intelligence - Class of intelligence which attempts to anticipate future possibilities
13	and probabilities based on an analysis of descriptive intelligence in the context of planned
14	friendly and assessed enemy operations. See also descriptive intelligence . (MCRP 5-12C)
15	-
16	${f \underline{F}}$
17	
18	fires - The effects of lethal or non lethal weapons.
19	
20	force protection - Security programs designed to protect Service members, civilian employees,
21	family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through
22	planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security,
23	and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24	
25	force reconnaissance company - A unit whose mission is to conduct preassault and deep
26	postassault reconnaissance operations in support of a landing force and its subordinate elements.
27	(MCRP 5-12C)
28	
29	friendly force information requirements - Information the commander needs about friendly
30	forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the
31	circumstances, information on unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly force information requirement. Also called FFIR.
32	(MCRP 5-12C)
33	(MCRF 3-12C)
34 35	fusion - In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and
36	information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)
37	information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (Joint 1 do 1-02)
38	fusion center - In intelligence usage, a physical location to accomplish fusion. It normally has
39	sufficient intelligence automated data processing capability to assist in the process. (Joint Pub 1-
40	02)
41	<i>(2)</i>
42	future operations section - 1. In MAGTF operations, a section normally under the staff
43	cognizance of the G-3 which focuses on planning/producing new fragmentary orders or the next
44	change of major subordinate command mission; this section forms and leads the integrated
45	planning effort with a planning horizon of 72-120 hours out. It develops branch plans and

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sequels. 2. In Marine aviation, that portion of the tactical air command center and aviation combat element commander's battlestaff responsible for the detailed planning and coordination of all future air operations conducted by the aviation combat element in support of the Marine air-ground task force. The future operations section plans for and publishes the next air tasking order(s) (normally a 48/72-hour period). (MCRP 5-12C)

 $\underline{\mathbf{G}}$

general military intelligence - Intelligence concerning the (1) military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations or (2) topics affecting potential US or allied military operations, relating to the following subjects: armed forces capabilities, including order of battle, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness; area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and meteorological, oceanographic, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; military materiel production and support industries,; military and civilian C4 systems; military economics, including foreign military assistance; insurgency and terrorism; military-political-sociological intelligence; location, identification, and description of military-related

general support - That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (Joint Pub 1-02)

installations; government control; escape and evasion; and threats and forecasts. (Excludes

scientific and technical intelligence.) Also called GMI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

geographic coordinates - The quantities of latitude and longitude which define the position of a point on the surface of the earth with respect to the reference spheroid. (Joint Pub 1-02)

 geographic intelligence - The process of collecting, organizing, analyzing, synthesizing, disseminating and utilizing geospatial information and services (GI&S) with regards to the military aspects of the terrain. Also called GEOINT. GEOINT is the integration and analysis of all-source geospatial information in support of specific Marine Corps operations. The analysis is focused on a specific mission and includes intensification of information detail and resolution to meet tactical requirements. GEOINT analysis is focused on the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process and addresses key terrain, observation & fields of fire, cover & concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach & mobility corridors. This analysis is commonly referred to as KOCOA for easy reference.

 geospatial information and services - The concept for collection, information extraction, product generation, storage, dissemination, and utilization of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including aeronautical, nautical and land navigation, as well as mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling and simulation and precise targeting. It also includes the evaluation and analysis of topographic, hydrophobic, littoral, or aeronautical features for their effect on military planning, operations and intelligence. This analysis could also include the development of a commander's visualization and preparation of the battlespace. It may be presented in the

1 2 3	form of printed maps, charts and publications; in digital simulation and modeling databases; in photographic form; or in digital form. Also called GI&S. (Nominated for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02)
4 5 6	global sourcing - A process of force provision or augmentation whereby resources may be drawn from any location/command worldwide. (MCRP 5-12C)
7 8	<u>H</u>
9	haliaantan landina nana Aanasifiad anaundana fan landina assault haliaantan ta ambada an
10 11 12	helicopter landing zone - A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. Also called HLZ. (Joint Pub 1-02)
13	
14	
15	high-payoff target - A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets, identified
16 17	through wargaming, which must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the
18	friendly commander's mission. Also called HPT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19	menary commander's mission. Also cancer in 1. (Joint 1 do 1-02)
20	high-value target - A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the
21	mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy
22	functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest. Also called HVT. (Joint Pub 1-
23	02)
24	<i>(-2)</i>
25	human intelligence - 1. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and
26	provided by human sources. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, human intelligence
27	operations cover a wide range of activities encompassing reconnaissance patrols, aircrew
28	debriefs, debriefing of refugees, interrogations of prisoners of war, and the conduct of
29	counterintelligence force protection source operations. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30	,
31	humanitarian assistance - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or
32	manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation
33	that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.
34	Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance
35	provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities
36	or agencies that may have primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also
37	called HA. (Joint Pub 1-02)
38	
39	hydrography - The science which deals with the measurement and description of the physical
40	features of the oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, and their adjoining coastal areas, with particular
41	reference to their use for navigational purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)
42	
43	_
44	<u>I</u>
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1	imagery exploitation - The cycle of processing and printing imagery to the positive or negative
2 3	state, assembly into imagery packs, identification, interpretation, mensuration, information extraction, the preparation of reports, and the dissemination of information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4	characteris, the propagation of reports, and the dissemination of information. (come rate 1 oz)
5	imagery intelligence - Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual
6	photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture
7	radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic
8	display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
9	imagery interpretation - The process of location, recognition, identification, and description of
10 11	objects, activities, and terrain represented on imagery. (Joint Pub 1-02)
12 13	indications and warning - Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-
14	sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the
15	United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It
16	includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency;
17	nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile
18	reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events.
19	Also called I&W. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20 21	information - 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a
22	human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (Joint
23	Pub 1-02)
24	
25	information report - Report used to forward raw information collected to fulfill intelligence
26	requirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27 28	information requirements - Those items of information regarding the enemy and his
29	environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence
30	requirements of a commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)
31	
32	information exchange requirement - The requirement for information to be passed between
33	and among forces, organizations, or administrative structures concerning ongoing activities.
34 35	Information exchange requirements identify who exchanges what information with whom as well as why the information is necessary and how that information will be used. The quality (i.e.,
36	frequency, timeliness, security) and quantity (i.e., volume, speed, and type of information such as
37	data, voice, and video) are attributes of the information exchange included in the information
38	exchange requirement. Also called IER. (MCRP 5-12C)
39	
40	integration - A stage in the intelligence cycle in which a pattern is formed through the selection and combination of evaluated information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
41	and combination of evaluated information. (Joint Plib 1-UZ)

Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation,

intelligence - 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis,

evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2.

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1	analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02) 3. Knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding
2	environment needed to support decisionmaking. This knowledge is the result of the collection,
3	processing, exploitation, evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available
4	information about the battlespace and threat. (MCRP 5-12C)
5	
6	intelligence annex - A supporting document of an operation plan or order that provides detailed
7	information on the enemy situation, assignment of intelligence tasks, and intelligence
8	administrative procedures. (Joint Pub 1-02)
9	
10	intelligence cycle - The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made
11	available to users. (Joint Pub 2-01)
12	
13	intelligence data - Data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection such as
14	imagery systems, electronic intercept equipment, human intelligence sources, etc. (MCRP 5-
15	12C)
16	
17	intelligence discipline - A well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation,
18	and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are five major
19	disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence,
20	signals intelligence (communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign
21	instrumentation signals intelligence), and open source intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22	
23	intelligence estimate - The appraisal, expressed in written, oral, or graphic form, of available
24	intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determine the courses of
25	action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint
26	Pub 1-02)
27	
28	intelligence operations - The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various
29	intelligence organizations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30	
31	intelligence preparation of the battlespace - 1. An analytical methodology employed to reduce
32	uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations.
33	Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in
34	which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the
35	impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form.
36	Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (Joint Pub 1-
37	02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and
38	environment in a specific geographic area. (MCRP 5-12C)
39	
40	intelligence report - A specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level
41	of command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the
42	timeliness of the information. Also called INTREP. (Joint Pub 1-02)
43	
44	intelligence requirement - 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the
45	collection of information, or the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps

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1	usage, questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander
2	requires to make sound decisions. Also called IR. (MCRP 5-12C)
3	
4	$\underline{\mathbf{J}}$
5	
6	joint deployable intelligence support system - A transportable workstation and
7	communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or
8	other tactical user. Also called JDISS. (Joint Pub 1-02)
9	
10	joint force - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or
11	attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander.
12	(Joint Pub 1-02)
13	is intintallicance center. The intellicance center of the icint force has devertors. The icint
14	joint intelligence center - The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support
15	intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national
16 17	intelligence community. Also called JIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
18	intelligence community. Also canca sie. (Joint 1 do 1-02)
19	joint intelligence support element - A subordinate joint force forms a joint intelligence support
20	element as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force
21	commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime
22	adversary situation. Also called JISE. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23	
24	joint operations - A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by
25	Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do
26	not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27	
28	joint task force - A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense,
29	a combatant commander, a sub unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.
30	Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)
31	
32	joint worldwide intelligence communications system - The sensitive compartmented
33	information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced
34	networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multi-point information exchange
35	involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS. (Joint Pub
36	1-02)
37	
38 39	<u>L</u>
40	<u>L</u>
41	line of communication - A route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating
42	military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.
43	(Joint Pub 1-02)

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4	$\underline{\mathbf{M}}$
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6	Marine Corps planning process - A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought
7 8	processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver
9	warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the establishment and
10	maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of mission analysis, course of action development,
11	course of action analysis, comparison/decision, orders development, and transition. Also called
12	MCPP. NOTE: Tenets of the MCPP include top down planning, single battle concept, and
13	integrated planning. (MCRP 5-12C)
14	
15	measurement and signature intelligence - 1. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by
16	quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence,
17	modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose
18 19	of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called MASINT.
20	ether reflected of efficient. Also caned WASHVI.
21	military operations other than war - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities
22	across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to
23	complement any combination of the other elements of national power and occur before, during,
24	and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)
25	
26	multinational operations - A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of
27	two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub
28	1-02)
29	
30	<u>N</u>
31	named area of interest. A maint on area along a narricular avenue of annuceach through which
32 33	named area of interest - A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within a named area of interest
34	will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Also called NAI. (MCRP 5-
35	12C)
36	
37	national intelligence support team - A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and
38	communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency,
39	National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called NIST. (Joint Pub 2-
40	01)
41	
42	near real time - Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information which has been delayed by

43 44 45 the time required for electronic communication and automatic data processing. This implies that

there are no significant delays. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or the United States. Also called NEO. (Joint Pub 1-02) Open-source intelligence - Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) operational architecture - A description (often graphical) of the operational elements, assigned tasks, and information flows required to support the warfighter. It defines the type of information, the frequency of exchange, and what tasks are supported by these information exchanged requirements. Also called OA. (MCRP 5-12C) operational control - Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command
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accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command
22 military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command
00 Department and control about discovered and the second the second
Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations;
24 normally this authority is exercised through the service component commanders. Operational
control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those
forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned
27 missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for
logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also
29 called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30
operations control and analysis center - Main node for the command and control of radio
battalion signals intelligence operations and the overall coordination of MAGTF signals
intelligence operations. Processes, analyzes, produces, and disseminates signals intelligence
derived information and directs the ground-based electronic warfare activities of the radio
battalion. Also called OCAC. (MCRP 5-12C)
 order of battle - The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the
order of battle - The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Also called OOB. (Joint Pub 1-02)
39 personner, units, and equipment of any limitary force. Also caned GOB. (Joint 1 ub 1-02)
40
41 <u>P</u>
42 42
priority intelligence requirements - 1. Those intelligence requirements for which a commander
has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. Also called

	6/5/0		
1 2	PIR. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. (MCRP 5-12C)		
3			
4	production - The conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis,		
5	evaluation, and interpretation of all-source data and the preparation of intelligence products in		
6	support of known or anticipated user requirements. Production is a process of synthesis the		
7	most important action in developing usable intelligence for the commander. (MCWP 2-1)		
8			
9	production management - Encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each		
10	product, developing a plan and schedule for the development of each product, assigning priorities		
11	among the various production requirements, allocating processing, exploitation, and production		
12	resources, and integrating production efforts with collection and dissemination. (MCRP 5-12C)		
13			
14	<u>R</u>		
15			
16	reach back - The ability to exploit resources, capabilities, expertise, etc. not physically located in		
17	the theater or a joint area of operations, when established. (MCRP 5-12C)		
18			
19	reactive targeting - The method used for targeting target of opportunity. It is used when time		
20	and situation do not allow for deliberate targeting,; i.e., during an attack, when defending against		
21	an attack, or upon discovery of the location of a target such as a radio jammer, tank, or		
22	antiaircraft weapon. (MCRP 5-12C)		
23	magnest for information. Any analities against all has requirement for intelligence		
24	request for information - Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence		
25	information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be		
2627	initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the		
28	theater commander's procedures. (Joint Pub 1-02)		
29	theater commander's procedures. (Joint 1 do 1-02)		
30			
31	<u>S</u>		
32	<u> </u>		
33	SECRET internet protocol router network - Worldwide SECRET level packet switch network		
34	that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems		
35	Network circuitry. Also called SIPRNET. (Joint Pub 1-02)		
36			
37	sensitive compartmented information - All information and materials bearing special		
38	intelligence community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future		
39	community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community		
40	systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. Also called SCI. (Joint		
41	Pub 1-02)		
42			
43	sensitive compartmented information facility - A restricted access facility providing SCI		
44	communications, processing, and storage. Also called SCIF. (Joint Pub 1-02)		

MCWP 2-13, MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination

0

	COORDINATING DRAFT
1	6/5/00 sensor data - Data derived from sensors whose primary mission is surveillance or target
2	acquisition, such as air surveillance radars, counterbattery radars, and remote ground sensors.
3	(MCRP 5-12C)
4	(Meta 5 12e)
5	signals intelligence - A category of intelligence information comprising either individually or in
6	combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumental
7	signals intelligence, however transmitted. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8	**
9	situational awareness - Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes
10 11	timely, relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy and other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that
12	foster an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding.
13	(MCRP 5-12C)
14	
15	surveillance and reconnaissance cell - Primary element responsible for the supervision of
16	MAGTF intelligence collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence
17	collection operations conducted by organic, attached, and direct support collection assets. Also
18	called SARC. (MCRP 5-12C)
19	
20	<u>T</u>
21	
22	tactical intelligence 1. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical
23	operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. Tactical intelligence concerns itself primarily with the location,
24	capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on the battlefield and with the tactical aspects
25	of terrain and weather within the battlespace. (MCRP 5-12C)
26	
27	target - A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by
28	military forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)
29	
30	target analysis - An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority
31	of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (Joint Pub 1-
32	02)
33	44
34	target area of interest - The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where
35	successful interdiction will cause the enemy to either abandon a particular course of action or
36	require him to use specialized engineer support to continue, where he can be acquired and
37 38	engaged by friendly forces. Not all target areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only target areas of interest associated with high-payoff targets are of interest to the staff.
38 39	These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. Target areas of interest differ from
40	engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons. Target
41	areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. Also called TAI. (MCRP 5-12C)
TI	areas of interest inight be engaged by a single weapon. This canca ITH, (WICKI 5-12C)

44 45

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43

target intelligence - Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or target

complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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1	tempest – An unclassified term referring to technical investigations for compromising
2	emanations from electrically operated information processing equipment; these investigations are
3	conducted in support of emanations and emissions security. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4	
5	terrain analysis - The collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic
6	information on the natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other relevant
7	factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8	
9	terrain study - An analysis and interpretation of natural manmade features of an area, their
10	effects on military operations, and the effect of weather and climate on those features. (Joint Pub
11	1-02)
12	
13	$\underline{\mathbf{W}}$
14	
15	warfighting functions - The six mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct
16	of all military operations are:
17	
18	1. Command and control the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be
19	done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.
20	
21	2. Maneuver the movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy
22	
23	3. Fires those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or
24	facilities as well as affect the enemy's will to fight.
25	
26	4. Intelligence knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support
27	decisionmaking.
28	
29	5. Logistics all activities required to move and sustain military forces.
30	
31	6. Force protection actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while
32	protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. (MCRP 5-12C)
33	
34	
35	

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Appendix B 1 2 REFERENCES 3 4 5 **Joint Publications (Joint Pubs)** 6 7 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1-02 8 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 9 2-0 Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations 10 2-01 **Intelligence Support to Targeting** 2-01.1 11 Counterintelligence Support 2-01.2 12 2-02 National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 13 14 2-03 **Geospatial Information** 15 CJCSI 3151.01 Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture 16 Reporting Requirements 17 18 19 20 **Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)** 21 1 22 Warfighting 23 1-1 Strategy Campaigning 1-2 24 **Tactics** 25 1-3 2 Intelligence 26 **Expeditionary Operations** 27 3 Logistics 28 4 5 Planning 29 Command and Control 30 6 31 32 **Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)** 33 34 35 2-1 **Intelligence Operations** 2-11 MAGTF Intelligence Collection (draft) 36 MAGTF Intelligence Analysis and Production (draft) 2-12 37 Geographic Intelligence (draft) 38 2-12.1 Counterintelligence (draft) 2-14 39 **Remote Sensor Operations** 40 2-15.1 2-15.2 Signals Intelligence 41 Ground Reconnaissance (draft) 42 2-15.3 Imagery Intelligence (draft) 2-15.4 43 2-15.5 Interrogator-Translator Operations (draft) 44

		COORDINATING DRAFT	
			6/5/00
1	3-2	Aviation Operations (draft)	
2	5-1	Marine Corps Planning Process	
3	6-2	MAGTF Command and Control (draft)	
4	6-22	Communications and Information Systems	
5	6-23	Information Management (draft)	
6			
7			
8	Marine (Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)	
9			
10	2-11A	RECCE-J (MCRP 2-2.1/ALSA PUB)	
11	2-11B	Joint STARS (ALSA PUB)	
12	2-12A	IPB (FMFRP 3-13-2/FM 34-130)	
13	2-15.3A	Recon Patrol Leader's Planning Handbook	
14	2-15.3B	Reconnaissance Reports and Formats	
15	5-12A	Operational Terms and Graphics	
16	5-12C	Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary	
17		of Military and Associated Terms	
18	5-12D	Organization of Marine Corps Forces	
19	6-23A	Joint Task Force Information Management	
20			
21			

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Appendix C 1 2 **Intelligence Estimate Format** 3 4 5 This appendix provides the format for an intelligence estimate to an operations order, written 6 from the perspective of a MAGTF. The first example is for an intelligence estimate in support of 7 conventional combat operations. The second example provides the format for an intelligence 8 estimate in support of MOOTW. 9 10 11 Copy no.__of__copies 12 Issuing headquarters PLACE 13 Date/time of issue 14 OF ISSUE Message reference number 15 16 17 <u>INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (Number)</u> 18 (a) Maps and Charts 19 Ref: 20 (b) Other pertinent intelligence documents and online databases 21 Intelligence and Information Cutoff Time Used for this Estimate: (Provide date-time group) 22 23 24 1. MISSION. (The command's restated mission as developed during the mission analysis phase of the planning process.) 25 26 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OR OPERATIONS. (State conditions which exist 27 and indicate the effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. 28 29 Assess the estimated effects of these conditions on both enemy and friendly capabilities and operations.) 30 31 a. Military Geography 32 33 (1) Topography 34 35 (2) Drainage 36 37 (3) Vegetation 38 39 (4) Surface materials 40 41 (5) Military aspects of terrain 42 43 (6) Effects of terrain on enemy and friendly capabilities and operations 44

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1		
2	b.	Hydrography
3		
4		(1) Coastline description
5		
6		(2) Hydrographic conditions
7		
8		(a) Surf
9		
10		(b) Tides
11		
12		(c) Currents
13		
14		(3) Beaches
15		
16		(4) Effects of hydrography on enemy and friendly capabilities and operations
17		
18	c.	Climate and Weather
19		
20		(1) Type and characteristics
21		
22		(2) Temperature
23		
24		(3) Precipitation
25		
26		(4) Visibility
27		
28		(5) Winds
29		
30		(6) Light Data
31		
32		(7) Flight conditions
33		
34		(8) Effects of weather on enemy and friendly capabilities and operations
35		
36	d.	<u>Transportation</u>
37		
38		(1) Airfields
39		
40		(2) Helicopter landing zones
41		
42		(3) Port facilities
43		
44		(4) Roads
45		

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1	(5) Railroads
2	(6) Inland waterways
4 5	(7) Effects of transportation on enemy and friendly capabilities and operations
6	
7 8	e. <u>Civilian Telecommunications and Media</u>
9	(1) International
10	
11 12	(2) Domestic
13 14	(3) Mass communications types, capabilities, key facilities
15	(a) Radio
16 17	(b) Television
18	
19	(c) Print media
20 21	(4) Effects of telecommunications and media on enemy and friendly capabilities and
22	operations
23 24	f. Economics and Infrastructure
25 26 27	(1) General economic activity and conditions (industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, etc.)
28 29	(2) Monetary system
30 31 32	(3) Power and utilities
33 34	(4) POL facilities
35	(5) Effects of economics and infrastructure on enemy and friendly capabilities and
36	operations
37 38 39	g. Politics
40 41	(1) Political system and climate
42 43	(2) Local political conditions
44 45	(3) Local political leaders

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	(4) Policy and attitudes towards the U.S. and the U.S. military
	(5) Effects of political situation on enemy and friendly capabilities and operations
h.	Sociology
	(1) Cities and towns
	(2) Population and distribution of area and of key cities and towns
	(3) Ethnic composition
	(4) Languages
	(5) Religions
	(6) Customs and norms
	(7) Social institutions and attitudes
	(8) Effects of sociological situation on enemy and friendly capabilities and operations
i.	Health and Medical
	(1) Food supply
	(2) Water supply
	(3) Diseases and other medical problems
	(4) Plant and animal hazards
	(5) Sanitation
	(6) Medical facilities
operat	(7) Effects of health and medical situation on enemy and friendly capabilities and ions
3. <u>EN</u>	EMY MILITARY SITUATION
a.	Ground Forces
[i.e., o	(1) Composition, organization and strengths. (Describe the structure of enemy forces rder of battle] and describe unusual organizational features, identity, etc. State the number

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1	and size of enemy units in and others available for use in the area of operations. Provide
2	estimated combat effectiveness of enemy forces.)
3	
4	(2) Disposition, locations, movements and activities. (Describe the geographic location
5	and latest known activities of enemy forces, including command and control facilities, fire
6	support elements, and other key combat support forces.)
7	
8	(a) Committed forces. (For ground forces, include all units currently in contact or
9	with which contact is imminent within the unit's AO, regardless of the specific friendly course of
10	action. For amphibious or forcible entry operations, committed forces would be those which
11	could immediately engage friendly units at their point of insertion. All fire support assets within
12	range are normally considered committed, regardless of subordination. Conventional military
13	forces are referred to by numbers of unit types (armor, infantry, etc.) two echelons below the
14	friendly unit. Guerrilla or insurgent forces are expressed in terms of total numbers of personnel
15	and fire support weapons.
16	
17	(b) Reinforcements. (Describe the enemy's reinforcement capabilities in terms of
18	possible forces and weapons that can react in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.
19	Factors to be considered include time available to react, terrain, weather, road and rail nets,
20	transportation, replacements, and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.)
21	
22	(3) Weapons and equipment. (Describe the operational capabilities and technical
23	characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy's inventory.)
24	
25	(4) Command and control
26	
27	(a) Organization
28	
29	(b) Key C2 nodes
30	
31	(c) Communications and information systems
32	
33	(5) Logistics. (Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports,
34	roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider
35	transportation, hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and
36	maintenance of combat equipment, etc.).
37	
38	(6) Training, tactics, operating patterns
39	
40	(7) Capabilities and effectiveness
41	
42	b. Naval Forces
42 43	
42	b. Naval Forces(1) Composition, organization and strengths

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${\bf MCWP~2\text{-}13}, \textit{MAGTF~Intelligence~Dissemination}$

	COORDINATING DRAFT	C/E/00
1	(2) Disposition, locations, movements and activities	6/5/00
2	(3) Weapons and equipment	
4		
5 6	(4) Command and control	
7	(a) Organization	
8 9	(b) Key C2 nodes	
10	(b) Key C2 nodes	
11	(c) Communications and information systems	
12 13	(5) Logistics	
14	(-) 8-2	
15	(6) Training, tactics, operating patterns	
16 17	(7) Capabilities and effectiveness	
18		
19 20	c. Air Forces	
21	(1) Composition, organization and strengths	
22 23	(2) Disposition, locations, movements and activities	
24 25	(3) Weapons and equipment	
26 27	(4) Command and control	
28 29	(a) Organization	
30 31	(b) Key C2 nodes	
32 33 34	(c) Communications and information systems	
35	(5) Logistics	
36 37	(6) Training, tactics, operating patterns	
38 39	(7) Capabilities and effectiveness	
40 41	d. Air Defense Forces	
42 43	(1) Composition, organization and strengths	
44 45	(2) Disposition, locations, movements and activities	

(2) Disposition, locations, movements and activities

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1	
2	(3) Weapons and equipment
3	(4) Command and control
5	(+) Command and Control
6	(a) Organization
7	(h) Way C2 madaa
8 9	(b) Key C2 nodes
10	(c) Communications and information systems
11	
12 13	(5) Logistics
14	(6) Training, tactics, operating patterns
15 16	(7) Capabilities and effectiveness
17 18	e. Paramilitary and Security Forces
19	(1) Composition appoints on and atmosphere
20 21	(1) Composition, organization and strengths
22	(2) Disposition, locations, movements and activities
23 24	(3) Weapons and equipment
25 26	(4) Command and control
27 28	(a) Organization
29	(1) 018
30 31	(b) Key C2 nodes
32 33	(c) Communications and information systems
34	(5) Logistics
35 36	(6) Training, tactics, operating patterns
37 38	(7) Capabilities and effectiveness
39 40	f. Command and Control Warfare Capability
41 42	(1) Intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance capabilities
43 44	(2) Electronic warfare capabilities
45	
	(Page number)

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	0/2/00
1	(3) Psychological warfare capabilities
2	
3	(4) Deception capabilities
4	(5) On anotional appropriate completition
5	(5) Operational security capabilities
6 7	g. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Capabilities
8	g. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Capabilities
9	h. Night Combat Capabilities
10	II. Italii Comout Capacinaco
11	i. <u>Unconventional Warfare Capabilities (guerrilla, subversion, sabotage, terrorism)</u>
12	
13	4. CAPABILITIES AND ANALYSIS. (List separately each enemy capability which can affect
14	the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information
15	on what the enemy can do, where they can do it, when they can start it and get it done, and what
16	strength they can devote to the task. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission,
17	considering all applicable factors from paragraphs 2 and 3, and attempt to determine and give
18	reasons for the estimated probability of adoption by the enemy. Examine the enemy's capabilities
19	by discussing the factors that favor or militate against its adoption by the enemy. The analysis of
20	each capability should also include a discussion of enemy strengths and vulnerabilities associated
21	with that capability. Also, the analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point
22	to possible adoption of the capability. Finally, state the estimated effect the enemy's adoption of
23	each capability will have on the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The term "capabilities"
24	includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy (i.e. attack, defend, withdraw,
25	etc.), but also the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. These
26	COAs should correspond exactly to the enemy COA models developed during step 4 of IPB.)
27	
28	5. <u>CONCLUSIONS AND VULNERABILITIES</u> . (Conclusions resulting from discussion in
29	paragraph 4. Include: enemy centers of gravity, critical and other vulnerabilities and estimated
30	exploitability of these by friendly forces, enemy courses of action beginning with the most
31	probable and continuing down the list in the estimated order of probability, and the estimated
32	effects adoption of each capability would have on the friendly mission.)
33	
34	
35	/s/

1 2	TABS (omit or add other tabs as required)
3	A. Tactical Study of Terrain
5 6	B. Beach Studies
7 8	C. Climatology Study
9 10	D. Airfield Studies
11 12	E. HLZ and DZ Studies
13 14	F. Port Studies
15 16	G. Lines of Communications Study
17 18	H. Order of Battle Study
19 20	
21	

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1	
1	MOOTW ESTIMATE FORMAT
2	
3	Copy noofcopies
4	Issuing headquarters
5	PLACE OF ISSUE
6	Date/time of issue
7	Message reference number
8	
9 10	INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (Number)
11	Ref: (a) Maps and Charts
12	(b) Other pertinent intelligence documents and online databases
13	(b) Other pertinent interrigence documents and online databases
14	Intelligence and Information Cutoff Time Used for this Estimate: (Provide date-time group)
15	intengence and information eutor Time escu for this Estimate. (1 fovide date-time group)
16	1. <u>MISSION</u> . (The command's restated mission as developed during the mission analysis phase
17	of the planning process.)
18	of the planning process.)
19	2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OR OPERATIONS. (Discuss characteristics of the
20	host nation (HN), the area, and their probable effects upon the threat(s), the mission force, and
21	the host government.)
22	the host government.)
23	a. Geography
24	a. <u>Goograph</u>
25	(1) Strategic location.
26	(1) Stategre rotation
27	(a) Neighboring countries and boundaries.
28	(a) 1 (eight of the countries with countries).
29	(b) Natural defenses including frontiers.
30	(0) 1 (400) 411 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401
31	(c) Points of entry and strategic routes.
32	(-),
33	(2) Size and dimensions.
34	
35	(3) Relief.
36	
37	(4) Beach Data.
38	
39	(5) Hydrography.
40	
41	(a) Coastal.
42	
43	(b) Lakes.
44	

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6/5/00 (c) Rivers. (6) Land use. (7) Geological basics. (8) Vegetation (9) Water sources. (10) Natural foods. (11) Population centers. (12) Wildlife. b. Climate and Weather (1) Type and characteristics. (2) Temperature. (3) Precipitation. (4) Visibility. (5) Winds. (6) Light Data. (7) Flight conditions. (8) Seasonal effects of weather on terrain and visibility. c. Demographics (1) History. (2) Ethnic composition. (3) Languages. (4) Social system. (5) Education.

		6/5/00
1 2	(6) Living conditions.	
3 4	(7) Cultural customs.	
5 6	(8) Religions.	
7 8 9	(9) Taboos.	
10 11	(10) Grievances.	
12 13	(11) Psychology (Behavior patterns and motivating factors.)	
14 15	d. <u>Transportation</u>	
16 17	(1) Airfields	
18 19	(2) Helicopter landing zones	
20 21	(3) Port facilities	
22 23	(4) Roads	
24 25	(5) Railroads	
26 27	(6) Inland waterways	
28 29	e. Civilian Telecommunications and Media	
30 31	(1) International	
32 33	(2) Domestic	
34 35	(3) Mass communications types, capabilities, key facilities	
36 37	(a) Radio	
38 39	(b) Television	
40 41	(c) Print media	
42		
43		
44		
45		

1	
2	f. Politics (Address existing situation, effects on threat(s), HN, and mission force.)
3	
4	(1) National government.
5	
6	(a) Structure.
7	
8	(b) Regional and/or international role.
9	(a) Degree of nonvious suggests
10	(c) Degree of popular support.
11	(2) Political parties (Both sanctioned and unsanctioned.)
12 13	(2) Fortical parties (Both sanctioned and unsanctioned.)
14	(3) Foreign dependence or alliances.
15	(3) I oreign dependence of unfunces.
16	(4) Controls and restrictions.
17	(1) Controls and resultations.
18	(5) Legal system (both civil and religious.)
19	
20	(6) Grievances.
21	
22	g. Economics (Address existing situation, effects on threat(s), HN, and mission force.)
23	
24	(1) Current value of currency and wage scales.
25	
26	(2) Financial structure to include national and international.
27	
28	(3) Foreign dependence.
29	
30	(a) Assistance programs.
31	(h) Faraian assured hypinassas and antamaiass in assurtan
32	(b) Foreign-owned businesses and enterprises in country.
33 34	(c) Trade agreements.
35	(c) Trade agreements.
36	(4) Agriculture and domestic food supply.
37	(+) rightenture and domestic food suppry.
38	(5) Natural resources and degree of self-sufficiency.
39	(1) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
40	(6) Industry.
41	
42	(a) Types.
43	
44	(b) Production levels.
45	

6/5/00 (c) Consumer demands. (d) Unions. (7) Black market and illicit trades (drugs, weapons, etc.) (8) Technology. (a) Capabilities. (b) Expertise. h. Health and Medical (1) Food supply (2) Water supply (3) Diseases and other medical problems (4) Plant and animal hazards (5) Sanitation (6) Medical facilities 3. THREATS (Note: For each category of threat (except medical/environmental and natural disasters) discuss organization and leadership (to include composition); strength and dispositions; recent and present significant activities, strengths and weaknesses; and relationships with other threat categories.) a. Conventional. b. Insurgent. c. Clans, Tribes, or Factions. d. Terrorist. e. Drug producers or traffickers f. Criminal organizations.

g. Third-party nation and external.

1	
2	h. Civil unrest
3	
4	i. Medical and environmental.
5	
6	j. Natural disasters.
7	
8	4. <u>CAPABILITIES AND ANALYSIS</u> (List current threat capabilities and discuss in regard to
9	probability of adoption)
10	
11	a. Enumeration. (Includes what, where, when, and how, for each category of threat.)
12	
13	(1) Basic capabilities.
14	
15	(a) Conventional.
16	
17	(b) Insurgent.
18	
19	(c) Clans, Tribes, or Factions.
20	
21	(d) Terrorist.
22	(a) Dans and disease on the ff alread
23	(e) Drug producers or traffickers
24	(f) Criminal organizations.
2526	(1) Criminal organizations.
27	(g) Third-party nation and external.
28	(g) Time-party nation and external.
29	(h) Civil unrest
30	(ii) Civii unicst
31	(i) Medical and environmental.
32	(i) integral and chrynomional.
33	(j) Natural disasters.
34	
35	(2) Supporting capabilities. (Includes intelligence, security, recruitment, organization,
36	training, finance, and logistics.)
37	
38	(a) Conventional.
39	
40	(b) Insurgent.
41	
42	(c) Clans, Tribes, or Factions.
43	
44	(d) Terrorist.
45	

6/5/00 (e) Drug producers or traffickers (f) Criminal organizations. (g) Third-party nation and external. (h) Civil unrest (i) Medical and environmental. (j) Natural disasters. b. Analysis and Discussion. (Includes all evidence supporting or rejecting the adoption of each capability.) 5. HN SECURITY a. Situation. (For each sub-paragraph describe organization and leadership; strength and disposition; recent and present significant activities; and strengths and weaknesses.) (1) Public order/internal security forces. (2) Armed forces. (3) External support forces an dependency. (Regional peacekeeping, foreign forces, mercenaries, etc.) b. Capabilities. (What, where, when, how for both basic capabilities and supporting capabilities.) (1) Public order/internal security forces. (2) Armed forces. (3) External support forces an dependency. c. Analysis and discussion. 6. FRIENDLY AND NEUTRAL THIRD-PARTY a. Situation. (For each sub-paragraph, as defined in 5.a.) (1) Embassies and consulates.

(2) Military.

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1		
2	(3) Business interests.	
3		
4	(4) NGO/PVO.	
5		
6	b. Capabilities. (As defined in 5.b.)	
7		
8	(1) Embassies and consulates.	
9		
10	(2) Military.	
11		
12	(3) Business interests.	
13	(A) NGO/PNIO	
14	(4) NGO/PVO.	
15	A malanda and discount an	
16	c. Analysis and discussion.	
17	7 CONCLUCIONS and VIII MED ADILITIES	
18	7. CONCLUSIONS and VULNERABILITIES	
19	a. Effects of the energianal environment. (State total effect of the AO upon COAs.)	
20	a. Effects of the operational environment. (State total effect of the AO upon COAs.)	
21	b. Probable threat COAs. (Listed in order of relative probability of adoption.)	
22 23	b. Frobable tilleat COAs. (Listed in order of relative probability of adoption.)	
	c. Threat vulnerabilities. (List exploitable threat vulnerabilities.)	
2425	c. Threat vulnerabilities. (List exploitable threat vulnerabilities.)	
25 26		
27	TABS (as necessary)	
28	17DB (as necessary)	
20		

6/5/00 Appendix D 1 2 **Intelligence Briefing Formats** 3 4 5 This appendix provides basic formats for the following common types of intelligence briefings: 6 Intelligence Information (or Orientation) Brief; Intelligence Estimate of Supportability Brief; 7 Mission/Target Intelligence Brief; Intelligence Decision Brief; and Intelligence Confirmation 8 Brief. These formats should be modified for use as appropriate, in accordance with the situation 9 and command SOPs and orders. 10 11 12 BASIC INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 13 (ORIENTATION) BRIEFING FORMAT 14 15 1. INTRODUCTION 16 17 2. GENERAL/SPECIAL SITUATION 3. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY (AS IT IMPACTS OPS IN THE AO) 18 19 a. Topography (1) Rivers & Streams 20 (2) Mountains 21 (3) Obstacles 22 (4) Vegetation 23 b. Hydrography 24 (1) Rivers 25 (2) Oceans & Beaches 26 27 (3) Ports c. Terrain Effects (KOCOA) 28 d. Weather/Climate 29 30 (1) Winds (2) Precipitation 31

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1	(3) Temperatures
2	(4) Weather Effects
3	(5) Astronomical Data
4	4. TRANSPORTATION
5	a. LOC Trafficability (Railways & Roads)
6	b. Avenues of Approach
7	c. Bridges (Type & Capability)
8	d. Airfields (Existing/Expeditionary)
9	e. Time/Distance Factors
10	5. MILITARY FORCES IN THE AOA
11	a. Ground Forces
12	(1) Composition
13	(2) Disposition (Committed forces, Reinforcements, Unit boundaries)
14	(3) Strength
15	(4) Key Equipment
16	(5) Doctrinal & Situational Templates
17	(6) Logistics
18	(7) Morale
19	b. Air Forces
20	(1) Composition
21	(2) Disposition (Committed forces, Reinforcements)
22	(3) Strength
23	(4) Key Equipment
24	(5) Logistics
25	(6) Morale

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1	c. Air Defense Forces
2	(1) Composition
3	(2) Disposition
4	(3) Strength
5	(4) Key Equipment
6	(5) Doctrinal & Situational Templates
7	(6) Logistics
8	(7) Morale
9	d. Naval Forces
10	(1) Composition
11	(2) Disposition (Committed forces, Reinforcements)
12	(3) Strength
13	(4) Key Equipment
14	(5) Logistics
15	(6) Morale
16	6. NBC
17	a. Composition
18	b. Disposition
19	c. Strength
20	d. Key Equipment
21	e. Doctrinal & Situational Templates
22	7. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
23	8. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
24	a. Guerilla Warfare
25	b. Sabotage

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2	d. Psychological Operations
3	9. ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES
4	a. Centers of Gravity (Operational & Tactical)
5	b. Strengths
6	c. Critical Vulnerabilities
7	d. Force Correlation (Operational & Tactical)
8	10. COURSES OF ACTION
9	a. DRAW-D
10	b. Most Likely (Short/Long Term) (Operational/Tactical)
11	c. Most Dangerous (To Friendly Forces) (Operational/Tactical)
12	11. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
13	12. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES
14	

c. Subversion

1

1	
2	INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF SUPPORTABILITY
3	BRIEFING FORMAT
4	
5 6 7 8 9	The single generic staff estimate format, shown below, standardizes the way staff members develop and give staff estimates. The G/S-2 (with input assistance from all staff members) will still conduct and disseminate the initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield as a separate product.
10	1. MISSION. Restated mission resulting from the mission analysis.
11 12	2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
13 14 15	A. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATION
16 17 18	(1) Weather. How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff area of concern and resources?
19 20 21	(2) Terrain. How will aspects of the terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?
22 23	(3) Other pertinent facts. Analyses of political, economic, sociological, psychological, and environmental infrastruture, as they relate to the area.
242526	B. ENEMY FORCES. Enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities, and COAs as they affect specific staff area of concern.
27 28 29	C. FRIENDLY FORCES
30 31	(1) Friendly courses of action
32 33	(2) Current status of organic intelligence, CI and reconnaissance units
34 35 36	(3) Current status of other supporting or external intelligence, CI and reconnaissance units and resources
37 38	(4) Key considerations or evaluation criteria used for COA intelligence supportability estimate
39 40 41 42	D. ASSUMPTIONS
43 44	

1	
2	
3	
4	3. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTABILITY (address each of the below for each friendly COA under
5	consideration)
6	
7	PURPOSE/AGENDA
8	• Orientation
9	• PIRs and IRs (By Phase)
10	Assets Available
11	 Intelligence, CI and Reconnaissance Units Task Organization and C2 Relationships
12	
13	INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
14	 Present key collection and production plans' information
15	(By estimated threat COAs or by phase for each intelligence asset)
16	•PIRs/IRs and key indicators
17	•NAI's assigned
18	 Movement to/from NAI, time on target, insert time and means, and any other
19	relevant intelligence operational in formation
20	•Security
21	 Recovery/Link up/Extract plan; or intelligence operations hand-off plan
22	•Timeline
23	
24	COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
25	•Use Connectivity Diagram
26	 Communication Schedule: routine and time-sensitive
27	 Nets used: primary and all specified alternates
28	 Other communication and dissemination information
29	(e.g., plan to shift reporting recipient from one command echelon to another)
30	•No Comm Plan
31	
32	4. ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTABILITY
33	(Summarize, compare and contrast in formation provided for all friendly COAs under
34	consideration and principal advantages and disadvantages for each. Keep focus on PIRs and IRs.
35	Ensure any deficiencies or gaps are clearly identified.
36	
37	5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

38

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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1			
2		MISSION / TARGET ANALYSIS	
3	INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FORMAT		
4			
5			
6	1. ORIENTATION	N AND INTRODUCTION	
7			
8	a. Introduc		
9	b. Orientat	ion to map	
10	c. Mission		
11	•	D. (57.0.) 7.0	
12	2. AREA OF OPE	RATIONS	
13	TT 7 .1		
14	a. Weather		
15	(1)	Existing Situation	
16	(2)	Effects on Enemy Courses of Action	
17	(3)	Effects on Friendly Courses of Action	
18	b. Terrain		
19 20	(1)	Existing Situation (KOCOA)	
21	(2)	Effects on Enemy Courses of Action	
22	(3)	Effects on Friendly Courses of Action	
23	(3)	Effects of Fichary Courses of Fiction	
24	c Other Ch	aracteristics	
25		Existing Situation	
26	(2)	_	
27	(3)	Effects on Friendly Courses of Action	
28	(-)		
29	3. ENEMY SITUA	ATION	
30			
31	a. Disposit	ion	
32	b. Compos	ition	
33	c. Strength		
34	(1)	Committed Forces	
35	(2)	Reinforcements	
36	(3)	Intelligence, espionage, sabotage, terrorism	
37	(4)	Air	
38	(5)	Artillery	
39	(6)	NBC	
40	(7)	Other threat functions or key capabilities, as appropriate	
41		and Current Significant Activities	
42	e. Critical	Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses	
43			

	6/5/00
1	
2	
3	4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES
4	
5	a. Mission
6	b. Enemy desired end state
7	c. COAs
8	I. Most Likely
9	II. Most Dangerous
10	III. Other COAs
11	
12	5. PIRs
13	a. Intelligence Operations Status & Initial Collection, Production, & Dissemination Plans
14	I. Assets tasked
15	II. Start and stop time
16	III. PIRs supported
17	b. Recommend for Commander's approval
18	
19	6. CONCLUSIONS
20	
21	a. Effects of Intelligence Considerations on Friendly Operations
22	b. Effects of AO on Own COAs
23	c. Probably Enemy COA and Reactions
24	d. Enemy Vulnerabilities
25	

1		INTELLIGENCE DECISION BRIEFING FORMAT
2		
3		
4	1. UPDA'	TED INTELLIGENCE MISSION ANALYSIS
5		
6	a.	Weather analysis
7	b.	Terrain analysis
8	c.	Enemy situation & COAs
9		
10		
11	2. INTEI	LIGENCE STAFF ESTIMATE (may be part of combined staff estimate)
12		
13	a.	Assumptions used in planning
14		Results of staff estimate
15	c.	Advantages and disadvantages (include risk) of each course of action
16		(with decision matrix or table showing course of action comparison)
17	d.	Recommended course of action
18		
19		
20		

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1	INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMATION BRIEFING FORMAT
2	
3	
4	1. INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION OF THE OPERATING AREA
5	
6	• Weather
7	 Hydrography
8	 Topography
9	 Population
10	Political Climate
11	 Points Of Entry (HLZs, airfields, ports, etc.) – Location, Description, etc.
12	
13	2. ENEMY SITUATION
14	
15	• Size
16	• Activity
17	 Identified Units (Location, Weapons, Equip, Uniform)
18	Capabilities/Limitations
19	Enemy COAs
20	Most Likely
21	Most Dangerous To Us
22	Most Advantageous To Us
23	Expectations Upon Friendly Actions
24	Reaction Force (Location, Weapons, Equip Uniform, Mobility)
25	Special Equipment
26	• Identifications
27	Intelligence and other Detection Capabilities
28	Air Threats
29	Fixed Wing
30	Helicopter
31	Surface To Air
32	SAM AAA
33 34	AAA Radar Capabilities
35	Radai Capaomides
36	3. SURVIVAL, EVASION, RECOVERY, ESCAPE (SERE) PLAN OF ACTION
37	5. SORTITUDE TRIBION, RECOVERY, ESCHIE (SERE) I EAR OF MOTION
38	Recovery Sites
39	Safe Areas
40	 Communications (Primary/Alternate)
41	 No Comms Plan (Night Far & Near; Day Far & Near)
42	• Extract Times (Primary/Alternate)

	COORDINATING DRAFT	<i>(151</i> 00
1 2	4. CHALLENGES AND PASSWORDS	6/5/00
3	5. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION REQUIREMENTS ON THE OBJECTIVE	
5 6		
7		
8		
9		

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Guide to Preparing and Conducting

Intelligence Presentations

COORDINATING DRAFT	
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Appendix E	

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38 39 This appendix provides a format to guide intelligence personnel, step by step, through the research, preparation and delivery of intelligence presentations and briefs.

BASIC PROCESS

Analyze your mission	Step	A
Consider your audience	Step	В
Identify objective and focus the brief	Step	C
Obtain and research intelligence and other info	Step	D
Determine the level of classification	Step	E
Establish a time line	Step	F
Conduct research	Step	G

Prepare an outline Step Η Plan for use of graphical and other visual aids Step Ι

II. Rehearsal

Research and Preparation

J Create working papers and graphics Step Approximate memorization Step K Reduce your material Step L Practice sessions with a designated listener Step M

III. **Delivery**

The Location Step N Body language Step O Minimizing nervousness P Step

1	I. Research and Preparation
2	STEP A Analyze your mission.
4	SIEI A Analyze your mission.
5	Defining parameters or "boxing-in" the mission.
6	You must determine the scope and intent of the intelligence brief. There are four primary factors
7	to consider: the audience and the occasion, the purpose of the brief, identifying relevant topics,
8	and selecting a method of presentation.
9	
10	STEP B Consider your audience.
11	1. Cauging the audience
12 13	1. Gauging the audience.
14	Analyzing your audience is one of the first and most crucial aspects in preparing an effective
15	brief. Present problems and draw conclusions that will be easily understood by all. In other
16	forums gauging the audience will not be as easy. Do not assume the level of detail/complexity
17	your audience is capable of retaining. Ask questions, gauge their body language (i.e. rolling eyes,
18	snoring, chuckles after each acronym, etc.) and most importantly prepare during the research
19	phase. Questions to ask about your audience include:
20	
21	1. How much do they know about the subject?
22	2. Does each individual in the audience know as much as everybody else? If not, who are the
23	principal targets or decision makers?
24	3. Are they interested in the subject?
25	4. Are there reasons why they should be interested?
26	5. Do they have biases about the subject?
27	
28	2. Playing the Audience.
29 30	Just as considering your audience is important before the brief, reacting to the attitude
31	of your audience is important during the delivery. There are several techniques that are good
32	rules of safety to follow:
33	rules of surety to follow.
34	- Avoid behaving in a conceited or antagonistic manner.
35	- Demonstrate a genuine concern for your listeners and exhibit a friendly attitude to relax
36	yourself and your audience.
37	- Emphasize similarities between your listeners and you.
38	- Be honest and straight forward. Don't attempt to talk to a level or use words beyond
39	your capability.
40	- Are there taboo subjects, phrases or words that will offend your audience?
41	- Establish with the audience a connection between your topic and their needs.
42	
43	
44	

1	
2	STEP C Identify Objective and Focus the Brief.
3	
4 5	Ensure it is appropriate to the audience planning and decisionmaking needs. Keep its scope focused on the supported PIRs, IRs, or other intelligence needs.
6	100 word on the supported 1 mis, or other missingeness needs.
7	Objectives. When you begin to do your research and prepare your material, determine your
8	primary objectives:
9	
10	- Weather, environment and threat orientation?
11	- Friendly intelligence, CI and reconnaissance capabilities and limitations?
12	- COAs wargaming?
13	-Answers to previously stated PIRs, IRs and RFIs?
14	-Future or immediate planning and decisionmaking?
15	
16	
17	STEP D Obtain and research intelligence and other information.
18	
19	The first step in researching an intelligence brief is an inventory of all the personal knowledge
20	you have on the subject, followed by checking with personnel and intelligence already on hand.
21	You will also want to check with external intelligence and other sources, such as NGOs and
22	academics.
23	
24	
25	STEP E Determine the level of classification.
26	
27	During tactical operations most intelligence briefs will be given at the SECRET level. However,
28	if your target audience and facility supports SCI briefs, then consider the advantages and
29	disadvantages of giving an SCI brief. Also, if allied, coalition partners, or other non-U.S.
30	personnel will be in the audience, determine how this will affect the brief's content and
31	classification.
32	
33	
34	STEP F Establish a time-line.
35	
36	Establishing a time-line . Establishing a time-line from preparation through delivery is essential.
37	Clearly delineate a research cut-off time. Also, plan for rehearsal time.
38	
39	- Schedule a location for preparation.
40	- Ensure all necessary CIS support and accesses.
41	- Prepare a realistic time-line.
42	- Stick to the schedule you've created.
43	

1	
2	STEP G Conduct research.
3	
4 5	Research entails much more than simply reading material on your subject. You must evaluate, analyze, assess and reduce available intelligence and other information, organize it, and
6	eventually verbalize it. To establish focus and ensure the brief supports the intelligence mission
7 8	and tasks, you must:
9	- Isolate and prioritize intelligence questions.
10	- Turn your research needs into precise questions.
11	- Determine what kind of answers you need.
12	- Prepare a work file.
13	- Take notes, maintain them logically.
14	- Ensure pertinent intelligence collection and production leaders are aware of your task and needs
15 16	to ensure that relevant new information and intelligence is brought to your attention as soon as it is available.
17	- Segment the material.
18	beginnent the material.
19	The last step, segmenting your material, involves preparing an outline. The outline should be
20	made up of three main parts: the Introduction , Body and Conclusion . The outline should
21	follow these basic principles:
22	r
23	(1) Start by clearly identifying the PIRs, IRs, RFIs or other intelligenc tasks.
24	(2) List the major issues to be covered.
25	(3) Bulletize sub-issues.
26 27	(4) Conclude by restating the pertinent PIRs, IRs and RFIs, and then provide clear, relevant and tailored intelligence conclusions.
28	tunored interrigence concrusions.
29	STEP H Prepare an outline.
30	<u> </u>
31	In preparing an outline of your material, the simpler the better. A sample is provided.
32	r · r · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
33	1. PIR, IR, RFI or other Intelligence Task
34	
35	2. Main Idea
36	
37	A. Supporting idea
38	B. Supporting idea
39	C. Supporting idea
40	
41	3. Main Idea
42	
43	A. Supporting idea
44	B. Supporting idea
45	

1	4. Main Idea
2	
3	A. Supporting idea
4	B. Supporting idea
5	C. Supporting idea
6	
7	5. Conclusions
8	
9	A. Supporting idea
10	B. Supporting idea
11	C. Supporting idea
12	
13	6. Questions/New IRs
14	
15	
16	Storyboarding is another means of helping you visualize your flow. It can be done with a white
17	board, butcher block paper or large note cards, and simply involves listing your main
18	topics/ideas on top and all pertinent material pertaining to each point below. Step back, avoid
19	concentrating on the material, and consider the flow. Does one point logically lead to the
20	next? Can they be rearranged according to a strategy or purpose? This method will help you
21	work on your transitions as you move from point to point, issue to issue. Whatever format you
22	choose, you must be able to visualize the whole of your presentation at a glance. By doing so it
23	will flow more naturally and you will not be intimidated by the quantity of information you are
2425	about to relay. Two tools you can use to format the brief's introduction and body are the acronyms INTROSH and PREP.
25 26	actoriyins in troosit and free.
27	INTROSH (Interest/Need/Title/Revision/Objectives/Scope/Handouts) is also a useful tool in
28	developing an introduction.
29	developing an introduction.
30	Interest - Build the audience's interest.
31	interest. Build the addresses interest.
32	Need – Immediately relate to his/their intelligence needs.
33	- 1000
34	Title - State the title, i.e, the PIR, IR, RFI or other supported intelligence task.
35	
36	Revision - List or identify if there are any revisions.
37	
38	Objectives - State the objectives of your brief.
39	
40	Scope - List the scope of your brief.
41	
42	Handouts/Notes - Are there any? When should you distribute them?
43	

1	
2	
3	PREP (Point/Reason/Example/Point) can be a useful tool in developing the body of the
4	brief.
5	
6	Point - State the intelligence as it directly relates to the specific PIR, IR, RFI or other intelligence
7	questions.
8	
9	Reason – Immediately relate to current situation and planning and decisionmaking.
10	
11	Example - Illustrate the intelligence with an appropriate example or reference to current or near-
12	term tactical activities.
13	Doint Doctote the main intelligence that the audiance must understand
14	Point - Restate the main intelligence that the audience must understand.
15 16	STEP I Plan for use of visual aids.
10 17	STEET I Train for use of visual alus.
18	1. The use of graphics and other visual aids.
19	The upo of graphics and other vibral and
20	Graphics and other visual aids are extremely important and, if used properly, enable your
21	audience to <u>remember</u> what you've said and apply it to their needs. Graphics and visuals should
22	conform to one or more of the following:
23	
24	- Show how things look (as in photos).
25	
26	- Show how things work (as in diagrams or models).
27	
28	- Show how things relate to each other (e.g., threat force dispositions)
29	Charries and intelligence such as been records on leavenumbers
30	- Show important intelligence such as key words or key numbers.
31 32	2. Designing your graphics and other visual aids.
32 33	2. Designing your graphics and other visual alus.
34	When designing graphics and other visuals there are 13 key issues to keep in mind.
35	Then do 35 miles and said thousand and 10 mely 100 mely in minute.
36	(1) Use simple terms, relationships, fonts, and graphics.
37	(2) If a visual doesn't explain something better than words, it shouldn't be used.
38	(3) A visual should never exceed 25 characters across (counting spaces).
39	(4) It should have a minimum number of lines (no more than eight as a rule of thumb).
40	(5) Only highlights should be shown.
41	(6) A complete sentence should never be used. Only key words or phrases.
42	(7) Cover only one idea per visual; don't dwell on it for more than a couple of minutes.
43	(8) On graphs, use a minimum number of curves (try not to exceed three).
44	(9) Use a minimum number of grid lines.
45	(10) Eliminate supplementary notes.

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1	(11) Omit subtitles.
2	(12) Never use vertical printing.
3	(13) A visual for a brief should contain far less information than an
4	illustration for a report or handout.
5	
6	II. Rehearsal
7	
8	Rehearsal is essential for many reasons, the most important of which are:
9	
10	1. To gain enough familiarity and confidence that the right words come out effortlessly and
11	naturally.
12	2. To allow easy use of graphics and other visual aids.
13	3. To look and feel more comfortable.
14	4. To stay focused on the intelligence objective and finish on time.
15	5. To make it easier to answer and anticipate questions.
16	6. Rehearsal may expose some gaps in your information, intelligence, or flaws in your logic.
17	
18	STEP J Create working notes.
19	
20	There are several techniques to organizing working notes and materials.
21	Time Convertial appearing time is most appropriate for "how to " builds to big the audience
22	<u>Time</u> - Sequential organization is most appropriate for "how to" briefs, taking the audience
23	through the logical steps.
24	Space A top to bottom approach Bost suited to technical alasses
25	Space - A top to bottom approach. Best suited to technical classes.
26	Causa/Effect. One of two strategies can be used. The first is a listing of cartain conditions
27	<u>Cause/Effect</u> - One of two strategies can be used. The first is a listing of certain conditions
28	and contend that these will produce a given result or effect. The second strategy is the inverse
29	of the first start with an effect and follow it up with the causes and conditions that drive it.
30	<u>Problem/Solution</u> - Extremely effective when providing recommendations to problems. You
31	must be able to demonstrate that your solutions and recommendations are practical, realistic and
32	desirable. This is best used when conducting a decision brief.
33	desirable. This is best used when conducting a decision brief.
34	<u>Pro/Con</u> - Another effective strategy for decision briefs is the Pro/Con technique. The briefer
35	
36	impartially itemizes the advantages and disadvantages of a certain course of action or issue.
37	The order in which you present the pro's and con's depends on many factors, but it is usually best to finish with the stronger portion or position.
38	to minsh with the stronger portion of position.
39 40	<u>Topical</u> - A topical division of the main points of a talk involves determining categories of the
41	subject.
+1	buojeet.

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STEP K Approximate memorization.

A simple and effective method for memorizing your material is approximate memorization.

A simple and effective method for memorizing your material is approximate memorization. Approximate, in that only a portion of the intelligence and other information needs to be committed to memory. If the main points covered and the material are well researched, the examples, related quotes, sub-issues, etc. will come naturally. This also allows flexibility for the briefer. If approximate memorization is used and the audience seems responsive only to certain elements, then the briefer can cull the information, expand on portions of it and avoid others.

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Danger of verbatim memorization

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By memorizing word by word instead of point by point, the material planned will certainly be the material covered. The danger in this is that the speaker becomes detached from the audience. In effect, it is a canned recital and often appears that way to the audience. Another problem with memorizing material word by word is "brief mental lapses". If even a single word is forgotten in a memorized speech, it may disrupt the briefer's thought process and briefing delivery.

17 18

STEP L Reduce your material.

19 20 21

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The "half rule" is a tool that can help you in creating an effective brief. Simply put, the half rule is culling down your material by half before you begin your final rehearsals. For a 15 minute presentation, prepare 1/2 hours worth of material and reduce it to the most essential, effective issues. Having an impartial and honest opinion from someone while you rehearse will assist you in determining which points are unnecessary. Avoid slanted reasoning and irrational appeals. Slanted reasoning could be:

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- Hasty/Rash generalizations.
- Faulty dilemmas and analogies.
- 30 Stacked or unsupportable evidence.

31 32

Irrational appeals depend upon blind transfer of feelings from one thing to another without logical thought. This area could include:

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- Name calling putting people or things in a bad light by using uncomplimentary terms.
- Glittering compliments, praise and generalities.
- Appeals for the audience to get on the band wagon.
- The superior approach, "browbeating" or intimidating the audience with superior experience, information or qualities.
- The "plain folks" approach is based not in reasoning and logic but emotion. An example could be "Hey, I'm just learning too. I'm just here to get through this".

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(See MCWP 2-12, chapter 3, for other analytical challenges and dangers.)

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2	
3	STEP M Run through with someone impartial.
4	
5	Practice your brief with another intelligence Marine equally or more knowledgeable with the
6	situation and intelligence questions. The more blunt and tactless your practice audience, the
7	better your presentation will become.
8	
9	III. Delivery
10	
11	STEP N The Location.
12	
13	Classroom Preparation
14	
15	As well as preparing briefing material, the briefer has the responsibility for preparing the briefing
16	location. He must ensure that the location is conducive to learning, that the furniture is arranged
17	appropriately, and that the computer and audiovisual aids are all serviceable and
18	properly set up. The briefer should try to control the physical environment so that it is conducive
19	to learning. The following factors are important:
20	
21	1. <u>Lighting</u> . Lighting should be adequate. If the audience is expected to read or write, then
22	lighting must be bright. Ideally, lighting should be controllable from a single point accessible to
23	the briefer.
24	
25	2. <u>Ventilation</u> . Inadequate ventilation will cause the environment to become heavy
26	causing lapses in concentration or dozing.
27	
28	3. <u>Distractions.</u> The audience can be distracted by visual aids which are not immediately
29	relevant. Accordingly, visual aids should be removed from sight when not in use.
30	Posters, diagrams, etc., should be confined from visibility until needed during the brief.
31	
32	4. Acoustics. A room with poor acoustics is tiring to brief in and it is irritating to
33	the audience.
34	
35	5. <u>Seating.</u> Comfortable seating is desirable in that it reduces lapses in the audience's
36	concentration. A suitable writing surface is desirable to aid in note-taking. Seating layout is really
37	a question of method, room size and shape, and type of activity. The most important
38	criterion is that the briefer should be able to see all of the audience from his main briefing area,
39	and that the audience should be able to see and hear the briefer as well as all of the graphics and
40	visual aids.
41	
42	STEP O Body language and other physical factors.
43	
44	One can usually tell a good presentation from a bad one even if you cannot hear it. A
45	speaker who is "bombing" typically shows it with gestures, posture, eye contact etc. There are

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1	a few guidelines to follow to ensure the visual factors of a brief are a success.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Appearance. An audience sees you before it listens to you. Your uniform, haircut, shave is consciously and subconsciously evaluated by the audience before you begin to speak. Always be aware of your appearance. Appearance is also affected by your attitude. A nervous, fidgety person will set off alarm bells in the minds of the audience that you are uncomfortable and therefore won't put on a first-rate presentation. Remain outwardly calm; make the butterflies fly in formation.
10 11 12	<u>Body Movement.</u> Effective body movement involves the audience in your brief. Use it to accentuate, clarify, punctuate, illustrate, and put you and your audience at ease.
13 14 15	<u>Use of the Voice</u> . A good voice has two important characteristics: intelligibility and variation. It is reasonably pleasant, it is easily understood and it expresses differences in meaning.
16 17 18 19	- <u>Intelligibility</u> of your speech is affected by your articulation, pronunciation, vocalization and choice of words. Speak carefully, not slowly, intentionally avoiding poor grammar and stock expressions such as "OK," "like," "you know," "all right," and the like.
20 21 22	- <u>Variety</u> is the conscious avoidance of monotone delivery. 100 to 180 words per minute is the norm, but you should vary delivery tempo or pitch to stress points.
23	STEP P Minimizing nervousness.
24252627	Nervousness can have a positive as well as negative impact on a brief. Nerves or adrenaline will heighten your sense of awareness and mental acuity. Nerves can also cause you to fold in front of an audience, with many in the audience becoming as anxious and uncomfortable as the briefer.
28 29	Tips for the Terminally Nervous:
30 31 32	- You are not alone. Other intelligence professionals will be present to help.
33	- Be well prepared.
343536	- Concentrate on what you have to say.
37 38	- Enthusiasm is the key.
39 40	- Hold good thoughts toward your audience and think of them as individuals.
41 42	- Develop a pre-brief routine to help you relax.
42 43 44	- Prep your body. Stretch your muscles, crack your knuckles, control your breathing.
45	- Visualize a successful performance. As you do your final mental run through, picture a

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responsive audience with you out in front giving a confident, successful brief.

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Appendix F 1 2 **Intelligence Reports Formats** 3 4 5 This appendix provides the formats for the following common types of all-source intelligence 6 reports: Intelligence Summary (INTSUM), Intelligence Report (INTREP), Mission Report 7 (MISREP), BDA Report, SALUTE Report, and Response to Request for Information (RRFI). 8 9 10 Section I. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) Report Format 11 12 The INTSUM provides a summary of the reporting unit's intelligence situation covering a 13 14 specified period of time. It is used to report threat activities, changes to threat capabilities, and the results of further collections, analysis and production to higher, adjacent, and subordinate 15 forces. It is designed to update the current intelligence estimate and provide a continual 16 intelligence assessment of threat actions and estimated capabilities and courses of action. 17 18 19 Guidance regarding the periodicity and deadline for submission of INTSUMs generally begins at the theater J2 level. Theater TTP and the specific OPLAN/OPORDER will designate INTSUM 20 21 reporting requirements for subordinate JTFs or Service/functional components. Based on those requirements, the MAGTF G/S-2 will establish INTSUM reporting requirements for their major 22 23 subordinate commands/elements (at the MEF CE level, this is the responsibility of the intelligence support coordinator). These requirements generally will be published as part of their 24 OPLAN/OPORDER. The deadlines established are to allow the intelligence battalion's 25 Production and Analysis (P&A) Cell sufficient time to incorporate subordinate INTSUMs into 26 27 their own or other intelligence products. The G/S-2s of MAGTF major subordinate 28 commands/elements will likewise determine INTSUM requirements for their headquarters and subordinate elements. Where possible, MEF TTP and SOPs, reflecting the TTP of anticipated 29 30 theaters of operations, should establish standard INTSUM reporting requirements. 31 All units can produce INTSUMs, however, in practice they are normally generated at the MSC 32 level or higher. The decision to produce INTSUMs at lower echelons must be balanced between 33 the relatively small size of intelligence sections at regiment/group and battalion/squadron and the 34 35 requirement for information and intelligence at higher command levels. A more abbreviated INTSUM format may be appropriate for lower tactical echelons, focused on significant threat 36 37 actions and anticipated future actions. 38 39 At higher command levels, particularly JTFs and Unified Commands, a daily intelligence summary (DISUM) will usually be published every 24 hours. While INTSUMs, particularly at 40 lower tactical echelons, provide a generally fine-grained but limited tactical perspective, the 41 DISUM is broader in scope, potentially encompasses more aspects of a threat country's elements 42 of national power, and focuses on operational-level intelligence analysis and estimates. MAGTF 43 44 command elements tasked as JTF headquarters will generally be required to submit DISUMs to

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- the combatant command CINC. See the combatant command's TTP for the DISUM format.
- 2 Although generally the same, formats may vary from theater to theater.

3

- Below is provided a sample format for a written INTSUM that may be posted on a website. It is
- 5 based generally on the intelligence estimate format. Like the estimate, the INTSUM should be
- 6 tailored and focused to mission, the type of unit, and the information and intelligence needs of
- 7 the commander. The format provided is representative of a format that would be used at the
- 8 MAGTF or MSC level for conventional military operations. For military operations other than
- 9 war (MOOTW), the below format generally will need to be modified to meet unique needs.

10

- Note: For paragraphs not applicable to the reporting unit, the notation "NA" (not
- applicable) may be used, or the paragraph may be skipped (paragraph numbering should
- remain the same). If no significant information or intelligence is available for a particular
- paragraph, the notation "NSTR" (nothing significant to report) may be used. The
- annotation () reflects classification of that information line.

16

- 17 CLASSIFICATION/RELEASABILTY
- 18 INTSUM #: (Sequentially numbered such, as "DD-001-97")
- 19 DTG: DDHHMM(Time Zone) (Month) YY
- 20 INFO cutoff DTG
- 21 PERIOD: DDHHMM TO DDHHMM (Month) YY

22

23 I. () Highlights:

24

A. () Ground: Highlights of the current ground situation, usually divided by area or sector.

26

27 B. () Air: Highlights of the current air situation.

28

II. () Summary of Enemy Situation: (Each category should use the commander's related PIRs as the basis for the analysis and assessment.)

31

A. () Ground: Detailed analysis of the battlefield by area or sector with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

34

B. () Air: Detailed analysis of the air and air defense situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

37

C. () Naval: Detailed analysis of the naval situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

40

D. () SSM/WMD: Detailed analysis of the SSM/WMD situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

- 44 E. () Special Operations Forces (SOF): Detailed analysis of the SOF, force protection, and rear
- area security situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

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1 2 F. () Other: May be used for detailed analysis of paramilitary, insurgent, terrorist, or other significant threat categories not discussed elsewhere. For MOOTW operations, separate 3 paragraphs for each category of threat or significant power group may be created as necessary to 4 either supplement or replace the above categories. 5 6 7 III. () MEF (or MSC) Assessment: 8 9 A. () Most Likely Course of Action: 10 11 B. () Most Dangerous Course of Action: 12 C. () Others (as necessary): 13 14 15 IV. () Enemy Movement During the Reporting Period: Major enemy units (to include at least two levels below that of the reporting command); include universal transverse mercator (UTM) 16 coordinates of the new position. 17 18 19 V. () PIRs: The commander's current (previous and new) PIRs are listed here, each with a 20 current assessment regarding the level of satisfaction of the intelligence requirement (i.e., partially satisfied, satisfied, not satisfied). 21 22 VI. () Intelligence Plans, Missions and Systems Status: Key intelligence collection, production, 23 and dissemination plans updates; information on planned intelligence and reconnaissance 24 missions; and intelligence systems status (generally only for those systems that are less than fully 25 operational). The period covered by this paragraph will be per unit SOP or annex B to the 26 operations order. 27 28 29 **GRAPHIC INTSUM** 30 In an effort to enhance the understanding of the INTSUM, and save time when disseminating, it 31 is now common to graphically portray the INTSUM as a single or set of map overlays. With the 32 proliferation of web-based automated information systems, it is increasingly common for 33 INTSUMs to be "posted" in graphic and text formats, providing a wide range of MAGTF 34 intelligence users the option to "pull" and use desired intelligence and products. By posting the 35 graphics and supporting text products to a website (e.g., S-TDN, SCI-TDN, INTELINK or 36 INTELINK-S), it is available to anyone with access to that site, to include G/S-3 personnel using 37 systems such as TCO. Care must be exercised, however, to not place an over-reliance on 38 electronically generated graphic INTSUMs. Graphics can require large bandwith and processing 39 power to be pulled over a web-based system, with possible degradation of the overall MAGTF 40 tactical data network. Lower-level tactical units and allied nation forces may also not possess the 41 means to access and use the information. This generally requires INTSUMs to be disseminated 42 43 over multiple paths, both electronically and via hard copy (to sometimes include couriers), in

44 45 both graphic and text form.

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- The challenge with graphic INTSUMs, as with any graphic representation, is to convey essential
- 2 intelligence and other information in a clear, concise, and easy to understand visual format.
- 3 Because of the volume of detail to be presented, most graphic INTSUMs, particularly at higher
- 4 commands, have evolved into multiple "slides" created with software such as Microsoft Power
- 5 Point. There is no one approved format for graphic INTSUMs; they are established per unit SOP
- or the operations order (see annex B, *Intelligence*), tailored to the level of command, type of
- 7 operation, and most importantly, the intelligence requirements of the commander. They do,
- 8 however, generally contain the same elements. Listed below are some common elements of
- 9 graphic INTSUMs. These should not be taken as absolutes, but instead as examples.

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• Weather Graphic(s) - Composite graphics, based on satellite imaging, showing weather fronts, cloud coverage, high and low pressure areas, etc. for the area. May include forecast graphics for specified future periods.

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• **5-Day Forecast** - Similar to television weather forecasts, showing forecast weather conditions (cloudy, partly cloudy, rainy, etc.), high and low temperatures, winds, normal temperatures based on climatology, and any other elements that may be of interest to the commander. Should also include light data for the same period.

18 19 20

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• Weather Impacts Graphic(s) - Normally presented in "gumball" chart (green, yellow, red) format. Should include those forces, types of operations, or critical items of equipment that are essential to unit mission performance, both friendly and enemy.

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• **PIRs** - Include current and new PIRs. May include assessment of level of satisfaction (not answered, partially answered, answered).

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29 30 • Activities and Assessments - Consists of a graphical situation map, denoting locations of threat forces of interest and, if possible, graphically indicating status/combat effectiveness (color coding or other symbology). Depending on the level of command and information needs, separate graphics for categories of threat forces (ground, air, air defense) may be created to reduce clutter. Each graphic should:

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-- Note significant threat activity over the reporting period, with text comment boxes tied to locations or an event numbering system with marginal text comments.

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-- Provide an assessment(s) keyed to the commander's PIRs.

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-- Use supporting graphics to examine items in more detail, such as aircraft sortie analysis or the location and status of a particular category of force or equipment (i.e., heavy equipment transporter systems (HETs), specialized units, etc.)

- Collection, Production, and Dissemination Plans; Status of Planned Missions -
- 43 Graphically presents locations of organic collection assets (reconnaissance teams, RadBn assets,
- 44 UAV tracks, sensor strings, etc.) and/or provides a timeline showing daily projected availability
- windows and mission-tracks (as applicable) of non-organic supporting assets (AWACS, RC-135,

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1 U2, etc.). Also identifies changes to previous production and dissemination plans and any new plans.

Outlook/Assessment- Provides overall assessment of estimated threat COA(s) (at a minimum, the threat's most likely/most dangerous COAs). It may be broken into estimate time periods, such as 24-48 hours, 48-96 hours, or whatever periods of time are applicable to the commands requirements to plan future actions. COAs should be graphically portrayed. In pre-hostilities or MOOTW, these graphics may be used to address anticipated political or societal actions/events that may impact on the force.

Section II. Intelligence Report (INTREP) Format

An intelligence report (INTREP) is a standardized report which is used to disseminate important intelligence without regard to a specific schedule. It can be prepared at any echelon by the first intelligence element acquiring the information and is disseminated as rapidly as possible to all units which may have need of the reported information. It may be prepared on any item of intelligence, regardless of source; generally, each report will concern only a single item.

An INTREP is generally required whenever an event occurs that is likely to result in a change in the friendly plan or when a change to the current or future analytical assessment is made. It is generally initiated when facts influencing threat capabilities have been observed, or when a change in threat capabilities has taken place. The commander's PIRs serve as the basis for determining what information warrants an INTREP. Whenever possible, the INTREP should include the originator's assessment of the significance of the intelligence, as well as an evaluation of the reliability and accuracy of the source. The format below provides an example of an INTREP format that would be posted on a website or forwarded via TDN or SIPRNET e-mail.

CLASSIFICATION/RELEASABILITY

INTREP#: DD-001-97 (Sequentially numbered by originating unit) DTG: DDHHMM(Time Zone) (Month) YY

35 I. () Significant Event(s): A summation of the significant 36 event(s) or developments that initiated the INTREP. Use either 37 5W (Who, What, Where, When, Why) or SALUTE (Situation, Activity, 38 Location, Unit, Time, Equipment) format.

40 II. () Assessment: The effect of the current activity on threat capabilities or courses of action.

43 III. () Evaluation of Source: State the original source of the 44 information and an evaluation of the accuracy and reliability of 45 that source.

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Note: () Reflects classification of that information line.

Section III. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Report Format

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> The following is an example of a periodic summary battle damage assessment (BDA) report that may be used by MEF major subordinate commands' intelligence personnel to provide consolidated Phase I/Physical Damage Assessment BDA from their subordinates to the intelligence battalion's P&A Cell. The report is a compilation of BDA reporting from subordinate elements, as well as any additional BDA obtained at the MSC level during the designated time period. The aviation combat element would normally be responsible for providing BDA on any air tasking order (ATO) related missions, while the ground combat element would focus on the results of engagements by their subordinate elements, to include the observed effects of close air support.

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The target intelligence/BDA team, P&A Cell, intelligence battalion, is responsible for consolidating, deconflicting, and refining these reports, introducing any additional information and intelligence obtained from other sources, and preparing the overall Phase I BDA (or Physical Destruction Assessment) for the MEF commander. The P&A Cell would also be responsible for adjusting the MEF order of battle (OOB) databases to reflect combat losses and developing the overall combat strength assessment for each unit. The P&A Cell target intelligence/BDA team would also prepare Phase II/Combat Strength Assessments based on the consolidated reporting from subordinate, higher and adjacent commands. Formats for BDA reporting to the JTF, theater, and national level will be established in the theater intelligence TTP or as directed by the ioint task force commander.

24 25 26

SAMPLE BDA REPORT FORMAT

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6 HR BDA REPORT (SUBMIT TO Intelligence Battalion's TqtIntel/BDA Team, P&A Cell, AT SPECIFIED TIMES) REPORTING UNIT: REPORTING PERIOD (FROM/TO): ENEMY UNIT OR FACILITY #1: (DOWN TO BDE NAME FOR MANEUVER, BN FOR FIRE SUPPORT, or as directed in unit SOP or OPORD. REPEAT THIS SECTION FOR EACH UNIT OR FACILITY). UIC OR BE#: DHGKNxxxxx DAMAGED/DESTROYED #DEST #DMGD/EXTENT LOC TYPE

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45

46 1. ARMOR: 47 2. FIRE SUPPORT:

- 48 3. TRUCKS:
- 49 4. AIR DEFENSE:

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1	5. C2 SYSTEMS			6/5/00
2 3 4		neers assets, bridges	s, lines of communication, min	nes,
5 6		<u>LOC</u> <u>WIA</u>	KIA	
7 8 9	8. PERSONNEL:			
10	REMARKS:			
11				
12 13 14 15	IF UNIT NAME IS UNKNOWN UNIT: UNKNOWN". DO NOT	· ·	PORT (TOR), UNDER HEADING "END H REPORT. FOR EXAMPLE:	EMY
16 17 18	ENEMY UNIT: UNKNOWN UIC: UNKNOWN			
19	DAMAGED/DESTROYED: LIST	ALL UNKNOWN UNIT BDA	A REPORTS BY TIME	
20 21 22 23	TOR* 1. ARMOR:	LOC TYP	E #DEST #DMGD/EX	TENT
21 22 23 24		LOC TYP	E #DEST #DMGD/EX	TENT
21 22 23 24 25	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE:	<u>LOC</u> <u>TYP</u>	E <u>#DEST</u> #DMGD/EX	TENT
21 22 23 24 25 26 27	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE: 5. C2 SYSTEMS	LOC TYP		TENT
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE: 5. C2 SYSTEMS 6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (Engi	neers assets, bridges	s, LOC's, mines, etc)	TENT
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE: 5. C2 SYSTEMS 6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (Engi		s, LOC's, mines, etc)	TENT
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE: 5. C2 SYSTEMS 6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (Engi 7. CSS:	neers assets, bridges LOC WIA REPORT. (NOTE: REMA	E, LOC's, mines, etc) <u>KIA</u> <u>EPW</u> ARKS ARE A MEANS OF REPORTING	
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE: 5. C2 SYSTEMS 6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (Engi 7. CSS: TOR* 8. PERSONNEL: REMARKS: *TOR: TIME OF INFORMATION THAT DOES N	neers assets, bridges LOC WIA REPORT. (NOTE: REMA	E, LOC's, mines, etc) KIA EPW ARKS ARE A MEANS OF REPORTING ES DESCRIBED ABOVE. SPELL IT	OUT
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32	1. ARMOR: 2. FIRE SUPPORT: 3. TRUCKS: 4. AIR DEFENSE: 5. C2 SYSTEMS 6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (Engi 7. CSS: TOR* 8. PERSONNEL: REMARKS: *TOR: TIME OF INFORMATION THAT DOES N	LOC WIA REPORT. (NOTE: REMA OT FIT INTO THE TABLE OR EACH UNIT IF NECES	E, LOC's, mines, etc) <u>KIA</u> <u>EPW</u> ARKS ARE A MEANS OF REPORTING	OUT

	Section IV. Mission Report (MISREP) Format
PR	ECEDENCE
FR	OM:
ТС):
[N]	FO:
CL	ASSIFICATION
SU	BJ: MISREP NO/Z/MONTH/YEAR
RE	F: (a) As appropriate.
вс	DDY
1.	<u>Air Task/Mission Number or Nickname</u> . Reference the request number, FRAGO number, directive causing initiation of the mission.
2.	<u>Location Identifier</u> . Target number, line number, approved target designator/identifier, or coordinates of the target or sighting being reported.
3.	<u>Time of Target/Time of Sighting</u> . Report at all times by date/time group, using GMT unless otherwise directed.
4.	Results/Sighting Information. This item should contain the pilot/aircrew evaluation of expected results (e.g., percent destroyed, number and type destroyed, or percent of coverage and concise narrative information on significant sightings (e.g., unusual or new enemy equipment or concentrations of enemy forces observed to include number, speed, and direction, if applicable).
5.	<u>Remarks</u> . Includes information and intelligence not specifically mentioned in above items (e.g., enemy defenses encountered; weather data; hostile electronic attacks; etc.).

1	Section V. SALUTE Report Format
2	
3	
4	1. PURPOSE. The SALUTE report is submitted by units/personnel to report enemy activity or
5	other intelligence information.
6	
7	
8	2. <u>INFORMATION</u>
9	
10	a. Classification. As required.
11	b. Periodicity. As required.
12	c. Due by. On occurrence.
13	d. Period Covered. As required.
14	e. Reporting Units.
15	f. Method of Transmission
16	(1) Primary. Secure voice radio transmission.
17	(2) Secondary. Electronic data transmission.
18	(3) Tertiary. Courier.
19	g. Precedence. As required.
20	2 ACTION OIL OLIVER AND A CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF
21	3. <u>ACTION</u> . Submit a SALUTE report upon observation of significant enemy activity.
22	4 COMPLETION INCEPTIONS.
23	4. <u>COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS</u> :
24	Line Alpho, Unit reporting and location
25	Line Alpha: Unit reporting and location.
2627	Line Bravo: Size. Number of troops and approximate size and type of unit.
28	Line Bravo. Size. Number of troops and approximate size and type of unit.
29	Line Charlie: Activity. Observed activity of the enemy.
30	Line Charne. Activity. Observed activity of the chemy.
31	Line Delta: Location. Position of enemy using UTM grid references.
32	Line Detail. Location. I osition of chemy using of the grid references.
33	Line Echo: Unit. Identity of enemy unit or description of markings, uniforms, equipment.
34	Eine Beno. Cint. Identity of enemy unit of description of markings, annothis, equipment.
35	Line Foxtrot: Time. Date-Time-Group (local) of sighting.
36	Zine Pontion Time Zute Time Group (rotal) of Signang.
37	Line Golf: Equipment. Number and description of weapons or equipment.
38	1F
39	
40	

Se	ection VI. Response To Request For Intelligence (RRFI) Format
1. PURP	OSE. The RRFI is used to answer a Request for Intelligence (RFI).
2. <u>INFO</u>	RMATION
a.	Classification. As required.
b.	Periodicity. As required.
c.	Due by. On occurrence.
d.	Period Covered. As required.
e.	Reporting Units.
f.	Method of Transmission
	(4) Primary. Electronic data transmission.
	(5) Secondary. Secure voice radio transmission.
	(6) Tertiary. Courier.
g.	Precedence. As required.
3. ACTIO	ON
3. <u>11011</u>	<u>511</u>
a.	Submit RRFI as soon as the intelligence information is available, but NLT the
u.	LTIOV.
b.	COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS:
0.	COM EDITOR IN INTROCTIONS.
	(1) Line Alpha: IR or RFI number followed by requester and requester serious
ทบ	mber.
110,	
	(2) Line Bravo: Free text answer to the RFI.

1	Appendix G
2	
3	Intelligence Communications and Information
4	Systems (CIS) Plan Appendix Format
5	
6	
7	Purpose. Tab D (Intelligence CIS Plan) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan) to Annex
8	B (Intelligence) should explain how intelligence CIS elements under the operational control
9	(OPCON) or supporting the MAGTF will be used to support the operations plan. It should also
10	provide guidance to subordinate commanders for the conduct of intelligence CIS dissemination
11	operations and the support of intelligence elements and personnel identified to fulfill the
12	intelligence requirements in support of this plan.
13	
14	
15	CLASSIFICATION
16	
17	Copy no of copies
18	Issuing Unit
19	PLACE OF ISSUE
20 21	Date/time group Message reference number
22	Wiessage reference number
23	Tab D to APPENDIX 16 (INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLAN) TO ANNEX B
24	(INTELLIGENCE) TO MAGTF OPORD X ()
25	Intelligence Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Plan (U)
26	
27	() REFERENCES : Identify organic DoD, DIRNSA, NIMA, and other directives; combatant
28	commander, JTF, JFMCC/JFLCC/JFACC or other higher authorities' operations orders, tactics,
29	techniques, and procedures (TTP), and standard operating procedures (SOP) for intelligence CIS
30	operations; formats; and any other relevant documents that pertain to anticipated intelligence
31	operations.
32	
33	1. () <u>SITUATION</u>
34	
35	a. () <u>Define the Area of Operations (AO) and Area of Interest (AOI)</u> . Describe the limits
36	of the AO and AOI. Summarize pertinent weather, terrain, and other AO characteristics and
37	conditions as they may influence the conduct of intelligence CIS operations.
38	
39	b. () Enemy. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and current intelligence estimates for threat
40	capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, and order of battle pertinent to intelligence CIS
41	operations.
42	

1 2	c. () <u>Assigned MAGTF Organic and Supporting Intelligence CIS Assets</u> . Identify organic and supporting forces available to perform C2 or intelligence CIS functions.
3	
4	d. () Assumptions. (Derived during the mission analysis step of the Marine Corps
5	planning process.)
6	
7	e. () Intelligence CIS Considerations. List key intelligence CIS and interoperability
8	considerations which impact this OPLAN or OPORD.
9	
10	(1) () Availability of national and commercial intelligence and multi-purpose CIS
11	resources.
12	
13	(2) () Intelligence C2 and dissemination support to and from JTF/Component
14	Headquarters and other external commands and intelligence organizations.
15	
16	(3) () Creation and manning of forward intelligence C2 and operations elements.
17	
18	2. () MISSION. State concisely the intelligence CIS mission as it relates to the command's
19	planned operations.
20	
21	3. () EXECUTION
22	
23	a. () Concept of Operations. Summarize pertinent command relationships, task-
24	organization, main and supporting efforts, and the scope of MAGTF and supporting intelligence
25	CIS operations. Reference the unit's intelligence SOP and Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations
26	Plan) to Annex B. Restate as appropriate the commander's intent and pertinent aspects of the
27	unit's overall concept of operations as they relate to intelligence operations. Outline the purpose
28	and concept of intelligence CIS operations, specified priorities, and summarize the means and
29	agencies to be employed to support the operations and intelligence concepts of operations.
30	Address the integration of JTF, other components, theater, national, and allied forces'
31	intelligence operations and CIS support.
32	h () CIC Tooks for Intelligence Units and Organizations Cyberdinets Units and
33	b. () <u>CIS Tasks for Intelligence Units and Organizations, Subordinate Units, and</u> Detachment Commanders/OICs.
34	Detachment Commanders/OICs.
35 36	(1) () Orders to Subordinate, Attached, and Supporting Units. Use separate
	subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit conducting intelligence-related
37 38	dissemination operations, including the originating headquarters, subordinate commands, and
39	separate intelligence support units.
40	separate interrigence support units.
	(a) () Marine Division(s)
41 42	(a) () Marine Division(s)
42	(b) () Marine Aircraft Wing(s)
44	(o) () Marine Michael Wing(s)
45	(c) () Force Service Support Group(s)
7.5	(c) () I of co bettee support Group(s)

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1	
2	(d) () Commanding Officer, Intelligence Battalion/Intelligence Support
3	Coordinator
4	1 () OIC Support Call
5 6	$\underline{1}$ () OIC, Support Cell
7	2 () OIC, Production & Analysis Cell
8	
9	<u>3</u> () OIC, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell
10	4 () Intelligence Systems Officer
11 12	4 () Intelligence Systems Officer
13	5 () Commanding Officer, CI/HUMINT Company
14	
15	<u>6</u> () Platoon Commander, Imagery Intelligence Platoon
16 17	7 () Platoon Commander, Topographic Platoon
18	<u>r</u> () Tracoon Commander, Topograpme Tracoon
19	8 () OIC, Joint STARS Common Ground Station
20	
21	(e) () Commander, Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit (if tasked to support)
22	(f) () Commanding Officer, VMU Squadron
23 24	(i) () Commanding Officer, VMO Squadron
25	(g) () Commanding Officer, VMAQ Squadron
26	
27	(h) () Commanding Officer, Radio Battalion
28 29	(i) () Commanding Officer, Force Reconnaissance Company
30	(i) () Commanding Officer, Porce Recommassance Company
31	(j) () OIC, National Intelligence Support Team (if attached)
32	
33	(2) () Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Provide separate
34	numbered subparagraphs pertaining to each unit not organic, attached, or supporting and from
35	which intelligence CIS support is requested, including other components, JTF headquarters,
36	allied or coalition forces, theater, and national operational and intelligence elements.
37	
38	c. () Coordinating Instructions. Reference Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan),
39	Annex K (CIS), Annex J (C2), and command and other pertinent forces' and organizations'
40	intelligence and CI SOPs. Detail here or in supporting tabs key changes to unit SOPs.
41	Additional topics to include or emphasize here are: requesting CIS support, timely reporting
42	procedures for intelligence CIS problems, coordinating switchover to backup dissemination
43	paths, intelligence operations, C2, and CIS hand over between command echelons, etc.
44	
45	4. () ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

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1	
2 3	a. () <u>Logistics</u> . Reference Annex D (Logistics). Identify intelligence CIS logistics requirements and concerns, such as: unique combat service support requirements (batteries,
4	unique replacement parts), procedures, and other guidance to support MAGTF intelligence units
5	and operations; procedures for specialized technical logistics support necessary from external
	organizations; map distribution; requirements for courier runs; etc.
6	organizations, map distribution, requirements for courier runs, etc.
7	b. () Personnel. Identify personnel requirements and concerns that affect intelligence CIS
8 9	operations and support (systems administrators, global sourcing requirements, etc.).
10	operations and support (systems administrators, global sourcing requirements, etc.).
11	5. () COMMAND AND CONTROL
12	3. () COMMIND MID CONTROL
13	a. () Command Relationships. Reference Annex J (Command Relationships). Provide
14	any instructions necessary regarding MAGTF command relationships that will influence
15	intelligence operations and CIS support.
16	menigenee operations and Old support.
17	b. () <u>Information Management</u> . Reference Annex U (Information Management), Annex C
18	(Operations) and Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan). Provide any instructions necessary
19	regarding information management (time-sensitive and routine reporting criteria, intelligence
20	databases, reports, etc.) that will influence MAGTF intelligence CIS, reporting, and other
21	operations.
22	•
23	c. () Communications and Information Systems. Reference Appendix 16 (Intelligence
24	Operations Plan) and Annex K (CIS). Provide any instructions necessary regarding CIS that will
25	influence MAGTF intelligence dissemination operations. List intelligence CIS priorities (by
26	operational phase, intelligence units, intelligence operations and C2 nodes, intelligence activities
27	 whichever approach is most effective for the operation).
28	
29	d. () <u>Intelligence C2 Nodes and Facilities</u> . Reference the unit's SOP and Appendix 16
30	(Intelligence Operations Plan). Provide any guidance and instructions necessary regarding
31	establishment and operation of intelligence C2 nodes and facilities and CIS support and priorities
32	to these, to include, at a minimum: G/S-2 elements within future plans, future operations, current
33	operations, and force fires centers; IOC's Support Cell, SARC and P&A Cell; CI/HUMINT
34	Company CP; reconnaissance operations center; OCAC; command element tactical or rear
35	echelons; and intelligence liaison elements.
36	
37	<u>Tabs</u>
38	A T (11' CTO A 1' () D' () () A 1' T C 1)
39	A <u>Intelligence CIS Architecture Diagrams</u> (See Appendix I for examples.)
40	• Include an diagram for the overall, overarching intelligence CIS architecture.
41	• Include diagrams by intelligence discipline (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, etc.) if
42	possible and useful for the operation.
43	• Include blueprints and CIS wire diagrams for all intelligence C2 and operations nodes
44	and facilities, as appropriate.
45	

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B Intelligence Information Management Flow Diagram(s) (See figure 4-1 for one example.)

Appendix H

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MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination Planning Checklist

<u>Introduction</u>. This appendix identifies typical dissemination planning and execution actions of the MAGTF command element's G/S-2 and Intelligence Battalion staff during each phase of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).

MCPP STEP	Actions of MAGTF Staff	Actions of MAGTF G/S-2 and Intel Battalion Staff
MISSION ANALYSIS	✓ Identify the higher headquarters' (HHQ)/supported headquarters' intent. ✓ Identify tasks. ✓ Determine the area of operations (AO) and area of interest (AOI). ✓ Review available assets and identify personnel and equipment resource shortfalls. ✓ Determine constraints and restraints. ✓ Determine recommended commander's critical information requirements (priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, essential elements of friendly information). ✓ Identify requests for information. ✓ Determine assumptions. ✓ Draft the mission statement. ✓ Present a mission analysis brief. ✓ Draft the warning order. ✓ Convene/alert red cell (if appropriate). ✓ Begin staff estimates. ✓ Refine the commander's intent. ✓ Develop the commander's planning guidance.	✓ Review HHQ and MAGTF standing intelligence plans (e.g., Annex B to an OPLAN), pertinent memoranda of understanding, etc. ✓ Determine, coordinate with G/S-6, and establish dissemination procedures and CIS support for immediate intelligence planning and dissemination activities. ✓ Activate intelligence dissemination requirements (IDR) management procedures, databases, etc. ✓ Assist with determination of the MAGTF AO and AOI. ✓ Determine specified, implied and essential intelligence dissemination tasks. ✓ Begin development of proposed intelligence dissemination concepts of operation; coordinate closely with collection and production planners and all supported intelligence officers and intel/CI/recon units; obtain G/S-2 approval. ✓ Identify organic/supporting intelligence dissemination elements & points of contact (POCs) in all subordinate units; determine operational status of each; determine personnel and equipment deficiencies (special attention to CIS resources and capabilities, data management, courier requirements, and distribution). ✓ Identify JTF/multinational

intelligence dissemination CIS

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interoperability issues; provide recommendations.

✓ Establish/review/update the MAGTF intelligence dissemination standard operating procedures (SOPs) and planning and direction tools; special attention to:

➤ Identify intel dissemination support requirements.

Prepare intelligence dissemination planning matrices (e.g., intelligence reports matrix and the dissemination matrix).

➤ Identify external organizations' intelligence dissemination plans and assess against MAGTF's initial requirements; determine deficiencies; initiate augmentation requests (coordinate with the ISC and G-2 plans officer).

✓ Validate/update JTF intelligence dissemination tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and MAGTF intelligence dissemination SOPs (coordinate with HHQ and subordinate units).

✓ Determine, validate and prioritize IDRs; identify deficiencies; special attention to those needed for COA development.

✓ Begin development of intelligence dissemination and CIS plans and modification of intelligence reporting SOPs; issue guidance to intelligence dissemination elements (coordinate with P&A Cell and SARC OICs).

✓ Initiate coordination with the G/S-3 information management (IM) officer regarding COP/CTP concept of operations, reporting, and other IM activities.

✓ Disseminate initial intelligence and CI estimates to subordinate units. Coordinate with P&A Cell OIC and subordinate intelligence officers regarding timelines and procedures for updates.

✓ Coordinate with the ISC, IMO, P&A Cell OIC, IIP and Topo Plt commander identification and

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- initial dissemination of geospatial information and imagery support.
- ✓ Coordinate with the IMO, ISC, and G/S-4 initial map and charts distribution.
- ✓ Coordinate courier dissemination support with the G/S-1.
- ✓ Coordinate with P&A Cell OIC and subordinate units' intelligence officers access to MEF intelligence databases.
- ✓ Activate G/S-2/IOC homepages (JWICS, SIPRNET, SCI-TDN, and S-TDN).
- ✓ Validate database management procedures for all-source and all single-source intelligence databases (coordinate with JTF).
- ✓ Establish initial IDR priorities.
- ✓ Ensure subordinate units' intelligence dissemination POCs kept advised of actions & developments.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

- ✓ Continue intelligence preparation of the battlespace (throughout all steps of the planning process).
- ✓ Array friendly forces.
- ✓ Assess relative combat power.
- ✓ Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities analysis.
- ✓ Brainstorm possibilities.
- ✓ Develop roughcut course(s) of action (COA).
- ✓ Commander's input.
- ✓ COA(s) refinement.
- ✓ COA(s) validation.
- ✓ COA(s) graphic and narrative development.
- ✓ Prepare and present COA(s) briefing.
- ✓ Commander selects/modifies COA(s).

- ✓ Assist the intelligence section and other IOC cells with COA development.
- ✓ Develop an intelligence dissemination concept of operations for each COA; begin preparation of Tabs C, D, and E to Appendix 16 to Annex B.
- ✓ Determine intelligence dissemination capabilities required for each COA. Establish priorities with G/S-2 approval.
- ✓ Submit to G/S-6 detailed, prioritized list of intelligence CIS requirements (G/S-2, IOC, and all organic and supporting intelligence, CI and reconnaissance units).
- ✓ Update IDR priorities.
- ✓ Ensure subordinate units' intelligence dissemination POCs kept advised of pertinent actions and developments.

WARGAMING

- ✓ Conduct COA analysis wargaming.
- ✓ Refine staff estimates and estimates of supportability.
- ✓ Develop concepts based upon
- ✓ Complete intelligence dissemination estimates of supportability for each COA designated by the G/S-2 or ISC.
- ✓ Assist P&A Cell OIC with

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warfighting functions (as required). ✓ Prepare COA analysis brief.

completing the intelligence estimate and the friendly intelligence estimate of supportability.

✓ In coordination with ISC, P&A Cell OIC, and G-2 plans and operations officer, disseminate and manage intelligence support to staff and subordinate units to support COA wargaming.

✓ Continue dissemination management in accordance with current PIRs/IRs and other guidance.

✓ Continue to monitor intelligence operations development and update intelligence dissemination plans.

✓ Ensure subordinate units receive necessary intelligence dissemination planning information; verify understanding; identify/update subordinates current IDRs.

✓ Validate and update MAGTF intelligence dissemination information requirements.

✓ Ensure subordinate units' intelligence dissemination POCs kept advised of pertinent actions and developments.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

- ✓ Evaluation of each COA
- ✓ Comparison of COAs
- ✓ Commander's decision
- ✓ Issuance of warning order
- ✓ Assist G/S-2, ISC and G-2 plans officer with evaluation and comparison of each COA.
- ✓ Continue development of dissemination and CIS plans and intelligence reports management consistent with the selected COA.
- ✓ Supervise intelligence and intelligence operations information dissemination to subordinate, supporting and external intelligence officers and planners to support the selected COA.
- ✓ Update, validate & prioritize IDRs and CIS requirements for the selected COA; issue guidance as appropriate to subordinate elements.
- ✓ Identify, initiate and coordinate intelligence CIS changes to support current operations.

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- ✓ Coordinate intelligence CIS and dissemination element taskorganization needs associated with the selected COA.
- ✓ Continue coordination with the G/S-6 regarding intelligence CIS requirements; coordinate with G/S-1 as necessary for physical couriering of intelligence products to subordinate units; and the G/S-4 for distribution of maps and charts.
- ✓ Continue coordination with the G/S-4 regarding intelligence CIS supply and transportation requirements.
- ✓ Review actions associated with satisfying intelligence CIS and dissemination personnel and equipment deficiencies associated with the selected COA.
- ✓ Ensure subordinate units receive pertinent intelligence CIS and dissemination guidance; verify understanding; identify/update subordinates' current IDRs.
- ✓ Validate and update MAGTF IDRs.
- ✓ Ensure subordinate units' intelligence dissemination POCs kept advised of pertinent actions and developments.

ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

- ✓ Commander's intent is refined.
- ✓ Concept of operations turned into an operations order or a fragmentary order.
- ✓ Staff estimates and other planning documents are updated and converted into operations order (OPORD) annexes and appendices.
- ✓ Commander approves OPORD.
- ✓ Complete development of dissemination and intellience CIS plans and intellience reporting management; ensure copies are provided to subordinate units and they understand.
- ✓ Assist G/S-6 as required with development of Annex K.
- ✓ Assist G/S-3 as required with development of Annex U.
- ✓ Update, validate & prioritize IDRs.
- ✓ Update and issue intelligence CIS and dissemination guidance as appropriate to subordinate elements.
- ✓ Ensure pertinent intelligence products are disseminated to all subordinate units.

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- ✓ Identify, prioritize and coordinate intelligence CIS requirements and support for deployment phases.
- ✓ Complete actions associated with personnel & equipment augmentation, interoperability issues, multinational dissemination, etc.
- ✓ Complete intelligence CIS, transportation and supply actions.
- ✓ Update IDR priorities.
- ✓ Maintain coordination with appropriate external organizations.

TRANSITION

- ✓ Transition brief
- ✓ Drills
- ✓ Plan refinements (as required)
- ✓ Assist intelligence section and ISC with transition brief.
- ✓ Modify intelligence CIS and dissemination plans as necessary.
- ✓ Modify intelligence reporting distribution as necessary.
- ✓ Monitor ongoing intelligence dissemination operations; update and issue orders as appropriate to intelligence elements.
- ✓ Ensure all intel dissemination POCs in JTF, other components, and subordinate units fully understand plans and standing requirements; and ensure they have received necessary intel products.
- ✓ Participate in drills, as appropriate.
- ✓ Monitor situation; PIRs/IRs; and initiate IDR and CIS priorities and actions as appropriate.
- ✓ Remain engaged in MAGTF future plans activities.

Appendix I

MAGTF Intelligence Communications and Information Systems Architectures

Section I

1	
2	

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National	MEE	Intalligance	CIC	Architectures
Monomai	TATTAT.	mitemgence		Aichitectures

Introduction. The graphics in Section I illustrate the intelligence systems communications connectivity and overall intelligence communications and information systems (CIS) architecture for the following:

- The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) main command post C2 nodes and combat intelligence center
- The Intelligence Battalion, its Intelligence Operations Center, and its key subordinate battalion elements
- The Marine Division main command post, Reconnaissance Battalion, and LAR Battalion
- The Marine Aircraft Wing headquarters air combat intelligence center
- The Force Service Support Group headquarters intelligence section and CSSD combat service support operations centers
- The MEU(SOC) amphibious task force intelligence center and select other C2 centers
- Various Marine intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance units

All information shown is notional – the actual CIS architecture used for any operation will be consistent with METT-T, commander's guidance, concepts of operation, and other key factors.

Each graphic is followed by a supporting table. These tables reflect the direction of the communication path for the connection, the communication link designator, addressed in the last table, I-22, "Standard Communications Pathways and Connectivity," and the internal message format that may be used. Table I-22 also contains the type of physical communication link used between systems, the data link layer protocol used, the network layer protocol used, the transport layer protocol used, and the type of message header used in the information exchange. Finally, table I-22 also lists the modem, switch or server, and cryptographic equipment normally used in that communication link or pathway.

1	All figures and supporting tables are organized by the intelligence C2 or intelligence operations node, showing those intelligence
2	systems and communications systems typically employed within each. Again, all information shown is notional METT-T
3	factors as well as variations in unit SOPs will determine the specific intelligence systems and CIS architecture used for a particular
4	operation.
5	
6	In addition to this information, please refer to the organization and responsibilities, the command and control, and the CIS chapters
7	and supporting appendices of the various intelligence series MCWPs for additional information on intelligence, CI and
8	reconnaissance CIS architectures.
9	
10	
11	




Figure I-1. MEF CE Combat Intelligence Center and Intelligence Battalion Intelligence IOC GENSER Systems Architecture

3 4

Systems	MEF IAS	JSWS	IOW	CTT-JTT	TGIL/DGIL	IAS V2	FLTSATCOM	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II STAR-T AN/TSC-85-93
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Intel Bn P&A Cell	Intel Bn P&A Cell	Intel Bn P&A Cell	Intel Bn P&A Cell	TOPO PLT	IIP	ATF COMD & EXTERNAL SYSTEMS	EXTERNAL SYSTEMS
MEF CE P&AC IAS								
Comm Net							TCC to the AN/TSC-96A	
Direction	В	В	В	R	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA01	LA02	LA02	TT01-04, & IB01	LA02	LA01	AU01	SPO1
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, NITF	VDX	Presently proprietary under IBS will be TADIL-J and VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, CADRG,GEOTI F,VPF & OTHERS	OTH-G, USMTF, NITF	OTH-G, USMTF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, NITF
Systems	IAS IOW	J-STARS CGS	IOW	GBS	IAS V2	TCO	GCCS	AFATDS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	VMAQ	Intel Bn J-STARS GRND TM	MEF CE & Radio Bn OCAC	Intel Bn P&A Cell	Intel Bn SARC	MEF CE COC	MEF CE CMD CTR	MEF CE FFC
Intel Bn P&A Cell MEF IAS								
Comm Net	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II							
Direction	В	В	В	R	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	SPO1	LA02	LA02	CD01/LAO2	LA02	LA02	LA02	LA02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G USMTF, VMF, NITF	OTH-G USMTF, NITF, VMF	VDX	MPEG-2, NITF (In SMTP or FTP), NTSC, DVB	OTH-G, VMF, NITF	OTH-G USMTF, NITF	OTH-G USMTF	OTH-G USMTF, VMF

Table I-1. MEF CE CIC and Intelligence Battalion IOC GENSER Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

Systems	CIHEP	TRSS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	CI/HUMINT	Ground Sensor
	Rep in SARC	Platoon
		Rep in SARC
Intel Bn P&A Cell IAS		
Comm Net		
Direction	В	В
Comm Links	LA01	LA01
Internal Message Format	OTH-G,	OTH-G,
	USMTF, NITF	SENREP (In
	& OTHERS	USMTF)

3

Table I-1. MEF CE CIC and Intelligence Battalion IOC GENSER Systems and Communications Interface Requirements (cont.)




Figure I-2. MEF Command Element Combat Intelligence Center and Intelligence Battalion IOC – SCI Systems Architecture

1 2

Systems	MEF IAS	TGIL/DGIL	IAS V2	JDISS	TCAC	TACINTEL	SSCC
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Intel Bn	TOPO PLT	IIP	Intel Bn	MEF CE &	ATF	EXTERNAL
	P&A Cell			P&A Cell	Radio Bn OCAC	SSES	SYSTEMS
MEF CE A&PC							
MEF IAS							
Comm Net						SSCC to the AN/TSC-96A	
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA01	LA02	LA01	LA02	LA02	AU01	AU01
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, CADRG,GEOTI F,VPF & OTHERS	OTH-G, USMTF, NITF	OTH-G, USMTF, NITF	OTH-G, USMTF	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,
Systems	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II SMART-T AN/TSC-85- 93	IAS IOW					
Intel Ops/C2 Node	EXTERNAL SYSTEMS	VMAQ					
Intel Bn P&A Cell MEF IAS							
Comm Net		AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II					
Direction	В	В					
Comm Links	JWOI	JWOI					
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, NITF, SMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, NITF					

Table I-2. MEF CE CIC and Intelligence Battalion IOC SCI Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

Imagery Intelligence Platoon Topographic Platoon E-6C IBS ARL External Systems ---(/ (SC01) (SC02) (TT01-04, IB01,JS01 (PS01-02) J-STARS Ground Team UHF SCR Voice AN/PSO-5 JSTARS CGS AN/TSQ-179 SCDL (LA02 DTC External Interface VHF SCR TDN GATEWAY AN/TRC-170 (SI05) Production and Analysis Cell External Interface (SP01) (SP01) TDN SERVER AN/TSC-120 (UA01-02) (LA02) AN/TSC-93B GCCS WORKSTATION TCO AN/TTC-42 **AFATDS** TCS/GCS MEF Combat MEF CE Force Fires Operations Center VMUCommand Cente

Figure I-3. Intelligence Bn IOC J-STARS CGS Architecture

Systems	TGIL/DGIL	IAS V2	JSTARS	JSTARS	JSTARS	CTT-JTT	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II STAR-T AN/TSC-85-93	ARL
Intel Ops/C2 Node	TOPO PLT	IIP	E-8C	E-8C	E-8C	Intel Bn P&A Cell	EXTERNAL SYSTEMS	
MEF CE								
JSTARS GRND								
TM								
JSTARS CGS								
Comm Net								
Direction	В	В	R	В	В	R	В	В
Comm Links	LA02	LA01	SC02	SC01	AN/VRC-83	TT01-04, IB01	SPO1	PS01-02
Internal Message	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	SAR, MTI, FTI	C2	Voice	Presently	OTH-G,	NITF
Format	USMTF,	USMTF,NITF				proprietary	USMTF, VMF	
	CADRG,GEO					under IBS will		
	TIF,VPF &					be TADIL-J		
Systems	OTHERS MEF IAS	JSWS		TCO	GCCS	and VMF AFATDS	APACHE	TCS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Intel Bn	Intel Bn		MEF CE	MEF CE	MEF CE FFC	LONGBOW	VMU
inter Ops/C2 Node	P&A Cell	P&A Cell		COC	CMD CTR	WIEF CE FFC	LONGBOW	VIVIU
MEF CE	1 4011 0011	T COLL			CIVID CITE			
JSTARS CGS								
GRND TM								
Comm Net								
Direction	В	В		В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA02	LA02		LA02	LA02	LA02	SI05	UA01-02
Internal Message	OTH-G,	OTH-G,		OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	MTI Data	Video
Format	USMTF, NITF	USMTF		USMTF; VMF	USMTF	USMTF; VMF		Telemetry

Table I-3. Intelligence Bn IOC J-STARS CGS Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

2


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Systems	JSTARS CGS		
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Intel Bn JSTARS		
	GRND TM		
Intel Bn JSTARS CGS			
GRND TM			
JSTARS CGS			
Comm Net			
Direction	В		
Comm Links	LA01		
Internal Message Format	Internal		

2

3

Table I-3. Intel Bn IOC J-STARS CGS Systems and Communications Interface Requirements (cont.)



NOTES:

4

1. JWICS/SCI-TDN and SIPRNET/S-TDN must be kept physically separated.



Figure I-4. MEF CE and Radio Battalion OCAC Architecture

Systems	JDISS	CTT-JTT	AN/VRC-92A	AN/PSC-5	AN/GRC231A(V)P	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II SMART-T AN/TSC-85-93	MEF IAS
Intel Ops/C2	MEF CE &	MEF CE &	MEF CE &	MEF CE &	MEF CE & RadBn	EXTERNAL	Intel Bn
Node	RadBn OCAC	RadBn OCAC	RadBn OCAC	RadBn OCAC	OCAC	SYSTEMS	P&A Cell
TCAC							
Comm Net							
Direction	В	R	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA03	TT01-04, IB01	SI02	PS01-02	PR01	JWOI	LA02
Internal Message	OTH-G,	TADIL-J and	USMTF, USSID,	USMTF, USSID,	USMTF, USSID,	USSID, USMTF	USMTF
Format	USMTF	VMF	VMF	VMF	VMF		VMF
Systems		IAS					
Intel Ops/C2		MEF CE P&AC					
Node							
IOW							
MEF CE OCAC							
Comm Net							
Direction		В					
Comm Links		LA01					
Internal Message Format		VDX					

3

Table I-4. MEF CE and Radio Battalion OCAC Systems and Communications Interface Requirements




Figure I-5. Intelligence Bn Imagery Intelligence Platoon Architecture

	1
	J

Systems	TEG	ATARS	ASARS	UAV IMAGERY	ТЅП	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II STAR-T AN/TSC-85-93	IAS V2
Intel Ops/C2	IIP	F-18	U-2	VMU	MEF CE TECH	EXTERNAL	IIP
Node					CON	SYSTEMS	
IIP TEG							
Comm Net							
Direction	В	R	R	R	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA01	AT01	CD01	TC01	SP04	SP01	LA01
Internal Message Format	Internal	E/O,	SAR	NTSC, E/O	NITF., VIDEO	NITF.2, USMTF	OTH-G, VMF, USMTF
Systems	IAS V2	JSWS	MEF IAS	IAS V2	TCO	GCCS	AFATDS
Intel Ops/C2 Node IIP IAS V2	IIP	P&A Cell	P&A Cell	SARC	MEF CE COC	MEF CE CMD CTR	MEF CE FFC
Comm Net							
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA01	LA02	LA01	LA02	LA02	LA02	LA02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, VMF, USMTF, NITF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, NITF	OTH-G, VMF, NITF	OTH-G, VMF, NITF	OTH-G USMTF	OTH-G USMTF	OTH-G USMTF, VMF

2

Table I-5. Intelligence Bn Imagery Intelligence Platoon Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

Systems	TGIL/DGIL
Intel Ops/C2 Node IIP	TOPO PLT
IAS V2	
Comm Net	
Direction	В
Comm Links	LA02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF,
	CADRG,GEOTIF,
	VPF & OTHERS

Table I-5. Intelligence Bn Imagery Intelligence Platoon Systems and Communications Interface Requirements (cont.)




Figure I-6. Intelligence Bn IOC Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell

Systems	MEF IAS	IAS V2	AN/TRC-170	TCC			
			AN/TSC-120				
			TS II				
			STAR-T				
			AN/TSC-85-93				
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Intel Bn P&A	IIP	EXTERNAL	EXTERNAL			
	Cell		SYSTEMS	SYSTEMS			
MEF CE SARC							
IAS							
Comm Net							
Direction	В	В	В	В			
Comm Links	LA02	LA02	SP01	AU01			
Internal Message Format	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G, USMTF,	JANAP 128			
	USMTF, NITF	USMTF, NITF	VMF, NITF	DOI-103			
		151111111111	~~~~~	151111111111	~~~~	~~~~	
IAS	TRSS	MANPACK SIDS	СІНЕР	MANPACK SIDS	СІНЕР	СІНЕР	
INTEL BN SARC	SENSOR	RECON	RECON	LA BN	LA BN	LA BN	
	PLT						
Comm Net							
Direction	Sensor Net						
Comm Links	R	R	R	R	R	R	
Internal Message Format	PR01 / SI04	SP01	SP01	SP01	SP01	SI01	
	SENREP	NITF Imagery	NITF	NITF Imagery	NITF	VMF	
	(USMTF)		Imagery & Tape		Imagery & Tape		

Table I-6. Intelligence BN IOC SARC Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

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



Figure I-7. Radio Battalion C2, Operations and Collection Systems Architecture

Systems	IAS	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120 TS II SMART-T AN/TSC-85-93	TPCS	RREP-SS-1	TPCS	RREP-SS-1	TPCS	TPCS
Intel Ops/C2	Radio Bn	EXTERNAL	RAD BN	RRT	RAD BN	RRT	RAD BN	SUPPORTED
Node	OCAC	SYSTEMS	SSEs & SSTs		SSEs & SSTs		SSEs & SSTs	ORG
TCAC OCAC								
Comm Net			Via AN/PSC-	Via	Via	Via	Via	Via
			5	AN/PSC-5	AN/VRC-92A	AN/GRC231A (V)P	AN/GRC231A (V)P	SSCC
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA03	JWO2	PS01-02	PS01-02	SI02	PR01	PR01	AU01
Internal Message	USMTF,	USSID,	USSID, VMF	USSID, VMF	USSID, VMF	USMTF	USSID, VMF	USSID
Format	VMF	USMTF	USMTF			USSID, VMF		USMTF
System TCAC	MEWSS PIP	MEWSS PIP		IOW	MEF IAS			
Intel Ops/C2 Node OCAC	LAR Bn/Other	LAR Bn/Other		OCAC	Intel Bn P&A Cell			
Comm Net	Via AN/GRC231A (V)P	Via MECDL						
Direction	В	В		В	В			
Comm Links	PR01	ME01		LA02	LAO2			
Internal Message Format	USMTF USSID, VMF	IEWCOMCAT DOI-103 USSID VMF		VDX	USMTF, VMF			

2

Table I-7. Radio Battalion C2, Operations & Collection Systems Interface and Communications Requirements




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Figure I-8. Topographic Platoon, Intelligence Bn, Architecture

Systems	J-STARS	MEF IAS	IAS	IPL	AN/TRC-170 AN/TSC-120	MCGIL	TCC
	LAN				TS II		
					STAR-T		
					AN/TSC-85-93		
Intel Ops/C2	MEF J-	Intel Bn P&A	MEF CE IIP	NIMA	EXTERNAL SYSTEMS	MCISU	EXTERNAL
Node	STARS	Cell					SYSTEMS
	GRND TM						
TOPO PLT							
TGIL/DGIL							
Comm Net							
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA02	LA02	LA02	SP01	SP01	SP01	AU01
Internal Message	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	CADRG,	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,	USMTF
Format	USMTF,	USMTF,	USMTF,	VPF	CADRG,GEOTIF,VPF &	CADRG,GEOTIF,	
	CADRG,GE	CADRG,GEO	CADRG,GEO		OTHERS	VPF & OTHERS	
	OTIF,VPF &	TIF,VPF &	TIF,VPF &				
	OTHERS	OTHERS	OTHERS				
Systems	IAS V2	TGIL/DGIL	MCGIL	DMS	DTAMS	IOW (IAS)	
DTAMS	DIV/WING/	TOPO PLT	MCIA	NIMA		MEU	
GIST	FSSG				GIT		
Comm Net		Via	Via	TCC			
		Multi-channel	Multi-channel				
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	
Comm Links	LA02	SPO1	SPO1	AU01	LA02	LA02	
Internal Message	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,	
Format	USMTF,	USMTF,	USMTF,	USMTF	CADRG,GEOTIF,VPF &	CADRG,GEOTIF,	
	CADRG,GE	CADRG,GEO	CADRG,GEO		OTHERS	VPF & OTHERS	
	OTIF,VPF &	TIF,VPF &	TIF,VPF &				
	OTHERS	OTHERS	OTHERS				

2

Table I-8. Topographic Platoon Systems and Communications Interface Requirements




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Figure I-9. CI/HUMINT Company, Intelligence Battalion, Architecture

Systems	CIT/ITT/HST	IAS SUITE
Intel Ops/C2 Node		DIV/WING/FSSG
CI/HUMINT Co Dets		
Comm Net		
Direction	R	В
Comm Links	VI01,PS03-04,	LA02
	PR01, SI02	
Internal Message Format	IMAGERY,	NITF
_	NITF, VMF	

Table I-9. CI/HUMINT Company Systems and Communications Interface Requirements



2 3

Figure I-10. Ground Sensor Platoon, Intelligence Battalion, Architecture

Systems	IAS .V2			
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Supported	SARC	SARC	
	Unit			
Ground Sensor Plt Dets				
TRSS monitoring				
Comm Net				
Direction	В	В	В	
Comm Links	LA02	SI01	PR01	
Internal Message Format	SENREP	SENREP	SENREP	
	(USMTF)	(USMTF)	(USMTF)	

Table I-10. Ground Sensor Platoon Systems and Communications Interface Requirements




Figure I-11. Division Main Command Post Combat Intelligence Center GENSER Architecture

Systems	MEF IAS.	IAS V2	IAS V1	IAS IOW	IAS V2	IAS V2	JSWS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MEF	Div	Regt	Bn	FSSG	Wing	Div
IAS V2			J			S	
Comm Net							
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	R
Comm Links	SP01	LA01	SP01	EP01	SP01	SP01	DL01
Internal Message	OTH-G,	OTH-G, VMF	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,	NITF
Format	USMTF, VMF		USMTF, VMF	USMTF, VMF	VMF	VMF	Imagery
Comm Net							
Direction	В		В	В	В	В	
Comm Links	PS01-02		PS01-02	PS01-02	PS01-02	PS01-02	
Internal Message	OTH-G,		OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,	
Format	USMTF, VMF		USMTF, VMF	USMTF, VMF	VMF	VMF	
Comm Net							
Direction	В		В	В			
Comm Links	SI01		SI01	SI01			
Internal Message	OTH-G,		OTH-G,	OTH-G,			
Format	USMTF, VMF		USMTF, VMF	USMTF, VMF			
Community No.							
Comm Net	D		D	D			
Direction Communication	B		B	B			
Comm Links	PR01		PR01	PR01			
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF		OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF			

2 3


Table I-11. Division Main Command Post CIC GENSER Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

Systems	CTT/JTT	TCO	AFATDS	DTAMS	MANPACK SIDS	CIHEP	TRSS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Div	Div	Div	Div	Direct Support	Direct Support	Direct Support
IAS V2							
Comm Net							Sensor Net
Direction	R	В	В	R	R	R	R
Comm Links	TT01-04, & IB01	LA02	LA02	LA02	VI01	VI01	PR01 / SI04
Internal Message	TADIL-J and	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	CADRG,	NITF Imagery	NITF	SENREP
Format	VMF	USMTF	USMTF, VMF	ADRG, JPEG,		Imagery & Tape	(USMTF)
				VPF, NITF		· ·	·

2 3 4

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Table I-11. Division Main Command Post CIC GENSER Systems and Communications Interface Requirements (cont.)



2

Figure I-12. Division Main Command Post Combat Intelligence Center Sensitive Compartmented Information Architecture

Systems	MEF IAS.	IAS V2	IAS V2	CTT/JTT	External Commands (SCI)
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MEF (SCI)	Div (SCI)	Wing (SCI)	Div (SCI)	
IAS V2					
Comm Net					
Direction	В	В	В	R	В
Comm Links	JW02	LA01	SP01	TT01-04, & IB01	JW02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	TADIL-J and VMF	USMTF, VMF
Comm Net					
Direction	В		В		
Comm Links	PS01-02		PS01-02		
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF		OTH-G, USMTF, VMF		
Comm Net					
Direction	В		В		В
Comm Links	AU02		AU02		AU02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF		OTH-G, USMTF		OTH-G, USMTF
Comm Net					
Direction	В				
Comm Links	SI01				
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF				

Table I-12. Division Main Command Post CIC SCI Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

Figure I-13. Reconnaissance Battalion Reconnaissance Operations Center and Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Combat Operations Center Architectures

Systems	IAS V2	IAS V1	TCO IOW	MANPACK SIDS	CIHEP	TRSS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	Div	Regt	Bn	Direct Support	Direct Support	Direct Support
IAS IOW						
Comm Net						Sensor Net
Direction	В	В	В	R	R	R
Comm Links	PS01-02	EP01	LA01	VI01	VI01	PR01 / SI04
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, VDX	OTH-G, VMF, VDX	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, VDX	NITF Imagery	NITF Imagery & Tape	SENREP (USMTF)
Comm Net						
Direction	В	В				
Comm Links	SI01	PS01-02				
Internal	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,				
Message Format	VMF, VDX	VMF, VDX				
Comm Net						
Direction	В	В				
Comm Links	PR01	SI01				
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, VDX	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, VDX				
Comm Net						
Direction		В				
Comm Links		PR01				
Internal Message Format		OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, VDX				

Table I-13. Reconnaissance Battalion Reconnaissance Operations Center and Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Combat Operations Center Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

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


Figure I-14. Marine Aircraft Wing Air Combat Intelligence Section GENSER Architecture

Systems	MEF IAS.	IAS V2	IAS V2	IAS V2	IAS V2	IAS IOW	TCO	IOW	DTAMS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MEF	Wing	MAG	Div	FSSG	Squadron	Wing	VMAQ	TOPO GIST
IAS V2									
Comm Net									
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	SP01	LA01	SP01	SP01	SP01	SP01	LA02	LA02	LA02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, VDX	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	VDX, OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, CADRG,GE OTIF,VPF & OTHERS
Comm Net									
Direction	В								
Comm Links	PS01-02								
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF								

2

Table I-14. Marine Aircraft Wing Air Combat Intelligence Section GENSER Intelligence Systems and Communications Interface Requirements




Figure I-15. Marine Aircraft Wing Air Combat Intelligence Section SCI CIS Architecture

Systems	IAS V2	IAS V2	IAS	IAS	DTAMS
			V2	V2	
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MEF	Wing	Div	FSSG	TOPO GIST
IAS V2					
Comm Net					
Direction	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	JW02	LA01	JW02	JW02	LA02
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, CADRG,GEOTIF,VPF & OTHERS

3

Table I-15. Marine Aircraft Wing Air Combat Intelligence Section SCI Systems and Communications Interface Requirements




Figure I-16. VMAQ Squadron Architecture

Systems	IAS V2	IAS IOW	TCO	CTT/JTT to TERPES	TRE to TERPES
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MAG	Squadron	Squadron	Squadron	Squadron
IAS IOW					
Comm Net					
Direction	В	В	В	R	R
Comm Links	SP01	LA01		TT01-04, & IB01	TT01-
Internal Message Format	VDX	VDX	VDX	TADIL-J and VMF	TADIX-B

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Table I-I6. VMAQ Squadron Systems and Communications Interface Requirements





Figure I-17. VMU Squadron Architecture

Systems	IAS V2	IAS IOW	TCO	TCS	UAV to TCS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MAG	Squadron	Squadron	Squadron	Squadron
IAS IOW					
Comm Net					
Direction	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	SP01	LA01		LA02	TC01
Internal Message Format	VDX, NITF	VDX, NITF	VDX, NITF	NITF	Imagery, SAR, I/R, E/O

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Table I-17. VMU Squadron Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

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
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Figure I-18. FSSG Headquarters Combat Intelligence Center Architecture

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Systems	MEF IAS	IAS V2	IAS	IAS	IAS	TCO	CTT/JTT	DTAMS
			V2	V2	IOW			
Intel Ops/C2 Node	MEF	Wing	Div	FSSG	CSSD	FSSG	FSSG	Topo GIST
IAS V2								
Comm Net								
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В	R	В
Comm Links	SP01	SP01	SP01	LA01	SP01	LA02	TT01-04, &	LA02
							IB01	
Internal Message Format	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	OTH-G,	VDX,	OTH-G,	TADIL-J	OTH-G,
	USMTF,	USMTF,	USMTF,	USMTF,	OTH-G,	USMTF,	and VMF	USMTF, VMF,
	VMF	VMF	VMF	VMF	USMTF,	VMF		CADRG,GEO
					VMF			TIF,VPF &
								OTHERS

Table I-18. FSSG CIC Systems and Communications Interface Requirements



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Figure I-19. Combat Service Support Detachment Architecture

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Systems	IAS V2	IAS IOW V1	TCO IOW
Intel Ops/C2 Node	FSSG	CSSD	CSSD
IAS IOW			
Comm Net			
Direction	В	В	В
Comm Links	PS01-02	EP01	LA01
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF
Comm Net			
Direction	В	В	
Comm Links	SI01	PS01-02	
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF	

Table I-19. Combat Service Support Detachment Systems and Communications Interface Requirements

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


Figure I-20. MEU(SOC) Amphibious Task Force Intelligence Center CIC Architecture (Afloat)

Systems	IAS V2	IOW	DTAMS	JSIPS-N	TCO	IOW
Intel Ops/C2 Node	P&A Cell	P&A Cell	GIT	IIP Det	LFOC	SACC
IAS V2						
Comm Net						
Direction	В	В	В	В	В	В
Comm Links	LA02	LA02	LA02	LA02	LA02	
Internal Message Format	OTH-G, USMTF,	VDX	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF,	NITF.2,	OTH-G, USMTF,	OTH-G, USMTF,
	VMF		CADRG,GEOTIF,VPF &	USMTF	VMF, NITF	VMF, NITF
			OTHERS			
Intel Ops/C2 Node	LFOC	LFOC	EXTERNAL & ASHORE MEU			
1			SYSTEMS			
Systems	GCCS	AFATDS				
Comm Net						
Direction	В	В	В			
Comm Links	LA02	LA02	SP01			
Internal Message Format	USMTF, VMF	USMTF, VMF	OTH-G, USMTF, VMF, NITF			

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Table I-20. MEU(SOC) ATFIC CIC GENSER System and Communications Interface Requirements

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Systems	CCT/JTT	EXTERNAL & ASHORE MEU SYSTEMS
Intel Ops/C2 Node	RadBn OCAC/SSES	
TCAC RAWS		
Comm Net		Via MC GCS or other router
Direction	R	В
Comm Links	TT01-04, & IB01	JW02
Internal Message Format	TADIL-J and VMF	USSID, USMTF, VMF, NITF

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Table I-21. MEU(SOC) ATFIC CIC SCI System and Communications Interface Requirements

Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
AN/PRC-104/ AN/MRC-213 or AN/MRC- 231 (HF) (PR01)	Radio Cabling	Host controlled	Host controlled	Host controlled	Host controlled			TSEC/KY-99A MINTERM	AN/PRC-104/ AN/MRC-213 or AN/MRC- 231 (HF)	The KY-99 can act as a modem
AN/PSC-5 (UHF) DAMA 5 Khz (PS03)	Radio Cabling	MIL-STD 188-220A				TCIM				Used with TPCS
AN/PSC-5 (UHF) DAMA 25 Khz (PS04)	Radio Cabling	MIL-STD 188-220A				TCIM				Used with TPCS
AN/PSC-5 (UHF) DAMA 25 Khz (PS02)	Radio Cabling	Host controlled	Host controlled	Host controlled	Host controlled	Imbedded, but can operate with external		ICOM COMPATIBLE W/KYV-5, KG- 84A KY-5 &KY- 99(ANDVT		Allows nominal 16Kbps transmission
AN/PSC-5 (UHF) DAMA 5 Khz (PS01)	Radio Cabling	Host controlled	Host controlled	Host controlled	Host controlled	Imbedded, but can operate with external		ICOM COMPATIBLE W/KYV-5, KG- 84A KY-5 &KY- 99(ANDVT	AN/PSC-5	Allows external encrypted operation w/KL-43C. Nominal 4.8 & 9.6 Kbps
AN/VRC-99 (UHF) MECDL (ME01)	Radio cabling				IEWCOM CAT/ USMTF					AN/VRC-99 Must be provided at both origination and destination site

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Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity

1

Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
AUTODIN (AU01)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	Mode I			DOI-103 Or JANAP 128	TLC-10 or replaceme nt		KG-84, KIV-7 OR EQUIVALENT		This will only be an SCI net when the TCCs are phased out
AUTODIN (AU02)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	Mode II			DOI-103			KG-84, KIV-7 OR EQUIVALENT		This net may continue to be used for lower level USMTF messages.
CDL (CD01)	TGDLS/TD LS OC-3c SONET	ATM			CIGSS ICD-F/A- 18-064				TGDL 137 MHz HR RL 2 channels @42.84 MHz	Data in TIGDL-SI- 101 Interface Specification Used for ATARS, ASARSII & SYERS
Direct Link (DL01)	RS-232				NITF					
EPLRS (EP01)	Via LAN	X.25	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP, DMS, VMF		TDN Server or TDN Gateway	TSEC/ KGV-13 ICOM	EPLRS	LAN connection via TDN
EPLRS (EP02)	EPLRS ADDSI (X.25 Subset) or MIL-STD- 1553B	X.25	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP, DMS, VMF	External to EPLRS		TSEC/ KGV-13 ICOM	EPLRS	Direct connection to EPLRS

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Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity (cont.)

1

Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
EPLRS (EP03)	EPLRS ADDSI (X.25 Subset) or MIL-STD- 1553B	MIL-STD- 188-220B	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	VMF	External to EPLRS must be MIL- STD-188- 220B Compliant		TSEC/ KGV-13 ICOM	EPLRS	MIL-STD-188- 220B
GBS	Via LAN	IEEE 802.3 Ethernet	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	MPEG-2, SMTP, FTP, NTSC		TDN via IP address	KG-75 TACLANE and FAST LANE	UFO	All imagery converted to MPEG-2, Video is DVB converted to NTSC
HAVE QUICK AN/VRC- 83 (HQ01)	Need additional research							TSEC/KY-57 HYP-57/TSEC		
IBS (IB01)	JTT				TADIL-J or VMF			KGV-11 Embedded		The TADIX-B format will be translated into either TADIL J or VMF at the user's direction
Joint Stars (JS01)	To be determined									
JWICS (JW01)	Via LAN	IEEE 802.3	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ FTP		TDN Server or TDN Gateway	KIV-7	AN/TSC- 85/93, TS II, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future. Cannot Be done until TDN is SCI certified

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Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity (cont.)

1

Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
JWICS (JW02)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	PPP, SLIP, 802.3	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ FTP		CGS-100 or other than TDN	KIV-7	AN/TSC- 85/93, TS II, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future
LAN (LA01)	10-BASE-T 10-BASE-5 10-BASE-2 100-BASE- T	Ethernet IEEE 802.3			N/A					Directly linked system
LAN (LA02)	10-BASE-T 10-BASE-5 10-BASE-2 100-BASE- T	Ethernet IEEE 802.3	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP FTP					Indirectly linked system
LAN (LA03)	10-BASE-T 10-BASE-5 10-BASE-2 100-BASE- T	Ethernet IEEE 802.3	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP FTP					SCI Version of LA02
NIPRNET (NP01)	Via LAN	IEEE 802.3	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ DMS/ FTP		TDN Server or TDN Gateway		AN/TSC- 85/93, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future
NIPRNET (NP02)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	PPP, SLIP, OTHER?	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ DMS/ FTP				AN/TSC- 85/93, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future

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Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity (cont.)

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Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
SCDL (SC01) (UP-LINK)	Integrated ADT				C2 Msgs			KGV-8	Ku ADT	
SCDL (SC02) (DOWN-LINK)	Integrated GDT				Real Time MTI/FTI/ SAR			KGV-8	Ku GDT	The GDT receives the data at the CGS
SINCGARS (SI03)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	LAP B	X.25 & Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP	TCIM		TSEC/KY-57 ICOM	SINCGARS	
SINCGARS (SI04)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	Mode 11			DOI-103 or JANAP 128			TSEC/KY-57 ICOM	SINCGARS	Traffic can still be passed with this configuration. It is very similar to radio teletype
SINCGARS (SI05)		See SDD VOL 2	Apache Long Bow	MSIP 000260- 104		IDM				
SINCGARS (SI01)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	MIL-STD- 188-220B	MIL- STD- 2045- 47001/ Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	VMF	Host must provide.		TSEC/KY-57 ICOM	SINCGARS	Host modem must provide the MIL- STD 188-220B protocol and modem
SINCGARS (SI02)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	MIL-STD- 188-220A	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	MTS B, SMTP	TCIM		TSEC/KY-57 ICOM	SINCGARS	

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Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity (cont.)

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Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
SIPRNET (SP01)	Via LAN	IEEE 802.3 on LAN, LAP-B for X.25, or	X.25 & Internet Protocol, or Internet	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ DMS/ FTP		TDN Server or TDN Gateway	KIV-7	AN/TSC- 85/93, TS II, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary. STAR-T & SMART-T in the
CIDDNET	X/' Y ANY	PPP	Protocol	The state of the s	CMED/			WW 7	ANI/EGG	future
SIPRNET (SP02)	Via LAN	IEEE 802.3 on LAN, LAP-B for X.25, or PPP	X.25 & Internet Protocol, or Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ DMS/ FTP		CGS-100 or other than TDN	KIV-7 or compatible	AN/TSC- 85/93, TS II, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future
SIPRNET (SP03)	Via LAN	IEEE 802.3 on LAN, LAP-B for X.25, or PPP	X.25 & Internet Protocol, or Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ DMS/ FTP		CGS-100 or other than TDN	KIV-7 or compatible	AN/TSC- 85/93, TS II, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future Used in SCIF
SIPRNET (SP04)	RS-232, RS-442, or MIL-STD- 188-114	PPP, SLIP, OTHER?	Internet Protocol	Transport Control Protocol	SMTP/ DMS/ FTP		CGS-100 or other than TDN	KIV-7HS	AN/TSC- 85/93, TS II, or DISN STEP	Transmission source may vary STAR-T & SMART-T in the future
TADIX-B (TT01)	CTT/H3/TR E				TADIX-B					No plans to convert to IBS
TDDS (TT03)	CTT/H3/JT T	TDD Unique See CTT ICD A3111338- 003970			Similar to TADIX-B			KGV-11 Embedded	FLTSATCOM or UFO	Will be converted to IBS
TIBS (TT04)	CTT/H3/JT T	TDMA			Bit- oriented Unique			KGV-11 Embedded	UHF Satellite	Will be converted to IBS

2

Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity (cont.)

	ı

Designator	Physical Connection	Datalink	Network	Transport	Message Header Format	Modem	Switch or Server	Crypto	Transmitter	Remarks
TRIXS (TT02)	CTT/H3/JT T	TDMA using HAVE QUICK II algorithm			USMTF		SCIVE	KGV-11 Embedded	GR/CS and CARS	Will be converted to IBS
UAV Video (UA01)	RS-170				Video					I have to determine how to transmit this image
UAV Telemetry (UA02)	RS-422				UAV Telemetry					
VIASAT (VI01)	Radio cabling	PROCOMM & Various others			HUIT & Various others	VIASAT				The VIASAT has been tested using SINCGARS, HF and UHF SCR

2

Table I-22. Standard Communication Pathways and Connectivity (cont.)

Section II

MAGTF Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Reconnaissance Radio Nets

Introduction. The MEF Master Net List is a database that facilitates the MEF's Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System CEOI

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generation. These files are unclassified and consist of every circuit within the MEF and each circuit's emission requirements, as well as grouping, call sign, and call word information. The MEF Master Net List is controlled by the MEF G-6 and is managed by the MEF frequency manager. The MEF Master Net List will be reviewed annually for proposed modifications on the basis of input from commanders. Requests for modification of the Master Net List will be submitted to higher HQ for consolidation and review.

The Master Net List, and thereby CEOI net assignments, should not be modified without the review and approval of the MEF

AC/S G-6.

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Table I-23. Special Characteristics of the Master Net List

The need to maintain consistent, standard radio network terminology demands that MEF radio circuit assignments be regulated.

With the introduction of the Revised Battlefield Electronic CEOI System Master Net List, electronic CEOI information can be

matched to the task organization, edited, generated, and printed for an entire MEF within hours. Unit participation in Master Net

List revisions and compliance are essential to maintaining the currency of this information.

Item	Purpose	Comment
Net number	Reference	Used to provide task organization requirements to higher HO
Net name	Description	Standard net description
Net ID	SINCGARS	000 - 999
Call sign	Call-sign assignment	Yes or No, assigned randomly
Organizational code	Echelon separation	Allows for duplicate net IDs within separate units
Restrictions	Sub-band separation	Allows for restrictive frequency assignments (such as HF day and night)
Frequency	Band assignment	N=None, H=HF, F=VHF, A=VHF-AM, U=UHF, S=SHF, E=EHF
Power	Output power	1-High through 4-Low
Reuse class	Geographic separation	Strategic
Reuse zone	Sub-geographic separation	Tactical
Call word	Call-word assignment	Fixed or random

The following information is an extract showing intelligence, reconnaissance and select key other radio nets that may be established for any operation. It is a planning guide for radio nets that may be established to satisfy MAGTF intelligence CIS radio requirements. As with all intelligence CIS architecture matters, the specific radio nets, operational and functional descriptions, what bands are used, net composition, etc., will be heavily influenced by METT-T, the commander's guidance, concepts of operations, and task-organizations. For the MEF the CMDO officer, assisted by the intelligence systems officer, SARC OIC, and intelligence and reconnaissance units commanders/OICs, is responsible for planning and coordinating radio net support of MEF intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operations. With subordinate unit intelligence section, the intelligence operations officer/air combat intelligence officer usually is responsible for this.

The kinds of services (voice, video, facsimile, data, imagery, etc.) that are required should be determined and adjusted to conform to available resources (personnel, equipment, and frequency/channel avail-ability) and environmental characteristics. The required service will be governed primarily by the tactical situation, terrain features, and distances between stations on the net (with due consideration to equipment inventories and available personnel). Multiple nets of the same type may be established to handle excess traffic volume. These nets would have a number suffix such as 1, 2, and 3 for the primary, secondary, and tertiary circuits

of the same type. The primary net descriptions are given in this section.

Within each net composition, units in *italics* normally participate in the specified net as required. There is no absolute requirement for each unit noted to participate in net composition. Intelligence operations planners and unit CIS officers can use the net composition in this appendix for planning and compiling radio guard charts for operations. Where multiple frequency bands are listed in parentheses following radio net titles, the frequency band that is normally assigned is listed first.

- 1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command Element Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Reconnaissance Nets.
- MAGTF CE nets are established to support the exercise of command and control during combat operations. The type operation, commander's intent, concept of operations, environment, enemy capabilities, and MAGTF task organization will influence which nets are required and established. During amphibious operations the term MAGTF is synonymous with the term landing force. MAGTF CE nets include the following:

1	a. M	AGTF Ground Reconnaissance Command (UHF-SATCOM/HF). Used for command and control of landing force
2	ground	d reconnaissance operations and transmission of collected reconnaissance directly to the MAGTF commander or the
3	MAG	TF CE combat intelligence center (CIC).
4		
5	W	CE
6	W	organic and direct support reconnaissance units
7	W	Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron/detachment
8	W	GCE(s)
9	W	Other units, as required (e.g. radio battalion radio reconnaissance team (RRT), Navy special warfare teams, etc.)
10		
11		AGTF Alert/Broadcast (HF). Used for alert warning traffic or general traffic pertaining to all (or the majority) of the
12	units o	on this net. Messages not of an alert warning type will be consecutively numbered upon transmission.
13		
14	W	CE
15	W	Designated units within the MAGTF major subordinate element(s)
16	3.4	A CORD LA IN THE CARCONATIONING IN 16 11 2 11 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
17		AGTF Intelligence (UHF-SATCOM/HF/VHF). Used for rapid reporting and dissemination of intelligence,
18 19		orative planning of future MAGTF intelligence operations, and command and control of ongoing MAGTF intelligence connaissance operations.
20	and re	connaissance operations.
21	W	CE
22	W	GCE(s)
23	W	ACE(s)
24	W	CSSE
25	W	Organic and direct support intelligence and reconnaissance units
26	W	UAV squadron/detachment
27		
28		
29		
30		
31		
32		

1	d. MAGTF Air Observation (UHF/VHF). Used to coordinate air observation and transmit information from air observers
2	MAGTF elements. May be used to adjust artillery or naval gunfire (NGF) on an emergency basis.
3	
4	w CE
5	w Aerial observer
6	w GCE
7	w FSCCs
8	w Artillery battery FDC
9	w Supporting arms special staff (SASS)
10	
11	e. MAGTF EW Coordination (HF). Used to coordinate electronic attack (EA) and SIGINT activities.
12 13	w CE (G-3/S-3 EWCC)
14	w OCAC
15	w GCAC
	w GCL w TACC
16	w TACC w TAOC
17	W TAOC
18	f. MAGTF Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) Entry (UHF-SATCOM/HF/Multiplex (MUX
19 20	Used to provide the MAGTF commander with an SCI data communication capability with external agencies. The
21	communication path is usually provided by the supported commander (i.e., communications battalion or detachment), and the
22	terminal equipment and personnel are provided by the radio battalion/SIGINT support unit (SSU) special security
23	communications element (SSCE).
24	
25	w MAGTF CE via the radio battalion/detachment special security communication element
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	
32	

1	g. MAGTF Special Intelligence Communications Net External (HF). Used to provide the MAGTF commander with a
2	secure data communications channel for the exchange of SCI. The communications path is provided by the supported
3	commander, and the terminal equipment and personnel are provided by the radio battalion SSCE.
4	
5	w MAGTF CE via the radio battalion/SSU special security communication element
6	w CJTF
7	w CATF
8	
9	h. MAGTF Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Net (UHF-SATCOM/VHF). Used to provide the supported
0	commander with a channel to adjacent Service cryptologic agencies or cryptologic support group. The communications path
1	provided by the supported commander, and the terminal equipment and personnel are provided by the radio battalion/SSCE.
2	
3	w MAGTF CE via the radio battalion/SSU SSCE
4	w Higher HQ, adjacent HQ, and theater and national intelligence/SIGINT agencies
5	
6	i. MAGTF Internal Special Intelligence Communications Handling System Net (VHF/UHF/SHF). Used to provide the
7	MAGTF commander with a secure SCI communications capability with subordinate division/wing commanders through their
8	organic SSCT. The communications path is provided by the supported commander, and the terminal equipment and personne
9	are provided by the radio battalion/SSU SSCE.
0.	
1	w MAGTF CE via radio battalion/SSU SSCE
2	w Division Special Security Communications Team (SSCT)
3	w MAW SSCT
4	
5	j. Radio Battalion/SSU Command and Control Net (HF/VHF). Used to provide the battalion commander/detachment
6	officer in charge with command and control of subordinate elements. The communications path, equipment, and personnel are
.7	provided by the radio battalion.
8	
9	w Radio battalion operations control and analysis center (OCAC)
0	w Radio battalion OCAC liaison teams (OLT), company command elements (CCE), SIGINT support platoons (SSP), ar
1	SIGINT support teams (SST)
2	

1	k. Theater Cryptologic Support Net (HF/UHF-SATCOM). Used to provide rapid exchange of cryptologic information
2	with the cryptologic elements of other organizations. The communications path is provided by the supported commander, and
3	the terminal equipment is provided by the radio battalion/SSU.
4	
5	w MAGTF (radio battalion/SSU)
6	w Adjacent Service cryptologic elements
7	w National cryptologic agencies
8	w Joint/ATF cryptologic agencies
9	
10	l. Radio Battalion CRITICOMM Net (UHF-SATCOM/HF/VHF). Used to provide CRITICOMM facilities to battalion
11	elements that are physically removed from the CP in support of MAGTF units. The communications path is provided by the
12	supported commander, and the equipment and personnel are provided by the radio battalion.
13	
14	w Radio battalion OCAC
15	w Radio battalion/SSU CCE (at least two)
16	
17	m. Radio Battalion/SSU Collection and Reporting Net (UHF-SATCOM/HF/VHF). Used to provide command and control
18	and SIGINT reporting capabilities for battalion/SSU collection operations.
19	
20	w Radio battalion/SSU OCAC)
21	w Deployed collection/direction funding (DF) SSTs
22	
23	n. Radio Battalion/SSU EA Control Net (VHF). Used to provide the direction and control of radio battalion electronic
24	countermeasures assets. The communications path, equipment, and personnel are provided by the radio battalion.
25	
26	w Radio battalion/SSU OCAC
27	w Deployed EA teams
28	
29	
30	
31	

1	o. Radio Battalion/SSU DF Flash Net (VHF). Used to provide the DF control station with a means of broadcasting DF	7
2	flashes to the DF outstations. The communications path, equipment, and personnel are provided by the radio battalion.	
3		
4	w Radio battalion/SSU OCAC	
5	w Deployed DF SSTs	
6		
7	p. Radio Battalion/SSU DF Report Net (VHF). Used for DF reporting from DF outstations to DF control. The	
8	communications path, equipment, and personnel are provided by the radio battalion.	
9		
0	w Radio battalion/SSU OCAC	
1	w Deployed DF SSTs	
2		
3	q. DF Data Net (VHF). Used to exchange DF information between outstations and DF control. The communications par	h,
4	equipment, and personnel are provided by the radio battalion.	
5		
6	w DF outstations/SSTs	
7	w DF control (OCAC)	
8		
9	r. Tactical Receive Equipment and Related Applications Program Data Dissemination System (TDDS). Used to	
0	provide global surveillance information in time for sensor cueing and to provide indications and warning. Data is forward	led
1	from sensor to communications gateways/relays for dissemination to worldwide military users via geosynchronous UHF	
2	satellite links. TDDS data sources include national and tactical sensor systems.	
.3		
4	w Intelligence agencies	
5	w IOC	
6	w OCAC	
.7	w SSES	
8	w ATFIC	
9	w ACE/VMAQ squadron	
0		

1	s. On	-Board Processor/Direct Downlink (OBP/DDL). Used to distribute nationally generated data to operational forces
2		mmanders worldwide. The information delivered directly to tactical users can be used to support indications and
3	warnin	g, surveillance, targeting (including OTH targeting), maneuver, execution, and battle damage assessment.
4		
5		Intelligence agencies
6		IOC
7	W	OCAC
8	W	SSES
9	W	ATFIC
10	W	ACE/VMAQ squadron
1		
12		ACINTEL Broadcast Service (TIBS). Used to provide near-real-time intelligence from an open network of interactive
13		pants by using multiple sensors and sources. The TIBS broadcast uses UHF SATCOM assets for network operation and
14		relay of out-of-theater specific information into the tactical users' AOs. TIBS participants include a wide variety of
15	nationa	al and Service airborne, surface, and subsurface intelligence platforms.
16		
17		JTF, theater, and national intelligence organizations
18		IOC
19	W	OCAC
20	W	SSES
21	W	ATFIC
22	W	ACE/VMAQ squadron
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
29 30		
, ,		

u. Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange System (TRIXS). Used to provide high-accuracy targeting data to 1 multi-Service/joint Services command, control, and intelligence users. The TRIXS network supports full-duplex data and half-2 duplex voice connectivity between user terminals. It is designed to provide in-time intelligence reports that are focused on 3 high-payoff ground threat targets. It is capable of providing maneuver, threat avoidance, targeting, mission planning, and sensor cueing support to commanders at all echelons. The TRIXS network can accept input from up to five intelligence 5 producers (such as the Army Guardrail Common Sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance Low). w JTF, theater, and national intelligence organizations 8 w IOC OCAC 10 SSES 11 w ATFIC 12 w ACE/VMAQ squadron 13 14 v. TACINTEL Net. Used for transmission and reception of sensitive information sensor data and voice among collection and 15 reporting units and detachments of the radio battalion, the MAGTF, and shipboard facilities, TACINTEL is an automated, 16 high-speed data link. 17 18 w JTF, theater, and national intelligence organizations 19 Radio Bn/SSU OCAC 20 w SSES 21 22 w. Rad Bn/SSU Mission Equipment Control Data Link (MECDL) Net (UHF). Used to control, coordinate, and monitor 23 the mission equipment of the MEWSS. This net is used for internal MEWSS operations and for interface and cooperative 24 operation with the Army intelligence and EW common sensor systems. 25 26 w MEWSS EA/SSTs 27 Army Guardrail Common Sensor 28 Army Ground-Based Common Sensor 29 w Army Advanced Quickfix 30 31 32

1	x. Ra	adBn/SSU DF Net (UHF). Used to control, coordinate, and report DF data.
2		
3	W	MEWSS EA/SST
4	W	Radio Bn/SSU OCAC
5	W	Army Technical Control and Analysis Element
6		
7	y. Ra	ndBn/SSU Tasking and Reporting Net (VHF). Used to issue taskings/report results for RadBn elements employing the
8	team p	portable collection system.
9		
10	W	Analyst Subsystem
1	W	Collection outstations/SSTs
12		
13		adio Reconnaissance Command (UHF-TACSAT). Used for command and control of deployed RRTs; reporting of
14	SIGIN	T collection and DF reports.
15		
16	W	RadBn/SSU OCAC
17	W	ATFIC (SSES)
18	W	RRTs
19		
20	aa. T	ROJAN SPIRIT II Net (C and Ku Band SATCOM). Used to receive, report, and disseminate intelligence information
21	over a	special-purpose satellite system.
22		
23	W	MAGTF CE (CIC/IOC/OCAC)
24	W	ATFIC (SSES)
25	W	External intelligence agencies and organizations
26		
27	bb. F	orce Reconnaissance Company Command (HF). Used to exercise command and coordinate administrative and logistic
28	reques	sts of subordinate units.
29		
30	W	Force reconnaissance company reconnaissance operations center (ROC)
31	W	Subordinate units
32	W	Liaison personnel

1		
2		
3		round Sensor Platoon (GSP) Command (VHF). Used for command and control of GSP operations and for the
4	coordi	nation of GSP administrative and logistic support.
5		
6	W	IOC (SARC/GSP liaison and control element)
7	W	GSP/detachment HQ
8	W	Monitoring sites/deployed sensor employment squad (SES)/sensor employment team liaison teams
9	W	Others, as required
10	11 C.	Description N.4 (VIII) Herder and formal description of a second data to a second description
11 12	aa. Se	ensor Reporting Net (VHF). Used as a means for rapid reporting of sensor data to supported units.
13	W	IOC (SARC (net control))
14	W	GSP monitoring sites
15	W	Supported units
16	W	Others, as required
17	••	
18	ee. GS	P Data Transmission (VHF). Used for transmission of sensor data collected by remote sensor sites.
19		
20	W	GSP liaison and control element monitoring sites
21	W	IOC (SARC)
22	W	Remote sensor and sensor relay sites
23		
24		unterintelligence/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Team(s) Command (HF/VHF). Used for command and control of
25		rintelligence teams and subteams, interrogator-translator teams and subteams, and HUMINT exploitation teams
26	operati	ons and the coordination of counterintelligence/HUMINT administrative and logistic support.
27		IOC (CARCIHIMINETILLICA CALLACTURA)
28	W	IOC (SARC HUMINT liaison and control element)
29	W	Counterintelligence/HUMINT company/detachment command post
30	W	Deployed counterintelligence/HUMINT teams and HUMINT support teams (HST)
31	W	Others, as required
32		

1	gg. Co	ounterintelligence/HUMINT Reporting Net (VHF). Used as a means for the rapid reporting of
2	counte	rintelligence/HUMINT data to supported units.
3		
4	W	IOC (SARC (net control))
5	W	Deployed counterintelligence/HUMINT teams and HSTs
6	W	Supported units
7	W	Others, as required
8		

1			
2	2.	Groun	nd Combat Element Intelligence and Reconnaissance Radio Nets
3			
4			vision/GCE Ground Reconnaissance Company Command (HF/VHF). Used for command and control of ground
5			naissance operations and for reporting reconnaissance information from deployed reconnaissance elements/teams to the
6 7		GCE	G-2/S-2 (SARC).
8		w	GCE HQ (G-2/S-2/SARC)
9		W	Reconnaissance units
0		W	LAR units
1		W	UAV squadron/detachment
2		VV	OA v squadron/detaenment
3		b. D	Division/GCE Intelligence (HF/VHF). Used to provide rapid reporting and dissemination of intelligence, collaborative
4			ng of future intelligence operations, and command and control of ongoing intelligence and reconnaissance operations.
5		P	or reverse more operations, and comment and control of ongoing morningened and recommendated operations.
6		w	GCE HQ (G-2/S-2 intelligence operations)
7		w	Infantry units HQs
8		w	Artillery units HQs
9		w	Reconnaissance units
0		w	LAR units HQs
1		w	Tank units HQs
2		w	Assault amphibian units HQs
3		w	Combat engineer units HQs
4		w	Attached/direct support intelligence units (radio battalion SSU, CI/IT teams and HSTs)
5		w	UAV squadron/detachment (remote receive station)
6		w	Attached combat and combat support units
.7			
8			
9			
0			
1			
2			

1	c. Marine Division Defense Special Security Communications System Entry (UHF-SATCOM/HF/MUX). Used to
2	provide the division commander with an SCI data communication capability with external agencies. The communications path
3	is provided by the communications company, and the terminal equipment and personnel are provided by the division SSCT.
4	
5	w SSCT
6	
7	d. LAR Battalion/Company/Platoon Tactical 1 (VHF/HF). Used to exercise command and control of subordinate units.
8	Each echelon has its own tactical command (TAC) net.
9	
10	w Unit HQ
1	w Subordinate units and vehicles
12	w Recovery vehicles (company net)
13	w Liaison personnel
14	w Attached units
15	
16	e. LAR Battalion Command (HF/VHF). Used to exercise command and coordinate administrative and logistic support.
17 18	w Battalion HQ
19	
20	
21 22	w Supporting/attached units
23	f. LAR Battalion Mortar (VHF). Used to request and control the fires of the mortar platoon.
24	2. — 2. — 2. — 1. — 2. — 1. — 2. — 2. —
25	w Forward observer teams
26	w Mortar platoon FDC
27	w Mortar representative at the battalion HQ
28	
29	
30	
31	
32	

1	_	Reconnaissance Battalion Command (HF/VHF). Used to exercise command and coordinate administrative and logistic
2	suppo	rt.
3	***	Decem Dr. DOC
4	W	Recon Bn ROC
5	W	Subordinate units
6	W	Patrols/support aircraft/vehicles
7	W	Supporting units
8	W	Liaison teams at supported units
9 10 11		nfantry Regiment Intelligence (VHF). Used for rapid reporting and dissemination of intelligence, collaborative ng of future intelligence operations, and command and control of ongoing intelligence and reconnaissance operations.
13	W	Infantry regiment HQ
14	W	Infantry battalion HQs
15	W	Intelligence units (radio battalion SSU, CI/IT teams, HST)
16	W	Supporting and attached units
17	w	Regimental observation post
18	VV	Regimental boservation posi
19 20 21		cout-Sniper Command (VHF). Used to exercise command and control of battalion scout-sniper operations and to onnaissance information collected by deployed scout-sniper teams.
22	W	Battalion S-2, S-3 and FSC
23	W	Scout-sniper teams
24		•
25	j. A	rtillery Regiment Radar Telling (VHF). Used to exchange radar intelligence information and for requests for
26	survei	llance of enemy counterfire weapons. May also be used for registration and adjustment of artillery fire.
27		
28	W	Artillery regiment HQ
29	W	Countermortar radar sites
30	W	Artillery battalions and batteries
31		

1	k. A	rtillery Regiment Survey/Metro (VHF). Used to exchange survey, meteorological, and ballistic information and data
2	betwee	en survey teams and artillery units.
3		
1	W	Artillery regiment HQ
5	W	Artillery battalions/batteries
5	W	Survey officers and teams
7	W	Division main command post
3		

1	
2	5. Aviation Combat Element Nets. MAW intelligence, reconnaissance and other select radio nets that are replaced by static
3 4	MUX circuits will remain available as backups.
5	171011 enealts will femali available as backaps.
6	a. Antiaircraft Control (HF/VHF/MUX). Used to control surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries. Types of information
7	passed on this net include: target assignments, fire direction orders, weapons status commands, battery status reports, and
8	progress-of-engagement reports.
9	
10	$\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{T}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{O}\mathbf{C}(\mathbf{s})$
11	w EW/C
12	w LAAD Battery CP/ADCP
13	
14	b. Antiaircraft Intelligence (HF/MUX). Used by SAM batteries to report targets acquired by the battery surveillance rad
15	TAOC passes selected early warning contacts to missile firing units. Combined with the antiaircraft control net when MUX
16	not available.
17 18	w TAOC(s)
19	w Air defense fire units
	w EW/C
20	
21 22	w LAAD Battery CP/ADCP
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	

32 33

c. Combat Information/Detection (HF/MUX). Used to report unidentified or hostile aircraft, including initial contact reports, tracking, amplifying, and final disposition. Multiple combat information/detection nets may be established for multiple 2 TAOCs. 3 4 w TAOC(s) 5 w Early warning/control activities w LAAD Battery CP/ADCP w Air defense fire units 8 w DASC (as required) 9 w MATCD (as required) 10 w TACC/TADC 11 w Other reporting agencies 12 13 d. Ground-Based Data Link (VHF). Used for air defense CP downlink of surveillance information to short-range firing 14 units. 15 16 w ADCP 17 w Short-range air defense 18 w Remote sensors 19 20 e. Tactical Air Request/Helicopter Request (TAR/HR) (UHF-SATCOM/HF/VHF). Used by forward ground combat 21 units to request immediate air support from the DASC. Intermediate ground combat echelons (FSCCs) monitor this net and 22 may modify or disapprove a specific request. The DASC uses the net to brief the requesting unit on the details of the mission. 23 Target damage assessments and HRs may be passed over this net. Multiple TAR/HR nets may be required, depending on the 24 scope of close air support operations. 25 26 w DASC 27 w TACPs 28 w HDC 29 w TAOC 30 w Tactical air coordinator (airborne) 31 w Forward air controller (airborne) 32

1	
2	f. Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Satellite Imagery (SATCOM). Used as an encrypted receive-only circuit to
3	provide a direct readout of real-time satellite imagery from polar orbiting satellites of the Defense Meteorological Satellite
4	Program.
5	
6	w Deployed Marine wing support squadron (MWSS)
7	
8	
9	g. Fleet Multichannel Broadcast (UHF SATCOM). Used as a receive-only circuit on channels 8 or 15 (environmental
10	channels) of the satellite to provide weather bulletins produced by Navy regional centers.
11	w Broadcast from NCTAMS
12	w Deployed MWSS
13	w Deployed W w SS
14 15	h. Goldwing Communications (HF). Used as a secure, in-theater, joint net that may be used for voice traffic but is primarily
1 <i>5</i> 16	for transmitting and receiving alphanumeric weather data.
17	Tot transmitting and receiving diphantametre weather data.
18	w Other-Service meteorological and oceanographic agencies
19	w Deployed MWSS
20	
21	i. Pilot to Metro (UHF). Used for exchange of meteorological information.
22	
23	w Flying aircraft
24	w Weather detachment at EAF
25	
26	j. Tactical Alert (HF). Used for rapid dissemination of air-raid warnings.
27	
28	w MAGTF HQ
29	w GCE/ACE/CSSE HQ
30	w Air control agencies
31	

1	k. Television Infrared Observation Satellites Imagery (SHF). Used as an unencrypted receive-only circuit to provide a
2	direct readout of real-time satellite imagery from the National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration.
3	
4	w Deployed MWSS
5	
6	l. Weather Radar Net (AN/FPS-106). Used as a single-site radar that provides a visual depiction of precipitation and storm
7	structure within a 200-nautical-mile radius of its location.
8	
9	w Deployed MWSS at the EAF
0	
1	m. Wing Intelligence (HF). Used for rapid reporting and dissemination of intelligence information.
2	W ACEC 2
3	w ACE G-2
4	w MAG S-2s
5	w Squadron S-2s
6	
7	n. MAW Defense Special Security Communications System Entry (UHF-SATCOM/HF/MUX). Used to provides the wing commander with an SCI data communication capability with external agencies. The communications path is provided by
8 9	the communications company, and the terminal equipment and personnel are provided by the MAW SSCT.
9	the communications company, and the terminal equipment and personnel are provided by the MAW SSC1.
1	w SSCT
2	WBBCI
3	o. UAV Command Net (HF/VHF/UHF). Used to coordinate UAV activities.
4	or elly communative (111) villy elli). Electic contamate elly activities.
5	w UAV squadron/detachment HQ
6	w GCS
7	w Launch and recovery site
8	w Remote video terminal teams
9	W 214-11-040 (1-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-1
0	
1	
2	

1	p. UAV Primary Uplink Control (G-Band). Used to control air vehicle and payload.
2	
3	w Ground data terminal
4	w Launch and recovery
5	w Air vehicle
6	
7	q. UAV Secondary Uplink Control (G-Band). Used to control air vehicle and payload if primary link control is lost.
8	
9	w Ground data terminal
10	w Launch and recovery
11	w Air vehicle
12	
13	r. UAV Telemetry Downlink (G-Band). Used to provide real-time video display of target area and downlink flight control
14	data.
15	
16	w GCS
17	w Launch and recovery site
18	w Remote video terminal teams
19	w Air vehicle
20	
21	s. Tactical Digital Information Link A (HF/UHF). TADIL-A, also called Link-11, is used to exchange tactical data in real
22	time among ships, aircraft, and shore sites. TADIL-A messages provide navigational data, surface and subsurface tracks, and
23	operational orders. TADIL-A is an encrypted half-duplex system. It can be used on either H single- or dual-sideband or UHF
24	frequencies. The exchange of digital information by TADIL-A is accomplished by net-configured participating units (PUs)
25	under the control of a net control station (NCS). A net can be composed of as few as two Pus.
26	
27	• TAOC
28	• TACC
29	VMAQ squadron/TERPES
30	
31	

t. Tactical Digital Information Link B (VHF/UHF/SHF Multichannel Radio). TADIL-B, multichannel radio (MUX), (also known as Link-11B) is a full-duplex, point-to-point, encrypted system that simultaneously exchanges tactical data between two 2 units capable of TADIL-B. TADIL-B messages provide navigational data, surface and subsurface tracks, and operational 3 orders. Participants on a TADIL-B network, such as TERPES, are called reporting units (RUs). Some RUs are capable of 4 simultaneously linking with several other RUs. Those units that can redistribute the information received from one RU to 5 another RU are called forwarding. • TACC • TAOC 9 • MATCD 10 • VMAQ squadrons/TERPES 11 12 u. Voice Product Net (UHF). The VPN provides a communications means for forwarding nondigital intelligence information 13 to other intelligence and operations elements. 14 15 • TACC 16 TAOC 17 • EA-6B aircraft 18 • VMAQ squadron/TERPES 19 • Other MAGTF external platforms (e.g., Rivet Joint, Compass Call, EP-3). 20 21

1			
2	6.	Comb	at Service Support Element Nets
3			
4			
5			SS Alert/Broadcast (HF). Used for alert warning or general traffic pertaining to all (or a majority) of the units.
6		Messa	ges not of an alert warning type will be consecutively numbered at the time of transmission.
7			
8		W	Unit HQ
9		W	General support group
0		W	Direct support group
1		W	CSS detachments
2			
3		b. F :	SSG/CSSE Intelligence (HF/VHF). Used to provide rapid reporting and dissemination of intelligence, collaborative
4		planni	ng of future intelligence operations, and command and control of ongoing and supporting intelligence and
5		reconn	aissance operations.
6			
7		W	CSSE HQ (G-2/S-2 intelligence operations)
8		W	CSSD combat service support operations centers
9			
0.			

6/5/00

Appendix J

Intelligence Reports Dissemination Matrix Format

Purpose. This appendix provides an example of an intelligence reports matrix, used to ensure MAGTF-wide understanding and efficiency in dissemination of intelligence reports. It may be used as an exhibit to Tab E (Intelligence Reports) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan) to Annex B (Intelligence).

INTEL REPORT	ORIGIN	DISSEMINATION METHOD	VIA	COMMS PATH	MEF G2/IOC FILTER
I MEE ODC ANIC					
I MEF ORGANIC					
EA-6B	XD (A C	D: (D:)/	VIVA O /EEDDEC	C TDM	GARG OCAG (10)
- TACELINTS	VMAQ	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	VMAQ/TERPES	S-TDN	SARC; OCAC (alt)
AIR RECON					
-INFLT RPTS	All A/C	LAN	TACC/MAW	S-TDN	SARC; P&A Cell (alt)
		DSVT	TACC/MAW	Phone	SARC; P&A Cell (alt)
-MISREPS	All A/C	LAN	TACC/MAW	S-TDN	SARC; P&A Cell (alt)
		DSVT	TACC/MAW	Phone	SARC; P&A Cell (alt)
F/A-18D (ATARS)					. ,
-IPIRS	VMFA	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	TACC/MAW	S-TDN	SARC; P&A Cell (alt)
UAV					
-INFLTRPTS	VMU	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)		S-TDN	SARC
		DSVT		Phone	SARC
FORRECON					
-SALUTE RPTs; all other grnd recon rpts	Recon Teams	Printer/LAN	ROC	S-TDN	SARC
other grid recon tpts	Teams	DSVT	ROC	Phone	SARC
GSP		DSVI	ROC	1 none	Britte.
-SENREPS		Printer/LAN			SARC
BEI WEI B		DSVT		Phone	SARC
RADIO BN		DOVI		Thone	Britte.
-TACREPS	SIGINT Spt Teams	Printer (Primary)/ JDISS (secondary)	OCAC	SCI-TDN	OCAC; P&A Cell
CI REPORTS	Spt Teams	3D188 (secondary)			
Various CI	CI Teams	LAN	CI HUMINT Co CP	S-TDN	SARC
Reporting	and HSTs			S IDI	Si iii C
Tiop or time		DSVT		Phone	
ITT REPORTS		_ ~		1110110	
Various ITT	IT Teams	LAN	CI/HUMINT Co. CP	S-TDN	SARC
Reporting	and HSTs	,	02/110//11/11 00/ 01	2 121,	5.2.0
		DSVT	CI/HUMINT Co. CP	Phone	SARC

INTEL REPORT	ORIGIN	DISSEMINATION METHOD	VIA	COMMS PATH	MEF G2/IOC FILTER
THEATER/JOINT					
JOINT STARS					
-RECCEXREPS	JSTARS aircraft	LAN; Printer (Primary)/IAS (secondary)	CGS	4 wire/ KG-84A	SARC; P&A Cell
U2R SYERS					
-RECCEXREPS	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)		4 wire/ KG-84A	SARC
-IPIRS	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)		4 wire/ KG-84A	SARC
U2R EMTI					
-RECCEXREPS (MTI)	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)		4 wire/ KG-84A	SARC; IIP (alt)
U2R ASARS					
-RECCEXREPS	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)		4 wire/ KG-84A	SARC; IIP (alt)
-IPIRs	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)		4 wire/ KG-84A	SARC; IIP (alt)
U2R SIGINT					
-TACREPS	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	OCAC	JWICS; Broadcast	OCAC
-TACELINT	U2R	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	OCAC	JWICS; Broadcast	OCAC
RC-135 SIGINT					
-TACREPS	RC-135	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	OCAC	JWICS; Broadcast	OCAC
-TACELINT	RC-135	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	OCAC	JWICS; Broadcast	OCAC
EP-3					
-TACREPS	EP-3	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	OCAC	JWICS; Broadcast	OCAC
-TACELINT	EP-3	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	OCAC	JWICS; Broadcast	OCAC
REEF POINT					
-IPIRS			OCAC	SI	SARC; OCAC (alt)
-TACREPS			OCAC	SI	SARC; OCAC (alt)
F-14 TARPS					
-IPIRS	CVBG	Printer (Primary) / IAS (secondary)		S-TDN	SARC
INTEL REPORT	ORIGIN	DISSEMINATION	VIA	COMMS	MEF G2/IOC FILTER

6/5/00

			1	1	0/5/00
		METHOD		PATH	
NATIONAL					
Imagery Products	Various	Printer (Primary) / IAS (secondary)	MCISU or IIP	JWICS; SIPRNET	IIP; P&A Cell (alt)
-IPIR	Various	Printer (Primary) / IAS (secondary)	MCISU or IIP	JWICS; SIPRNET	IIP; P&A Cell (alt)
-IR	Various	Printer (Primary) / IAS (secondary)	MCISU or IIP	JWICS; SIPRNET	IIP; P&A Cell (alt)
-TACREP	Various	Printer (Primary) / IAS (secondary)	MCISU or IIP	Phone/IAS	OCAC
-TACELINT	TACSIM (SI)	Printer (Primary) / IAS (secondary)	OCAC	Phone/IAS	OCAC
-TACELINT	GALE Lite	TRAP	OCAC	Phone/IAS	OCAC
EPW/CI/HUMINT					
-Various Reporting	J2X; others	Printer (Primary)/ IAS (secondary)	CI/HUMINT Co. CP	SIPRNET	SARC
REPORTS					
-INTSUMS	External	LAN/IAS	P&A Cell	SIPRNET	P&A Cell
	Internal	LAN Homepage	P&A Cell	S-TDN	P&A Cell
-INTREPS	External	LAN/IAS	P&A Cell	SIPRNET	P&A Cell
	Internal	LAN Homepage	P&A Cell	S-TDN	P&A Cell
-RRFIs		LAN/IAS	P&A Cell	JWICS; SIPRET alt	P&A Cell; SARC (alt)
-TARGET LIST	P&A Cell	IAS/RAAP	P&A Cell	S-TDN or SIPRNET	P&A Cell
-Consolidated BDA (First Phase)	P&A Cell	IAS	P&A Cell	S-TDN or SIPRNET	P&A Cell

1

1	Appendix K
2	
3	MAGTF Intelligence Dissemination Plan Format
4	
5	
6	Purpose. Tab C (Intelligence Dissemination Plan) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations
7	Plan) to Annex B (Intelligence) should explain how intelligence dissemination elements under
8	the command or supporting the MAGTF will be used to support this plan. Additionally, it
9	provides basic guidance and direction to subordinate commanders and intelligence officers for
10	the conduct of MAGTF intelligence dissemination operations and the support of intelligence
11	elements and personnel identified to fulfill the intelligence dissemination requirements in support of this plan.
12 13	or this plan.
14	
15	CLASSIFICATION
16	
17	Copy no of copies
18	Issuing Unit
19	PLACE OF ISSUE
20	Date/time group
21	Message reference number
22	
23	Tab C to APPENDIX 16 (INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLAN) TO ANNEX B
24	(INTELLIGENCE) TO MAGTF OPORD X ()
25	Intelligence Dissemination Plan (U)
26	
27	() REFERENCES : Identify organic DoD, DIRNSA, NIMA, and other directives; combatant
28	commander, JTF, JFMCC/JFLCC/JFACC or other higher authorities' operations orders, tactics,
29	techniques, and procedures (TTP), and standard operating procedures (SOP) for intelligence
30	dissemination operations; formats; and any other relevant documents that pertain to anticipated intelligence dissemination operations.
31 32	interrigence dissemination operations.
33	1. () SITUATION
34	
35	a. () <u>Define the Area of Operations (AO) and Area of Interest (AOI)</u> . Describe the limits
36	of the AO and AOI. Summarize pertinent weather, terrain, and other AO characteristics and
37	conditions as they may influence the conduct of intelligence dissemination operations.
38	
39	b. () Enemy. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and current intelligence estimates for threat
40	capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, and order of battle pertinent to intelligence dissemination
41	operations.
42	
43	c. () <u>Assigned MAGTF Organic and Supporting Intelligence Dissemination Assets</u> .
44	Identify organic and supporting forces available to perform intelligence dissemination functions.

1	
2	d. () Assumptions. (Derived during the mission analysis step of the Marine Corps
3	planning process.)
4	
5	e. () Intelligence Dissemination Considerations. List key intelligence dissemination, CIS
6	and interoperability considerations which impact this OPLAN or OPORD.
7	
8	(1) () Availability of national and commercial intelligence and multi-purpose CIS
9	resources.
10	
11	(2) () Intelligence C2 and dissemination support to and from JTF/Component
12	Headquarters and other external commands and intelligence organizations.
13	
14	(3) () Creation and manning of forward intelligence C2 and operations elements.
15	(e) () e
16	2. () MISSION . State concisely the intelligence dissemination mission as it relates to the
17	command's planned operations.
18	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
19	3. () EXECUTION
20	
21	a. () Concept of Operations. Summarize pertinent command relationships, task-
22	organization, main and supporting efforts, and the scope of MAGTF and supporting intelligence
23	dissemination operations. Reference the unit's intelligence SOP and Appendix 16 (Intelligence
24	Operations Plan) to Annex B. Restate as appropriate the commander's intent and pertinent
25	aspects of the unit's overall concept of operations as they relate to intelligence operations.
26	Outline the purpose and concept of intelligence dissemination operations, specified priorities,
27	and summarize the means and agencies to be employed to support the operations and intelligence
28	concepts of operations. Address the integration of JTF, other components, theater, national, and
29	allied forces' intelligence operations, dissemination, and CIS support.
30	uniou iorees interngence operations, also enimation, and eas support
31	b. () Dissemination Tasks for Intelligence Units and Organizations, Subordinate Units, and
32	Detachment Commanders/OICs.
33	Demonstration Communication Cress.
34	(1) Orders to Subordinate, Attached, and Supporting Units. Use separate subparagraphs
35	to list detailed instructions for each unit conducting intelligence-related dissemination operations,
36	including the originating headquarters, subordinate commands, and separate intelligence support
37	units.
38	
39	(a) () Marine Division(s)
40	(, () 2.20200(0)
41	(b) () Marine Aircraft Wing(s)
42	(-) () 1m.m
43	(c) () Force Service Support Group(s)
44	

1	(d) () Commanding Officer, Intelligence Battalion/Intelligence Support
2	Coordinator
3	
4	<u>1</u> () OIC, Support Cell
5	
6	2 () OIC, Production & Analysis Cell
7	
8	<u>3</u> () OIC, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell
9	A () Intallianna Crystoma Officer
10	<u>4</u> () Intelligence Systems Officer
11 12	5 () Commanding Officer, CI/HUMINT Company
13	<u>5</u> () Commanding Officer, Cl/HOMINT Company
14	<u>6</u> () Platoon Commander, Imagery Intelligence Platoon
15	<u>o</u> () Thitoon communer, magery memgence ration
16	7 () Platoon Commander, Topographic Platoon
17	_ (
18	8 () OIC, Joint STARS Common Ground Station
19	
20	(e) () Commander, Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit (if tasked to support)
21	
22	(f) () Commanding Officer, VMU Squadron
23	
24	(g) () Commanding Officer, VMAQ Squadron
25	
26	(h) () Commanding Officer, Radio Battalion
27	(i) () Commonding Officer Force Reconneissance Company
28	(i) () Commanding Officer, Force Reconnaissance Company
29 30	(j) () OIC, National Intelligence Support Team (if attached)
31	(j) () Oic, National Intelligence Support Team (if attached)
32	(2) () Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Provide separate
33	numbered subparagraphs pertaining to each unit not organic, attached, or supporting and from
34	which intelligence CIS support is requested, including other components, JTF headquarters,
35	allied or coalition forces, theater, and national operational and intelligence elements.
36	8
37	c. () Coordinating Instructions. Reference Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan),
38	Annex K (CIS), Annex J (C2), and command and other pertinent forces' and organizations'
39	intelligence and counterintelligence SOPs. Detail here or in supporting tabs key changes to unit
40	SOPs. Additional topics to include or emphasize here are: requesting CIS and dissemination
41	support, timely reporting procedures for intelligence CIS problems, coordinating switchover to
42	backup dissemination paths, intelligence operations, C2, and CIS hand over between command
43	echelons, etc.
44	
45	(1) () General Dissemination Guidance and Procedures. Use separate subparagraphs

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1 to list detailed instructions for routine and time-sensitive dissemination, precedence of transmissions, predetermined recipient lists, general and specific broadcast parameters, reporting 2 thresholds and reporting filters. 3 4 (2) () Intelligence Reporting Criteria 5 6 (3) () Resource Allocation. Discuss dissemination resource allocation between both 7 the main and supporting efforts, and between support to current operations and support to future 8 9 operations. 10 11 (4) () Intranet Management. List detailed instructions for homepage and database management, to include authorities for posting, updating, and removing information and 12 intelligence. 13 14 15 (5) () Common Operational Picture/Common Tactical Picture. List detailed instructions for track data and auto-forwarding, broadcast times, and boundary/track ownership 16 responsibilities. 17 18 19 (6) () Formats and Standardization. Provide formats for internal and external MAGTF intelligence dissemination and reporting, preformatted templates, and/or where to find these 20 referenced elsewhere in the OPLAN. Include standards and limits on size and composition of 21 files attached to e-mail. 22 23 24 4. () ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 25 a. () Logistics. Reference Annex D (Logistics). Identify intelligence dissemination 26 logistics requirements and concerns, such as: unique combat service support requirements 27 (batteries, unique replacement parts), procedures, and other guidance to support MAGTF 28 29 intelligence units and operations; procedures for specialized technical logistics support necessary from external organizations; map distribution; requirements for courier runs; etc. 30 31 32 b. () Personnel. Identify personnel requirements and concerns that affect intelligence dissemination operations and support (systems administrators, global sourcing requirements, 33 34 etc.). 35 5. () COMMAND AND CONTROL 36 37 38 a. () Command Relationships. Reference Annex J (Command Relationships). Provide any instructions necessary regarding MAGTF command relationships that will influence 39 intelligence operations and dissemination support. 40 41 b. () Information Management. Reference Annex U (Information Management), Annex C 42 (Operations) and Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan). Provide any instructions necessary 43 regarding information management (time-sensitive and routine reporting criteria, intelligence 44

1	databases, reports, etc.) that will influence MAGTF intelligence dissemination, reporting, and
2	other operations.
3	
4	c. () Communications and Information Systems. Reference Appendix 16 (Intelligence
5	Operations Plan) and Annex K (CIS). Provide any instructions necessary regarding CIS that will
6	influence MAGTF intelligence dissemination operations. List intelligence dissemination
7	priorities (by operational phase, intelligence units, intelligence operations and C2 nodes,
8	intelligence activities – whichever approach is most effective for the operation).
9	
10	d. () <u>Intelligence C2 Nodes and Facilities</u> . Reference the unit's SOP and Appendix 16
11	(Intelligence Operations Plan). Provide any guidance and instructions necessary regarding
12	establishment and operation of intelligence C2 nodes and facilities and dissemination support
13	and priorities to these, to include, at a minimum: G/S-2 elements within future plans, future
14	operations, current operations, and force fires centers; IOC's Support Cell, SARC and P&A Cell
15	CI/HUMINT Company CP; reconnaissance operations center; OCAC; command element tactical
16	or rear echelons; and intelligence liaison elements.
17	
18	<u>Tabs</u> (as required)
19	
20	A Intelligence Dissemination Flow Diagram(s) (See figure 4-1 for one example.)
21	
22	B Intelligence Dissemination Requirements Matrix (See figure 4-2 for one example.)
23	
24	